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Abstract
In this thesis, I focus on scalar implicatures, presuppositions and their connections. In
chapter 2, I propose a scalar implicature-based account of neg-raising inferences, standardly
analyzed as a presuppositional phenomenon (Gajewski 2005, 2007). I show that an approach
based on scalar implicatures can straightforwardly account for the differences and similarities
between neg-raising predicates and presuppositional triggers.
In chapters 3 and 4, I extend this account to “soft” presuppositions, a class of
presuppositions that are easily suspendable (Abusch 2002, 2010). I show how such account
can explain the differences and similarities between this class of presuppositions and other
presuppositions on the one hand, and scalar implicatures on the other. Furthermore, I discuss
various consequences that it has with respect to the behavior of soft presuppositions in
quantificational sentences, their interactions with scalar implicatures, and their effects on the
licensing of negative polarity items.
In chapter 5, I show that by looking at the interaction between presuppositions and scalar
implicatures we can solve a notorious problem which arises with conditional sentences like (1)
(Soames 1982, Karttunen and Peters 1979). The main issue with (1) is that it is intuitively not
presuppositional and this is not predicted by any major theory of presupposition projection.
(1) I’ll go, if you go too.
Finally, I explore in more detail the question of which alternatives should we consider in the
computation of scalar implicatures (chapter 6). Traditionally, the answer has been to consider
iii
the subset of logically stronger alternatives than the assertion. Recently, however, arguments
have been put forward in the literature for including also logically independent alternatives. I
support this move by presenting some novel arguments in its favor and I show that while
allowing new alternatives makes the right predictions in various cases, it also causes an under-
and an over-generation problem. I propose a solution to each problem, based on a novel
recursive algorithm for checking which alternatives are to be considered in the computation of
scalar implicatures and the role of focus (Rooth 1992, Fox and Katzir 2011).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The utterance of a sentence like (1a) typically gives rise to the inferences in (1b) and (1c).
(1) a. Not every student read Frank’s book on conditionals.
b. Some student read Frank’s book on conditionals.
c. Frank has a book on conditionals.
(1a) and (1b) exemplify a scalar implicature and a presupposition, respectively, two of the most
prominent inferences that we draw from sentences. These inferences lie at the core of our se-
mantic and pragmatic competence, our capacity of understanding and producing meanings in
interaction with the context of a given conversation. Their investigation is therefore relevant to
the question of the division of labor between pragmatics and grammar, the interplay between
content and context, and compositional and non-compositional aspects of meaning. While re-
search on scalar implicatures and presuppositions has always been central to formal semantics
and pragmatics, it is currently undergoing a particularly intense phase: many new theories in
both areas have brought along with them radical reconsiderations of the issue of the relation
between what should be part of the grammar and what should be attributed to pragmatics, re-
opening old questions and raising new ones. In this thesis, I follow these recent developments
and investigate scalar implicatures and presuppositions by focusing in particular on three ideas
that have recently been put forward in the literature and which challenge the traditional bound-
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aries between them. The first one is the proposal that some presuppositions should be given
an account based on lexical alternatives (Abusch 2002, 2010, Simons 2001). The second idea
is that the behavior of the inferences associated with strong scalar terms like every is in vari-
ous ways analogous to that of presuppositions raising the possibility of analysing the latter as
scalar implicatures of a sort (Chemla 2009a, in preparation). The third idea is a partial answer
to the question of where presuppositions come from, sometimes called the ‘triggering problem’
(Abrusa´n 2011b,a). Building on these three ideas, I propose a scalar implicature-based account
of the so-called ‘neg-raising’ inferences (e.g., the inference from (2a) to (2b)), standardly ana-
lyzed as a presuppositional phenomenon (Gajewski 2005, 2007).
(2) a. John doesn’t think that Bill is in town.
b. John thinks that Bill isn’t in town.
In particular, I show that an approach based on scalar implicatures can straightforwardly account
for the differences between neg-raising inferences and presuppositions, while also accounting
for their similarities (CHAPTER 2). In CHAPTERS 3-4, I then extend this scalar implicature-
based account to the presuppositions of ‘soft’ triggers, a class of triggers which give rise to
presuppositions that are particularly weak and context dependent (Abusch 2002, 2010). I show
that in connection with the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures (Chierchia et al. to appear
among others) this proposal can account for the differences and similarities between the pre-
suppositions of soft triggers, ‘soft presuppositions’ henceforth, and other presuppositions on the
one hand, and scalar implicatures on the other. Furthermore, I discuss a variety of consequences
that this proposal has with respect to the behavior of soft presuppositions in quantificational sen-
tences, their interactions with scalar implicatures, and their effect on the licensing of negative
polarity items (NPIs). Finally I adopt and adapt Abrusa´n’s (2011a) solution to the triggering
problem in order to give a principled answer to the question of where the lexical alternatives
of soft triggers come from. In other words, I propose that in the case of the presuppositions
of soft triggers the triggering problem should be reduced to another problem in the literature,
which is where alternatives come from (Chemla in preparation, Katzir 2007, Fox and Katzir
2
2011, Swanson 2010).
Another thread running through this thesis is the exploration of an exhaustification based
approach to scalar implicatures and its consequences. In particular, in addition to providing an
account of neg-raising inferences and soft presuppositions, I show in CHAPTER 5 that it can
also provide a solution to a notorious problem concerning the behavior of certain presupposi-
tions in the antecedent of sentence-final conditionals and other quantificational constructions.
The problem was first noticed by Karttunen and Peters (1979) and Soames (1982) and is exem-
plified by sentences like (3). The main issue with (3) regards the fact that it is intuitively not
presuppositional but this is not accounted for by any theory of presuppositions which correctly
predict that presuppositions generally project out of the antecedents of conditionals.
(3) I’ll go, if you go too.
Finally, I zoom in on alternatives and I explore in more detail the question of which alternatives
should we consider in the computation of scalar implicatures (CHAPTER 6). More precisely,
scalar implicatures are standardly assumed to arise as negations of a subset of the alternatives
of a particular sentence. The question is how should we define this subset. Traditionally, the an-
swer has been to consider the subset of alternatives that are more informative - that is, logically
stronger - than the assertion. Recently, however, arguments have been put forward in the liter-
ature for including also logically independent alternatives. I support this move by presenting
some novel arguments in its favor and then show that while allowing new alternatives makes
the right predictions in various cases, it also causes an under- and an over-generation problem.
I propose a solution to each problem, based on a novel recursive algorithm for checking which
alternatives are to be considered in the computation of scalar implicatures and the role of focus
in the computation of scalar implicatures (Rooth 1992, Fox and Katzir 2011 among others).
Before a more detailed overview of the chapters of this thesis, I turn now to sketch the version
of the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures that I adopt throughout the thesis.
3
1.1 The grammatical theory of scalar implicatures
In the neo-Gricean approach, implicatures arise through reasoning about what the speaker said
and what she could have said instead. This reasoning takes as input the output of compositional
semantics and, on the basis of general considerations about rational interactions, it outputs scalar
implicatures. In recent years, this approach has been challenged, in particular in its ability to
account for when scalar implicatures appear embedded, when they appear to be obligatory and
when they appear to interact with polarity items. Each of these cases has been taken as an ar-
gument for treating them as part of grammar, computed recursively within the compositional
side of meaning (Chierchia 2004, Chierchia et al. To appear, Chierchia to appear, Fox 2007,
Magri 2011a). In response to these new proposals substantially refined versions of the standard
approaches have been developed (Sauerland 2004, van Rooij and Schulz 2004, Spector 2007b,
Geurts 2010, Russell 2012. I will not review this debate here, for discussion and new argu-
ments in favour of the grammatical approach see Fox 2012a and Sauerland 2012; for a recent
dissenting view see Russell 2012).
In the following, I adopt a version of the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures. In this
theory scalar implicatures arise as entailments of sentences which contain one or more silent
exhaustivity operator (Chierchia et al. To appear, Fox 2007 and Magri 2010a among others).1
This grammatical approach to scalar implicatures will be crucial in particular in the account
of intervention effects of soft presuppositions in the licensing of NPIs and in the interactions
between soft presuppositions and scalar implicatures (CHAPTER 4). In the following, I review
the main ingredients of this approach, starting from the notion of alternatives.
1.1.1 Alternatives
Implicatures like the one in (1c) above are called “scalar” because they correlate with the pres-
ence of words or expressions (“scalar items”) that may be viewed as part of an informational
1See Franke (2011) for a useful comparison between this type of exhaustification-based theories of scalar impli-
catures and others that do not employ syntactically realized exhaustivity operator like van Rooij and Schulz (2004),
Schulz and Van Rooij (2006) and Spector (2006).
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scale (Horn 1972, Gazdar 1979, Sauerland 2004 among many others). Where such alternatives
come from is an open question, on which I remain neutral (Katzir 2007, Fox and Katzir 2011,
Swanson 2010), although I will propose a partial answer to it in the case of the alternatives of
soft triggers. I assume that certain items are associated with a set of lexical alternatives and
adopt a theory of how they grow to become alternatives of more complex expressions contain-
ing them. For concreteness, I make use the formulation of alternatives’ growth in (4) and (5),
adapted from Chierchia 2004.
(4) Basic Clause: For any lexical entry α, Alt(α)2 =
a. {[[α]]} if α is lexical and does not belong to a scale3
b. {[[α1]] ... [[αn]]} if α is lexical and part of a scale 〈[[α1]]...[[αn]]〉
(5) Recursive Clause (pointwise functional application)
a. Alt(β(α)) = {b(a) : b ∈ Alt(β) and a ∈ Alt(α)}
To illustrate, consider a scalar item like every, which is standardly assumed to be associated
with the set of lexical alternatives in (7).4
(7) Alt(every) = {every, some}
2Where Alt is a function from expressions to a set of interpretations
3Where a ‘scale’ is a set of expressions partially ordered by generalized entailment.
4An alternative formulation based on Logical Forms rather than interpretations is proposed in Klinedinst 2007
and is summarized in (6a) and (6b).
(6) For any expression α, the set of alternatives to α, indicated as Alt(α) is:
a. {α1...αn} if α is lexical and part of a scale 〈α1...αn〉
{α} if α is lexical and not part of a scale
b. {[β ′γ ′] : β ∈ Alt(β)∧ γ ′ ∈ Alt(γ)}, if α = [βγ]
What (6) says is that the alternatives to a complex structure is the set of all possible combinations of replacements
of alternatives to lexical items contained in that structure.
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Given the definition above, we are now in a position to compute the alternatives of any complex
sentence containing every. For instance, the alternatives of (8a) are predicted to be those in (8b),
while the alternatives of (9a), those in (9b).
(8) a. Every student came.
b. {every(student)(came), some(student)(came)}
(9) a. Not every student came.
b. {¬[every(student)(came)], ¬[some(student)(came)]}
1.1.2 A covert only
The assumption of silent operators in the grammar is a common strategy in the account of a
variety of phenomena. For instance, in the literature on plurality, a silent distributivity operator
with a meaning akin to each is assumed in order to account for the fact that a sentence like (12)
is ambiguous between the readings in (13a) and that in (13b). These readings can be obtained
by giving different scope to the indefinite a student and this silent each operator.5
(12) Bill and Sue met a student.
(13) a. Bill met a student and Sue met a student.
b. There is a student that Bill and Sue both met.
Analogously, in the grammatical approach to scalar implicatures, a covert exhaustivity opera-
tor EXH, with a meaning akin to overt only is postulated. The semantics of only is generally
5To illustrate, consider the simplified meaning for the distributive operator in (10).
(10) [[EACH]] = λPλx.∀y ∈ x[P(y)]
The meanings that we obtain by scoping the EACH operator below or above the indefinite are (11a) and (11b),
respectively, which correspond to the two readings of (12) in (13a) and (13b).
(11) a. ∀y ∈ [[Bill and Sue]]∃z[student(z)∧meet(y, z)]
b. ∃z[student(z)∧ ∀y[y ∈ [[Bill and Sue]] → meet(y, z)]
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assumed to be that in (14): a function from a proposition p and a set of alternatives C to the
negation of an excludable subset of C, only defined if p is true (see Rooth 1992, Beaver and
Clark 2009 among many others).6
(14) [[onlyC]](p) = λw : p(w).∀q ∈ Excl(p)[¬q(w)]
The exhaustivity operator is defined as the non-presuppositional variant of only in (15). Like
only it takes a proposition p and a set of alternatives as arguments and it outputs the negation of
an excludable subset of the alternatives. However, instead of presupposing p, it asserts the truth
of p.
(15) [[EXHAlt(p)]](p) = λw.p(w)∧ ∀q ∈ Excl(p)[¬q(w)]
The question, at this point, is how to define the notion of excludable alternatives. The standard
definition is in (17), whereby the excludable alternatives are all and only the ones that are
strictly stronger than the prejacent. In CHAPTER 6, I argue that we should move to a notion of
exclusion, which, instead, also excludes logically independent alternatives as in (18).7
(17) Exclst(p) = {q ∈ Alt(p) : q ⊂ p}
(18) Exclnw(p) = {q ∈ Alt(p) : λw[¬qw] ∩ p 6= ∅}
Once the exhaustivity operator is assumed, scalar implicatures can be derived as entailments of
sentences whose LFs contain one or more exhaustivity operator. To illustrate, consider the case
6Following the notation of Heim and Kratzer (1998) I indicate presuppositions as definedness conditions of
functions, so that λφ : ψ . χ means the function from φ to χ defined only if ψ.
7I am assuming a notion of entailment appropriately generalized to types that ‘end in t’ as defined in (16a) and
(16b).
(16) cross-categorial entailment
a. For any p and q of type t, p ⊆ q iff p→ q
b. For any f and g of type 〈τ, t〉 and any a1, ...,an of type τ,
f ⊆ g iff f(a1), ..., f(an) ⊆ g(a1), ...,g(an)
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in (19a) and let us go through how we can derive the inference in (19b).
(19) a. Not every student came.
b. Some student came.
Assuming the LF in (20a), we obtain (19b) via the exhaustification of (19a) with respect to its
alternatives in (20b). This is shown in (21).8
(20) a. EXH[not[every student came]]
b. Alt(20a) =
{
¬[every],¬[some]
}
(21) [[EXH[not[every student came]]]](w) =
[[EXH[not[every student came]]]](w)∧ ∀ψ ∈ Excl(¬every)[¬ψw] =
¬every∧ ¬¬some =
¬every∧ some
1.1.3 Excludable Alternatives
I defined the notion of excludable alternatives as in (22): all alternatives that can be consistently
negated with the assertion.
(22) Exclnw(φ) = {ψ ∈ Alt(φ) : λw[¬ψw] ∩ φ 6= ∅}
This definition, however, runs into problems in the case of a disjunction like (23), assuming
the alternatives in (24) (Sauerland 2004). Indeed, if we were to simply negate all alternatives
in (24) we would get a contradiction: all alternatives but the assertion are non-weaker, in fact
stronger, than the assertion. Therefore, negating them all would give us that Paul or Sue came
and that not both of them came and also that Paul didn’t come and that Sue didn’t come. As it
is easy to see all these conjuncts cannot be true together.
8This kind of scalar implicatures arising from the strongest element of the scale has been called “indirect scalar
implicatures” by Chierchia (2004) and “negative implicatures” by Chemla (2009c).
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(23) Paul or Sue came
(24) Alt =

paul or sue
paul
sue
paul and sue

We need to refine (22) in such a way that a contradiction is avoided in cases like (23). I adopt
the notion of innocent exclusion by Fox (2007).9 The basic idea is that we want to exclude
as many as non-weaker alternatives as possible, without making an arbitrary choice between
them. The definition of innocently excludable alternatives is as follows: firstly, we define a
notion of CONSISTENTLY EXCLUDABLE SUBSETS of the alternatives, that are constituted by
the alternatives that can be consistently negated with the assertion.10
(25) A subset X = {ψ1,ψ2, ...} of the set of alternatives Alt(φ) is a CONSISTENTLY EX-
CLUDABLE subset with respect to φ iff φ∧ ¬ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2... is not a contradiction.
Secondly, we are interested in the MAXIMAL ones among these subsets.
(26) A subset X ⊆ Alt(φ) is called a MAXIMAL CONSISTENTLY EXCLUDABLE subset of
Alt(φ)with respect toφ iff there is no consistently excludable superset of X inAlt(φ)
Finally we are in a position to define the INNOCENTLY EXCLUDABLE SUBSET of the alter-
natives, that is Exclie, as all the alternatives in the intersection of all maximal consistently
excludable subsets.
(27) Exclie(φ) is the intersection of all maximal consistently excludable subsets ofAlt(φ)
9see Chierchia (to appear) for an alternative approach.
10The way of presenting innocent exclusion here is that in Magri 2010a, see also Fox 2007, Franke 2011, and
Nickel 2011.
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To illustrate how this definition works, consider again the case in (23) above and take all the
maximal consistently excludable subsets of (24) that we can obtain with respect to (23): we
have {paul, paul and sue} and {sue, paul and sue}. The intersection of these sets winds up
being {paul and sue}, thus we correctly derive that the only excludable alternative in (24) is
(28).
(28) paul and sue
Notice that the intuition mentioned above that we want to exclude as many consistently exclud-
able alternatives as possible without deciding among them in an arbitrary way is captured by
the requirement that innocently excludable alternatives are only the ones in every maximally
excludable set. This is because if we were to exclude a consistently excludable alternative that
is only in some maximally excludable set it can be shown that it would always be the case that
we would be forced to include (not exclude) a different alternative which is in some other max-
imally excludable set. For instance in (24) above, paul is not innocently excludable because
paul or sue together with the negation of paul entails the inclusion of the other alternative
sue. In the following, I assume the notion of excludability in (27), although for presentational
purposes I will sometimes use the simpler (22).
1.1.4 The distribution of EXH
As a syntactic operator, EXH can be inserted at any level of embedding. However, from this
it does not follow that its distribution should be completely free (Chierchia et al. (To appear),
Fox and Spector (2009)). It is well-known in particular that exhaustification below a downward
entailing operator is marked. For instance (29a), typically pronounced with stress on “or”, can
be treated as a case of local exhaustification. This is because local exhaustification gives rise to
a meaning that is compatible with the continuation that John talked to both Paul and Sue.
(29) a. John didn’t talk to Paul or Sue, he talked to both of them.
b. ¬[EXH[John talked to Paul or Sue]] = [John didn’t talk to Paul or Sue] or [he
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talked to both Paul and Sue]
One way to account for the markedness of (29a) is to appeal to a version of the strongest mean-
ing hypothesis (Dalrymple et al. 1998)). The idea is that unless forced to by contradictions in
the context, we insert EXH only if the resulting meaning is not equivalent or weaker than the
one without it (Chierchia et al. To appear). This predicts that (29a) should be marked given that
it violates (30).11
(30) Minimize Weakness: Do not insert EXH in a sentence S if it leads to an equivalent or
weaker meaning than S itself.
In the following, I assume that the distribution of EXH is constrained by (30).12
1.1.5 Suspension of Scalar Implicatures
One main characteristic of implicatures is their context dependence or ‘optionality’. This can
be illustrated by the example in (31a), which generally has the scalar implicature in (31b). The
latter, however, can be suspended as in (31c).
(31) John met some of the students.
(31) John didn’t meet all of the students.
(31) John met some of the students. In fact, he met them all.
How is context dependence to be captured in grammatical approaches? There are three main
mechanisms that have been proposed: the optionality of EXH (Fox 2007), restriction of the
domain of quantification of EXH (Magri 2010a) and the optional activation of the alternatives
(Chierchia 2006, to appear). While any of these analyses can, in principle, be imported to
account for the context dependence of soft presuppositions (and neg-raising inferences), I adopt
11This is because for any downward entailing operator f, exhaustification above f entails exhaustification below
it: EXH(f(p)) ⊆ f(EXH(p)).
12This constraint is enough for our purposes, but see Chierchia et al. To appear, Fox and Spector 2009 and Magri
2011b for longer discussion and alternative formulations.
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the notion of optional activation of alternatives and combine it with a mechanism for restricting
alternatives based on relevance. As I discuss in CHAPTERS 3 and 4, this combination provides
a way to model obligatory implicatures and a way to account for the difference between soft
presuppositions on one hand, and scalar implicatures on the other.
1.1.5.1 Activation of alternatives
Chierchia (2006, to appear) proposes that scalar terms bear an abstract morphological feature
[σ], which take the value “+” when alternatives are “active” and “-” when they are not.13 Scalar
terms with active alternatives have to enter into an agreement relation with an exhaustivity
operator higher in the structure, or the derivation will be syntactically ill-formed. This ensures
that active alternatives must be exhaustified. A case like (32a) can, therefore, be interpreted as
having the LF in (32b) or the one in (32c), depending whether alternatives are active or not.
(32) a. John did the reading or the homework.
b. EXH[John did the reading or[+σ] the homework] IMPLICATURE
c. John did the reading or[−σ] the homework. NO IMPLICATURE
The activation of alternatives depends, in turn, on various contextual factors and the process is
predicted to be analogous to what happens when we interpret structurally ambiguous sentences
like (33), which can be interpreted with the prepositional phrase attaching to the object or to the
verb phrase.
(33) Mary shot the soldier with a gun.
1.1.5.2 Relevance
I addition to the grammatical feature-based mechanism, I also assume a pragmatic mechanism
based on the notion of relevance. As discussed by van Rooij (2002), Fox and Katzir (2011),
Zondervan (2009), Magri (2010a), we can model relevance using questions under discussion.
13The [+/-σ] feature corresponds to the [+/-F] feature generally used in focus semantics (see Rooth 1992).
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The idea is that all assertions can be thought of as answers to (implicit or explicit) questions
under discussion (see Roberts 2004, Beaver and Clark 2009 among others). Further, assume
that a question is associated with a partition of the common ground (i.e., a set of pair-wise
disjoint propositions whose union is the common ground).14 The notion of relevance is that in
(34), where Q is the partition associated with the question (Heim 2011).
(34) Relevance A proposition p is relevant to a question Q iff p is (contextually equivalent
to) the union of some subset of Q.
What (34) says is that a proposition is relevant if it does not distinguish among the cells of
the (partition associated with) the question. By way of illustration consider the question under
discussion to be (35a), which corresponds to the partition Q in (35b).
(35) a. Is it raining?
b. Q = {c1 = rain, c2 = ¬rain}
Given the notion of relevance in (34), we predict that (36a) is relevant given the question in
(35a), while (36b) is not. This is because the former corresponds to one cell of the partition,
while the latter does not correspond to any cell (i.e., both in c1 and c2 there are worlds in which
John will come and worlds in which John will not come).
(36) a. It’s not raining.
b. John will come.
We can define a subset of the alternatives, the set of “relevant alternatives”, based on this notion
of relevance. The set of relevant alternatives is the set of alternatives the interpretations of which
is a union of some subset of (partition of the) question under discussion.
(37) Given the partition Q of the question under discussion,
14This can be the semantics of questions itself or derivable from it (see Heim 1994). For a discussion of the
semantics of questions see Hagstrom 2003.
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AltR(p) = {q ∈ Alt(p) : q is a cell or a union of cells of Q}
At this point, we can simply redefine exhaustification as taking relevant alternatives as in (38)
and, correspondingly the set of excludable alternatives as in (39).
(38) [[EXHAltR ]](p)(w) = p(w)∧ ∀q ∈ Excl(p)[¬q(w)]
(39) Excl(p) = {q ∈ AltR(p) : λw[¬qw] ∩ p 6= ∅}
From now on, I assume that the alternatives are relevant alternatives and omit the subscript
whenever no confusion could arise.
This notion of relevance can account for the fact that typically we draw the inference to the
negation of (40d) from (40c) when the question under discussion is (40a) and not when it is
(40b).
(40) a. How many chairs do you have?
b. We need two chairs for the faculty meeting. Who has two chairs?
c. I have two chairs.
d. I have three chairs.
By way of illustration, (40a) gives rise to the partition of the common ground in (41) in which
each line represent a cell of the partition and exactly n stands for I have exactly n chairs
(suppose the maximum number of chairs you can have is four).
(41) Q1 =

c1 = zero
c2 = exactly one
c3 = exactly two
c4 = exactly three
c5 = exactly four

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We can now see that (40d) is relevant given Q1 because it is the union of some of its cells (i.e,
c4 ∪ c5). Given that it is relevant, it is going to be negated by EXH, so we expect the implicature
that I have two but not three chairs.
On the other hand, the question in (41b) gives rise to the partition in (42), where me and
john stand for John has two (or more) chairs and I have two (or more) chairs, respectively
(suppose the only individuals in the context are me and John).
(42) Q2 =

c1 = ¬me∧ ¬john
c2 = me∧ ¬john
c3 = ¬me∧ john
c4 = me∧ john

Here (40d) is not relevant because it is not the union of any cells of Q2, rather it distinguishes
within c2, providing irrelevant information. In sum, we can account for the pattern in (40),
because the alternative (40d) is relevant when (40a) is the question under discussion but not
when (40b) is.
Summing up, I am assuming a grammatical feature-based mechanism according to which
each scalar term is ambiguous between a version that needs to agree with an exhaustivity op-
erator and one that does not. This mechanism will allow us to define a scalar term that is not
ambiguous, but which is obligatorily exhaustified. Furthermore, I am assuming a pragmatic
mechanism that reduces alternatives depending on the question under discussion. The integra-
tion of these two mechanisms is not a trivial task, but for our purposes it is sufficient to assume
the following constraints on their interaction: when the grammatical mechanism allows an am-
biguity between scalar terms, then the alternatives are subject to relevance. When instead the
grammatical mechanism gives us no choice between active and non-active forms, then relevance
plays no role. In other words, I am assuming that when grammar leaves a choice between active
and non-active alternatives, the pragmatic mechanism of relevance is allowed to kick in and
carve out the set of alternatives depending on the question under discussion. When, on the other
hand, it only provides us with obligatorily activated alternatives, then relevance is not taken into
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account (see also Chierchia to appear for a similar idea).
Before going to a more detailed overview of the contents of this thesis’ chapters, let us
briefly go through the logic on an argument for embedded scalar implicatures coming from a
felicity condition on disjunctive sentences. This will be useful below in that I use it to test the
inferences predicted by the scalar implicature-based approach that I propose. The condition is
that in (43) (Hurford 1974; see also Chierchia et al. To appear and Singh 2008c).
(43) Hurford’s constraint:
A sentence that contains a disjunctive phrase of the form S or S ′ is infelicitous if S
entails S ′ or S ′ entails S.
(43) can immediately account for the infelicity of sentences like (44).
(44) #John is in Italy or in Milan.
Hurford (1974) and Gazdar (1979), however, observed that (43) appears to be violated by cases
like (45), as the second disjunct is stronger than the first one, but nonetheless (45) is felicitous.
(45) Either John solved some of the problems or he solved them all.
Chierchia et al. (To appear) argue that (45) is not a violation of the Hurford’s constraint because
we should analyze it with an embedded exhaustivity operator in the first disjunct as in (46a), so
that it becomes equivalent to (46b), and hence the second disjunct does not entail the first one.
(46) a. Either [EXH[John solved some of the problems]] or he solved them all.
b. Either John solved some but not all of the problems or he solved them all.
Chierchia et al. (To appear) use the Hurford’s constraint as a diagnostic for (embedded) scalar
implicatures. In the following, I use it in a number of occasions to test the inferences predicted
by the approach that I am proposing.
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1.2 Overview of the Chapters
1.2.1 Chapter 2: A scalar implicature-based approach to Neg-raising
In this chapter, I give an analysis of neg-raising inferences as scalar implicatures. The main
motivation for this account as opposed to a presupposition-based approach (Bartsch 1973 and
Gajewski 2005, 2007) comes from the differences between presuppositions and neg-raising in-
ferences, noticed by Gajewski (2005, 2007) and Homer (2012a). In response to this issue,
Gajewski (2007) argues that neg-raising predicates are soft presuppositional triggers and adopts
the account of how their presuppositions arise by Abusch (2002, 2010). However, I argue that
there is a difference between soft triggers and neg-raising predicates in their behavior in embed-
dings; a difference that is straightforwardly accounted for in the present approach. Furthermore,
by adopting Abusch’s (2010) account of soft triggers, Gajewski (2007) inherits the assumptions
of a pragmatic principle of disjunctive closure and of a non-standard interaction between se-
mantics and pragmatics - assumptions that are not needed by the present proposal, which is
just based on a regular theory of scalar implicatures. Finally, I show that the arguments that
Gajewski (2007) presents in favor of the presuppositional account can be explained also by the
scalar implicatures-based approach proposed here.
1.2.2 Chapter 3-4: Soft presuppositions as obligatory scalar implicatures
As mentioned above, presupposition triggers can be divided in two groups, soft and hard, on
the basis of whether the presuppositions they give rise to are easily defeasible (Abusch 2002,
2010). I discussed three ideas which have been put forward in the literature in connection with
this issue: first, soft triggers should be thought of as non-presuppositional items associated with
lexical alternatives (Abusch 2002, 2010; see also Chierchia 2010). Second, the question of
where their presuppositions come from can be given a principled answer (Abrusa´n 2011b,a).
Third, the projection behavior of presuppositions can be accounted for by a theory based on
scalar implicatures (Chemla 2009a, Chemla in preparation). In these two chapters, following
these three ideas, I extend the scalar implicature-based approach explored in CHAPTER 2 to soft
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presuppositions. I develop the proposal by focusing on four novel contributions. First, I propose
an account of how soft presuppositions are similar and different from hard presuppositions, on
the one hand, and scalar implicatures, on the other, based on the notion of obligatoriness of
scalar implicatures (Chierchia 2006, to appear, Spector 2007a, Magri 2010a). Second, I discuss
how the proposal can account for the projection behavior of soft presuppositions, both from
the scope and the restrictors of quantificational sentences, in line with the experimental results
reported in Chemla 2009b. Third, I show that by being based on the grammatical theory of
scalar implicatures the proposal can account for the intervention effects associated with the pre-
suppositions of soft triggers in the licensing of negative polarity items (Homer 2010, Chierchia
to appear). Finally, I show that this approach can account for some puzzling cases arising from
the interactions between soft presuppositions and “regular” scalar implicatures.
1.2.3 Chapter 5: Exhaustification as a solution to Soames’ problem
In this chapter, I show that an exhaustification based approach to scalar implicatures provides a
way to account for the problems raised by the example in (47), first noticed by Soames (1982).
(47) Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
There are three issues with (47). First, it is felicitous and does not appear to have presup-
positions. However all major theories of presuppositions predict that it should presuppose
that Nixon is guilty (Heim 1983, Beaver 2001, Beaver and Krahmer 2001, Schlenker 2007,
Schlenker 2009 among many others). Second, a typical way to resolve the problem would be
to locally accommodate the presupposition in the antecedent. However, this wrongly predicts
tautological truth-conditions for (47); a meaning that we could paraphrase as “Nixon is guilty,
if both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.” Third, Soames (1982) observes that there is a contrast
between (47) and (48).
(48) ??If Haldeman is guilty too, Nixon is guilty
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As a solution to these three problems, I propose that the presupposition is nonetheless locally
accommodated in the antecedent and that furthermore the sentence is also interpreted exhaus-
tively, which gives rise to a non-presuppositional, non-tautological meaning analogous to (49).
(49) Nixon is guilty, only if both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
Finally, I argue that the degraded status of (48) is an independent fact rooted in the topic-focus
structure of sentence-final conditionals. This proposal can account for the three problems above
and it can also be extended to treat related non-presuppositional cases like (50).
(50) I will go, if we go together.
1.2.4 Chapter 6: Under- and over- generation in scalar reasoning
In the standard Gricean approach, scalar implicatures arise from the hearer reasoning about rele-
vant stronger alternatives that the speaker could have uttered (Grice 1975; see also Gamut 1991).
Recently, however, various cases have been pointed out in the literature, for which reasoning
only over stronger alternatives fails to predict inferences that are intuitively attested and that
could be derived if we were to add also logically independent alternatives in scalar reasoning
(see Spector 2007a and Chierchia et al. (To appear) among others). In this chapter, I first sum-
marize the existing arguments for logically independent alternatives and present some novel
ones coming from sentences with existential modals and from the phenomenon of so-called
“free choice permission” (Fox 2007). I then show that while allowing logically independent
alternatives makes the right predictions in such cases, it also causes both an under-generation
and an over-generation problem (see also Fox 2007:fn. 35 and Magri 2010a). I propose a so-
lution to the over-generation problem based on a novel recursive algorithm for checking which
alternatives are to be considered in the computation of scalar implicatures. The gist of the idea
is that alternatives are not considered altogether at the same time, but rather through a recursive
algorithm that proceeds in steps and decide at each step which alternatives is to be included
in the computation of scalar implicatures. I also argue for a solution to the under-generation
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problem based on the role of focus in the computation of scalar implicatures (Rooth 1992, Fox
and Katzir 2011). Finally, I discuss and compare the proposal of this chapter with the ones of
Fox (2007) and Chemla (in preparation).
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Chapter 2
A scalar implicature-based approach
to neg-raising inferences
2.1 Introduction
It is an old observation in the literature that certain sentence embedding predicates such as
think and want interact with negation in a surprising way: when negated, these predicates are
generally interpreted as if the negation was taking scope in the embedded clause. In brief,
sentences like (1a) and (2a) are generally interpreted as (1b) and (2b), respectively.
(1) a. John doesn’t think Bill left.
b. John thinks Bill didn’t leave.
(2) a. John doesn’t want Bill to leave.
b. John wants Bill not to leave.
The traditional name for this phenomenon is “neg-raising”, and predicates like think and want
are called “neg-raising predicates”.1 The fact that the sentence with wide scope negation ap-
pears to imply the one with narrow scope is not predicted by the standard semantics of such
1Beyond think and want, there are many other neg-raising predicates, the following in (3) is a list from Horn
1989.
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predicates.2 Furthermore, other sentence-embedding predicates do not exhibit this property;
compare (1a) and (2a) above with a sentence with a non-neg-raising predicate like be certain in
(6a): the latter does not imply at all the corresponding sentence with internal negation in (6b).
(6) a. John isn’t certain that Bill left.
b. John is certain that Bill didn’t leave.
There are three main approaches to neg-raising in the literature: a syntactic, an implicature-
based, and a presuppositional approach. The syntactic approach, which also gave the name to
the phenomenon, postulates that in a sentence like (1a) above negation is actually generated in
the embedded clause and interpreted there, but it then raises above the predicate and appears
linearly before it (Fillmore 1963 among others). I do not discuss the syntactic approach here,
for compelling arguments against it see Horn 1978, Gajewski 2005, 2007, and Homer 2012a.
An alternative approach is a pragmatic analysis in terms of a type of implicature (Horn 1978).
Horn (1989) calls such implicatures “short-circuited implicatures”, implicatures that would be
in principle calculable but in fact are conventional properties of some constructions. The main
problem of this account is that there does not appear to be any independent motivation for this
(3) a. believe, suppose, imagine, expect, reckon, feel
b. seem, appear, look like, sound like, feel like
c. be probable, be likely, figure to
d. intend, choose, plan
e. be supposed to, ought, should, be desirable, advise, suggest
See Horn 1978 for a general introduction to neg-raising and Homer 2012a for an extensive discussion of neg-raising
modals.
2The standard way to analyze such predicates, originally proposed by Hintikka (1969), is as universal quantifiers
over possible worlds, restricted to some modal base. So for instance the semantics of believe is in (4), whereM is a
function from worlds and individuals to sets of worlds, in this case the set of worlds compatible with the beliefs of
a in w.
(4) [[believe]](p)(a)(w) = ∀w ′ ∈M(w,a)[p(w)]
It is clear that negating (4) as in (5a) is not equivalent to (5b), where negation takes narrow scope.
(5) a. ¬[∀w ′ ∈M(w,a)[p(w)]]
b. ∀w ′ ∈M(w,a)[¬p(w)]
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type of calculable but conventional implicatures (for extensive discussion of the implicature-
based account see Gajewski 2005). The presupposition-based approach is defended in Bartsch
1973 and Gajewski 2005, 2007 and, as I discuss below in detail, is successful in accounting for
a variety of data relating to neg-raising. However, it also faces the problem of explaining why
the presupposition that it postulates does not behave like other presuppositions in embeddings
other than negation. Gajewski (2007) tries to overcome this problem by connecting neg-raising
predicates to “soft” presuppositional triggers, in the sense of Abusch (2002, 2010), a class of
triggers whose presupposition is particularly weak and context-dependent, which I discuss ex-
tensively in CHAPTERS 3 and 4. I argue that, nonetheless, the behavior of neg-raising predicates
is different from that of this class of presuppositional triggers. Furthermore, as I discuss below,
by adopting Abusch’s (2010) account of soft triggers, Gajewski (2007) inherits some empirical
issues and extra non-standard assumptions about the semantics-pragmatic interface associated
with that view.
In this chapter, following ideas in Chemla 2009a and Abusch (2002, 2010), I propose a
scalar implicature-based account of the inferences associated with neg-raising predicates (“neg-
raising inferences”, henceforth). I discuss two main arguments which favor this approach over
the presuppositional one: first, it can straightforwardly account for the differences between
between neg-raising predicates and presuppositional triggers. Second, it is based on an inde-
pendently justified theory of scalar implicatures and it does not need to adopt the system in
Abusch 2010, which, as I discuss below, has conceptual and empirical problems. Finally, I
show that it can also account for those aspects of the behavior of neg-raising inferences that
do appear presuppositional. While being based on implicatures, the account that I propose is
different from Horn’s (1978) in that it only uses regular and independently motivated scalar
implicatures.
This chapter is organized as follows: in section 2.2, I summarize the version of the presup-
positional approach by Gajewski (2005, 2007) and the account of soft triggers by Abusch (2010)
that he adopts. In section 2.3, I discuss the aspects of the behavior of neg-raising predicates that
the presuppositional approach gets right and those that it gets wrong. The latter constitute the
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motivations for the scalar implicature-based analysis of neg-raising that I outline in section 2.4.
In section 2.5, I discuss its predictions and in particular how the proposal accounts for the dif-
ferences between neg-raising inferences and presuppositions. In section 2.6, I show how it can
also account for what the presuppositional account can explain with respect to the suspension of
neg-raising inferences, the interaction with polarity, the neg-raising inferences from the scope
of negative quantifiers and negated universals, and the behavior of stacked neg-raising predi-
cates. I conclude the chapter in section 2.7. Finally, in appendix A, I explore the interaction
between neg-raising inferences and conditional perfection, in section B, I discuss an open is-
sue connected to the treatment of stacked neg-raising predicates that I propose in this chapter,
and in Appendix C, I summarize the recent approach to the licensing of the so-called “strong”
negative polarity items (Gajewski 2011, Chierchia to appear) and I show that neg-raising desire
predicates constitute a challenge for this approach. Finally, I propose a tentative solution to it.
2.2 The presuppositional approach
2.2.1 The excluded middle as a presupposition
Bartsch (1973) proposes a presuppositional account of neg-raising. The idea is that a sentence
like (7a), schematized as in (7b), presupposes the so-called excluded middle proposition in (7c),
something that in the case of (7a) we could paraphrase as “John has an opinion as to whether
Bill is here”.
(7) a. John believes that Bill is here.
b. believej(p)
c. believej(p)∨ believej(¬p)
The positive case is not particularly interesting, because (7c) is entailed by (7b). However, when
we negate (7a) as in (8a), under the assumption that presuppositions project through negation,
we obtain the result in (8d). This is obtained because (8b) together with its presupposition in
(8c) entails (8d) (if it’s false that John believes that Bill is here and he has an opinion as to
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whether Bill is here or not, then he must believe that Bill is not here).
(8) a. John doesn’t believe that Bill is here.
b. ¬believe(p)
c. believej(p)∨ believej(¬p)
d. believej(¬p)
One problem that Bartsch’s (1973) purely pragmatic approach faces is accounting for why cer-
tain predicates allow neg-raising and others do not (for instance why is want in English neg-
raising, while desire is not?). Furthermore, neg-raising predicates also present cross-linguistic
variation: for instance, hope is not neg-raising in English, while its counterpart in German, hof-
fen, is neg-raising (see Horn 1989 and Gajewski 2007). In other words, whether a predicate is
neg-raising appears to be a matter of conventional properties of such predicate and is not based
on general pragmatic assumptions.3
Gajewski (2005, 2007) adopts Bartsch’s (1973) approach and improves on it in two respects.
First, in response to the issue of conventionality just mentioned, he proposes that the excluded
middle should be thought of as a semantic presupposition, lexically specified for certain predi-
cates. As a lexically encoded property, it is then expected that it can be subject to cross linguistic
variation. The semantics of a neg-raising predicate P is given schematically in (9).4
(9) [[P]] = λpλx : [P(p)(x)∨ P(¬p)(x)] . P(p)(x)
While this move offers a way to accommodate the conventionality of neg-raising predicates,
it also gives rise to the issue of why neg-raising inferences are context dependent. Indeed, we
can easily create contexts which suspend them. For instance, in a context like (10a), (10b) does
not imply (10c) (from Bartsch (1973), reported in Gajewski (2007)).
3But see Homer 2012a for some suggestions on how to account for the source of neg-raising inferences in a
purely pragmatic way.
4I use Heim and Kratzer’s (1998) notation, so that λφ : ψ.χ indicates the function from φ to χ only defined if ψ.
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(10) a. Bill doesn’t know who killed Caesar. Furthermore, Bill isn’t sure whether or not
Brutus and Caesar lived at the same time, so naturally
b. Bill doesn’t think Brutus killed Caesar.
c. Bill thinks Brutus didn’t kill Caesar.
In response to this issue, Gajewski (2007) argues that neg-raising predicates are soft presup-
positional triggers and that this would account for their context dependence. In the following
section, I turn to the connection between neg-raising and soft triggers and I summarize Gajew-
ski’s (2007) proposal.
2.2.2 Connecting neg-raising and soft triggers
2.2.2.1 Soft triggers
As I discuss in detail in CHAPTERS 3 and 4, presupposition triggers can be divided into two
groups, soft and hard, on the basis of whether the presuppositions they give rise to are easily
defeasible (Abusch 2002, 2010). A paradigmatic example of a soft trigger is win whereas an
example of a hard one is it-clefts: a sentence with win like (11a), its negation in (11b), and a
conditional with (11a) embedded in the antecedent like (11c), give rise to the inference in (11d).
Analogously, (12a)-(12c) give rise to the inference in (12d).
(11) a. Bill won the marathon.
b. Bill didn’t win the marathon.
c. If Bill won the marathon, he will celebrate tonight.
d. Bill participated in the marathon.
(12) a. It was Mary who broke that computer.
b. It wasn’t Mary who broke that computer.
c. If it was Mary who broke that computer, she should repair it.
d. Somebody broke that computer.
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Another way to look at the pattern above is is by taking (11d) and (12d) as inferences of (11a)
and (12a) respectively, and showing that they project regardless of whether they are embed-
ded under negation or in the antecedent of a conditional. This projection behavior is what is
generally taken to be the main characteristic of presuppositions.5 Arguably, the best way to
distinguish between soft and hard triggers is what Simons (2001) calls “the explicit ignorance
test”. The recipe is to create a context in which the speaker is manifestly ignorant about the
presupposition; triggers that do not give rise to infelicity in such contexts are soft triggers. Con-
sider the following two examples modeled on Abusch 2010 that show that according to this
diagnostic win and it-clefts are indeed soft and hard triggers respectively.
(13) I don’t know whether Bill ended up participating in the Marathon yesterday
but if he won, he is certainly celebrating right now.
(14) I don’t know whether anybody broke that computer
#but if it is Mary who did it, she should repair it.
Notice that the presupposition can be suspended even if the speaker does not say explicitly that
she is ignorant about the presupposition associated with a soft trigger. However, it has to be
evident from the context that she is. Consider the following example in (15) and assume it
is a conversation between two people who are meeting for the first time (from Geurts (1995)
reported in Simons (2001)): the presupposition of stop, i.e. that the addressee used to smoke, is
clearly not present.
(15) I noticed that you keep chewing on your pencil. Have you recently stopped smoking?
In sum, there is a class of presuppositions that can be suspend in a context that supplies the
relevant information about the speaker’s epistemic state.6 In the next subsection, I summarize
5For an introduction to presuppositions see Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000 and Beaver and Geurts To
appear.
6In the following, extending Abusch’s (2002) terminology, will refer to the presuppositions of soft and hard
triggers as “soft presuppositions” and “hard presuppositions”, respectively.
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Abusch’s (2010) alternatives-based account of the presupposition of soft triggers, “soft presup-
positions” henceforth, and some of the problems that it faces. Then I turn to Gajewski’s (2007)
account of neg-raising predicates as soft triggers.
2.2.2.2 Abusch 2010
Abusch (2002, 2010) proposes a pragmatic account of soft presuppositions based on lexical al-
ternatives. The architecture of her proposal is as follows: the semantics of a soft trigger does
not contribute a semantic presupposition but rather it provides a set of lexical alternatives; the
pragmatic side is constituted by a principle that operates on these alternatives. The flexibility
and defeasibility of soft presuppositions comes from the context sensitivity of the pragmatic
principle. In slightly more detail, she assumes that the alternatives of soft triggers are intu-
itively contrastive terms, so that, for instance, win and lose are alternatives to each other. These
lexical alternatives grow compositionally similarly to what is assumed in focus semantics, ulti-
mately giving rise to sentential alternatives (see CHAPTER 1, section 1.2.1). For instance (16a),
schematized in (16b), has the alternatives in (16c)
(16) a. Bill won.
b. won(b)
c. Alt(16b) =
{
won(b), lost(b)
}
On the pragmatic side, Abusch (2010) assumes a pragmatic default principle, which requires
the disjunction of the set of alternatives, indicated as ∨Alt, to be true. Given the alternatives
assumed, their disjunction entails what is generally assumed to be the soft presupposition. For
instance, disjunctive closure applied to the alternative set in (16c) gives rise to the entailment
that Bill participated - that is (17a) entails (17b).
(17) a. ∨{won(b), lost(b)} = (won(b)∨ lost(b))
b. participated(b)
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The inferences of soft triggers in unembedded cases are derived by using lexical alternatives
and a pragmatic principle of disjunctive closure operating on them. Assuming that they are
generated in this way, however, raises the question of how such presuppositions should project.
Indeed, one of the main challenges associated with soft triggers is explaining the fact that even
if they are different from hard triggers with respect to defeasibility, they appear to project in
very similar ways.7 In other words, a theory that can account for their defeasibility, still has to
provide an explanation for the projection patterns. In relation to this Abusch (2010) assumes
a dynamic framework along the lines of Heim 1983 and crucially formulates her pragmatic
principle in such a way as to make reference to the local contexts created by the context change
potentials of the dynamic meanings that make up the sentences. The definition of the principle
is in (18).
(18) If a sentenceψ is uttered in a context with common ground c andψ embeds a clause φ
which contributes an alternative setAlt, then typically c is such that the corresponding
local context d for φ entails that some element of Alt is true.
The local contexts referred to in (18) are those information states created by the dynamic com-
positional semantics she assumes. I refer the reader to Abusch’s (2010) paper for the details, but
what is relevant for us is that this strategy effectively mimics the projection behavior of seman-
tic presuppositions, by applying the pragmatic default globally, in a way that makes reference
to the local context of the trigger. In other words, the principle in (18) applies to full sentences,
at the global level, but makes reference to local contexts that are created during the composition
of such sentences. Notice that this last assumption is at odds with standard assumptions about
the semantics-pragmatics interface, whereby pragmatics only has access to the output of the se-
mantics, generally thought to be a proposition (or a set of propositions). Here instead we would
need a way to keep track of the history of the semantic composition in terms of context change
potentials and then make this visible to pragmatics.
7As I discuss in CHAPTER 3, there are differences between their projection behavior in quantificational contexts.
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Beyond this conceptual point, there are two empirical problems connected to the way soft
presuppositions project in Abusch’s (2010) system: first, as I discuss in CHAPTER 3 in de-
tail, soft and hard presuppositions pattern differently with respect to the projection behavior in
quantificational sentences. In her system, the projection behavior of soft presuppositions ex-
ploits indirectly the one of hard presuppositions, so the former is predicted to be identical to
the latter, and no difference is expected between them with respect to projection. Second, a
further problem for this account was pointed out by Sauerland (2008), who observed that when
a soft trigger is embedded under another, the disjunctive closure of the combination of alterna-
tives gives rise to an inference that is too weak. As he discusses, a sentence like (19a), which
contains the soft triggers win and stop, has intuitively the inference in (19b). However, the
disjunctive closure of the alternatives in (19c) only gives rise to (19d).8
(19) a. John stopped winning
b. John used to win
c. Alt(19a) =
 stop(win(j)), stop(lose(j))continue(win(j)), continue(lose(j))

d. John used to participate
Notice that in this case the inference in (19b) is an entailment of (19a) as shown by (20), so
Abusch (2010) could appeal to this entailment to account for the intuition that (19a) leads to the
inference in (19b).
(20) John stopped winning #but he didn’t used to win.
However, this would not help her in the case of (21a), which does not entail (21b), but still has
(21b) as an inference.
8Abusch (2010) does not include anymore stop in the list of triggers that she discusses, contrary to Abusch (2002).
The problem is however general and it applies to any case of a soft trigger embedded into another. Furthermore, if
her theory is not meant to apply to aspectuals or factives, it is not anymore an account of soft triggers as identified by
the explicit ignorance test above, but rather an account of a subset of them, for which, however, she does not specify
a criterion of identification.
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(21) a. John didn’t stop winning
b. John used to win
As Sauerland (2008) shows, the problem generalizes to all sentences which contain more than
one soft presupposition.9
2.2.2.3 Gajewski 2007
Following Abusch (2002, 2010), Gajewski (2007) proposes that neg-raising predicates are also
soft triggers and stipulates that the alternatives of a neg-raising predicate are the corresponding
predicates with internal negation; hence, a predicate like believe would have doubt (=believe-
not) as its alternative, while a predicate like want would have want-not. As shown in (23a)-
(23d), once we apply the principle of disjunctive closure proposed by Abusch (2010) over these
alternatives we obtain as an inference the excluded middle proposition that Bartsch (1973) pos-
tulates directly as a presupposition. Once generated, this inference is predicted to project as a
presupposition, in the way described above.
(23) a. John believes that Bill left.
b. believej(p)
c. Alt(believej(p)) =
 believej(p)believej(¬p)

d. ∨{believej(p), believe(¬p)} = (believej(p)∨ believe(¬p))
9In response to this, Abusch (p.c. to Sauerland) suggests that the pragmatic principle should apply every time
a soft trigger is encountered. This would ensure that there would never be a combination of the alternatives of
soft triggers. However, given the assumption that the alternatives of soft triggers grow compositionally, the same
problem would arise with other alternative bearers like scalar terms. For instance, in the case of (22a) the predicted
inference is only (22b) and not the intuitively correct (22c).
(22) a. (Now that he is retired), John didn’t stop meeting all the students
b. John used to meet some of the students
c. John used to meet all of the students
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In sum, by adopting Abusch’s (2010) account, Gajewski (2007) provides an analysis of neg-
raising predicates as soft triggers. However, he inherits the extra assumptions of Abusch’s
(2010) system, the disjunctive closure and the non-standard semantics/pragmatics interface, and
its empirical problems discussed above. The fact that the approach that I propose below does
not need these extra assumptions constitutes an advantage over Gajewski’s (2007) account.
2.3 Predictions
2.3.1 What the presuppositional approach gets right
The presuppositional approach can successfully account for four aspects of the behavior of neg-
raising predicates. In the following, I summarize each of them and briefly show how they are
predicted by the presuppositional account.
The first aspect, observed by Gajewski (2005), regards the fact that the inference associated
with a neg-raising predicate in the scope of negation is hard to suspend, in a way that resembles
the markedness of presupposition cancellation in such environments. For instance, there is
a contrast between (24a) and (24b)/(24c), which shows that canceling neg-raising requires a
special intonation, like stress on the auxiliary or on the predicate.
(24) a. John doesn’t think that it is raining, #he is not sure.
b. John DOESN’T think that it is raining, he is not sure.
c. John doesn’t THINK that it is raining, he is not sure.
The second aspect regards the inferences that neg-raising predicates give rise to when embed-
ded in the scope of negative quantifiers and negated universals: from a sentence like (25a) we
typically draw the universal inference in (25b), while in the case of a negated universal sentence
like (26a), the inference that we draw is (26b).10
10Homer (2012a) calls the inference in (26b) “wide-scope existential quantification reading” and takes it as char-
acteristic of neg-raising predicates, using it as a diagnostic of neg-raising in his investigation of modals.
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(25) a. No student thinks that Mary passed.
b. Every student thinks that Mary didn’t pass.
(26) a. Not every student thinks that Mary passed.
b. There are some students who think that Mary didn’t pass.
The third aspect has to do with the licensing of certain NPIs. NPI licensing is a useful tool
in the analysis of neg-raising predicates, as it backs up the often subtle judgements about neg-
raising inferences. The standard assumption about NPIs is that they are licensed in downward
entailing (DE) environments (Ladusaw 1979; cf. CHAPTER 4). A DE environment is the scope
of a DE function, which can be defined as in (27).11
(27) A function f is downward entailing iff for any a,b in the domain of f such that a ⊆ b,
then f(b) ⊆ f(a).
Negation is a DE function, as shown by the fact that (28a) entails (28b) and (29b) entails (29a).
(28) a. It rained hard.
b. It rained.
(29) a. It didn’t rain hard.
b. It didn’t rain.
A subset of NPIs, so-called “strict” or “strong” NPIs, are licensed only in some DE environ-
ments. Zwarts (1998) proposes that the characteristic property of the members of such the en-
vironments that license strong NPIs is anti-additivity (but see appendix C for a different, more
recent, hypothesis on the licensing of strict NPIs, defended in Gajewski 2011 and Chierchia to
appear). An anti-additive environment is the scope of an anti-additive function, defined in (30).
(30) A function f is anti-additive iff for any a,b in the domain of f, f(a)∧ f(b) ⊆ f(a∨b)
11from Gajewski 2007, where ⊆ indicates cross-categorial entailment as defined in CHAPTER 1.
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As shown by the validity of the inference from (31a) to (31b), negation is also an anti-additive
function.
(31) a. It didn’t rain and it didn’t snow.
b. It didn’t rain or snow.
It was noticed in Lakoff 1969 that strict NPIs show a difference between neg-raising and non-
neg-raising predicates, in that they are licensed when embedded under a negated neg-raising
predicate, like in (32a), but they are not when in the scope of a non-neg-raising one, like in
(32b).
(32) a. John doesn’t think that Mary will arrive until tomorrow.
b. *John isn’t certain that Mary will arrive until tomorrow.
Furthermore, strict NPIs are licensed in the scope of neg-raising predicates embedded under
negative quantifiers, as in (33).
(33) No student thought that Mary would arrive until tomorrow.
The fourth aspect regards the behavior of stacked neg-raising predicates. Fillmore (1963) orig-
inally observed that neg-raising operates cyclically. In other words, a sentence like (34a), in
which negation appears before a sequence of stacked neg-raising predicates, gives rise to the
neg-raising inference in (34b).
(34) a. I don’t imagine Bill thinks Mary wants Fred to leave.
b. I imagine Bill thinks Mary wants Fred not to leave.
Horn (1971), however, observes that the cyclicity is only partial: the generalization appears to
be that neg-raising belief predicates embedding neg-raising desire ones allow cyclicity, while
desire-predicates embedding belief-ones do not.
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(35) a. I don’t believe Bill wanted Harry to die.  
b. I believe Bill wanted Harry not to die.
(36) a. I don’t want Bill to believe Harry died 6 
b. I want Bill to believe Harry didn’t die.
The NPI licensing also reveals this pattern as shown by (37a) and (37b) (from Gajewski 2007).12
(39) a. I don’t believe John wanted Harry to die until tomorrow.
b. *I don’t want John to believe Harry died until yesterday.
In sum, there are four aspects of the behavior of neg-raising predicates, which, as I discuss
below, can be accounted for if we treat them as presuppositional triggers: (a) the fact that the
neg-raising inferences are hard to cancel (b) the inferences they give rise to from the scope of
negative quantifiers and negated universals, (c) the licensing of strong NPIs, and (d) the behavior
of stacked neg-raising predicates. Gajewski (2007) shows that the presuppositional approach
can account for these four aspects of the behavior of neg-raising predicates. Let us go through
each of them in the following.
First, the fact that presuppositions are hard to cancel under negation appears to be parallel
to what happens with neg-raising inferences.13 (40b) appears parallel to the case of a presuppo-
sitional triggers like discover, as (41a) and (41b) show.
(40) a. John doesn’t think that it is raining, #he is not sure.
b. John DOESN’T think that it is raining, he is not sure.
12Other doxastic and bouletic/deontic predicates behave similarly.
(37) a. Mary doesn’t think Bill should have left until yesterday.
b. *Mary shouldn’t think Bill left until yesterday.
(38) a. Bill doesn’t imagine Sue ought to have left until yesterday.
b. *Bill ought not imagine Sue left until yesterday.
13Notice that this applies even if Gajewski (2007) argues that neg-raising predicates are soft triggers, since also
these triggers, like discover, appear hard to suspend under negation.
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(41) a. John didn’t discover that he was accepted, #he wasn’t.
b. John DIDN’T discover that he was accepted, he wasn’t.
Second, if we assume that presuppositions in the scope of negative quantifiers project univer-
sally (see Heim 1983 and Chemla 2009a for discussion), the prediction for the meaning of a
sentence like (42a) are (43a) with the presupposition in (43b). (43a) and (43b) together entail
(43c). In other words, Gajewski (2007) can derive the universal inference in (42b) (=(43c)).
(42) a. No student thinks that he was accepted.
b. Every student thinks that he wasn’t accepted.
(43) a. ¬∃x[student(x)∧ thinksx(p)]
b. ∀x[student(x)→ (thinksx(p)∨ thinkx(¬p))]
c. ∀x[student(x)→ thinkx(¬p)]
The presuppositional account also makes the right predictions in the case of negated universal
sentences: (44a), schematized as in (45a), together with the presupposition in (45b), entails
(45c), which is the intuitively correct inference in (44b).
(44) a. Not every student thinks that he was accepted.
b. Some student thinks that he wasn’t accepted.
(45) a. ¬∀x[student(x)→ thinksx(p)]
b. ∀x[student(x)→ (thinksx(p)∨ thinkx(¬p))]
c. ∃x[student(x)∧ thinkx(¬p)]
Third, it can be shown that the presuppositional approach predicts that cases like (49) and (50)
are anti-additive environments, thus the fact that strong NPIs are licensed in these environments
is predicted.14
14As Gajewski (2007:p.304) discuss, consider the meaning of a neg-raising predicate P as in (46) (where  has
to be understood to range over the modal base of the neg-raising predicate P, see fn.3 above).
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(49) John doesn’t think that Mary would arrive until tomorrow.
(50) No student thinks that Mary would arrive until thursday.
Finally, Gajewski (2007) shows that the presuppositional account can also derive the behavior
of partial cyclicity. The reason why it predicts it lies in the different way presuppositions project
from belief- versus from desire-predicates. Consider embedding a sentence, like (51a), which
presupposes (51b), into think and want, as in (52a) and (52b), respectively. The observation is
that both (52a) and (52b) appear to presuppose (52c) and crucially (52b) does not presuppose
(52d) (see Heim 1992 and Beaver and Geurts To appear for discussion).
(51) a. Bill will sell his cello.
b. Bill has a cello.
(52) a. Bill thinks he will sell his cello.
b. Bill wants to sell his cello.
c. Bill thinks he has a cello.
d. Bill wants to have a cello.
This asymmetry in projection between think and want is what allows Gajewski (2007) to derive
(46) [[not P]](p)(x) =
a. presupposes : [p∨¬p]
b. asserts : ¬p
c. together (46a) and (46b) entail: ¬p
(47) [[not P]](q)(x) =
a. presupposes : [q∨¬q]
b. asserts : ¬q
c. together (47a) and (47b) entail: ¬q
(48) [[not P]](p∨ q)(x) =
a. presupposes : [(p∨ q)∨¬(p∨ q)]
b. asserts : ¬(p∨ q)
c. together (48a) and (48b) entail: ¬(p∨ q)
(46) and (47) entails that no world is a (p∨ q)-world, hence the presupposition of (48) is satisfied and (48) must be
true. The presuppositional account, then, predicts that negated neg-raising predicates create anti-additive contexts.
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the pattern above (see Gajewski 2007 and Homer 2012a for detail).
In sum, the presuppositional account successfully accounts for the four aspects of the be-
havior of neg-raising predicates presented above. However, as I discuss now, the presuppo-
sitional account does not predict any difference between soft presuppositions and neg-raising
inferences, contrary to what appears to be the case.
2.3.2 What the presuppositional approach gets wrong
The main problem for a presupposition approach to neg-raising is the fact that there is very
little evidence that the proposition assumed to give rise to neg-raising, the excluded middle
proposition, has a presuppositional status. As Gajewski (2005:68) says, “the evidence turns out
to be mixed, tending towards suggesting that neg-raising predicates are not presuppositional.”
Recall that the standard test for presuppositionality is the projection behavior, that is the phe-
nomenon exemplified by (53a), which presupposes (53b) in the same way as complex sentences
embedding (53a) like (53c)-(53f) do.
(53) a. It was Mary who killed Bill.
b. Somebody killed Bill.
c. It wasn’t Mary who killed Bill.
d. If it was Mary who killed Bill, she should confess.
e. Perhaps it was Mary who killed Bill.
f. Was it Mary who killed Bill?
Negation aside, however, the rest of the projection behavior of the excluded middle does not
look presuppositional. Compare the cases in (53d)-(53f) above, with the ones in (54d)-(54f):
the inference from the latter to (54b) is extremely weak, if it is there at all.
(54) a. Bill thinks that Sue is here.
b. Bill has an opinion as to whether Sue is here
c. Bill doesn’t think that Sue is here.
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d. If Bill thinks that Sue is here, he will come.
e. Perhaps Bill thinks that Sue is here.
f. Does Bill think that Sue is here?
Again quoting from Gajewski (2005):
There are certain environments linguists use to diagnose the presence of a presup-
position. The most common are the antecedents of conditionals, yes/no questions,
and epistemic modals. [...] If think introduces the presupposition that its subject is
opinionated about the truth or falsity of its complement, then we expect each of the
sentences to imply that Bill has an opinion as to whether Sue is here. This does not
seem to be the case Gajewski (2005:p.69)
In response to this difference, that is not predicted by the presuppositional approach, Gajew-
ski (2007) postulates that the excluded middle is a soft presupposition in the sense discussed
above. In other words, (54b) would not project out of embeddings like (54d)-(54f) because it
can be suspended. I argue, however, that the suspension of soft presuppositions and the non-
projection behavior of the excluded middle are different. The intuition is the following: consider
(55a) and (56a): in an out of the blue context (55a) appears to give rise to the inference in (55b),
unless we explicitly suspend it like in (55c) or by making clear that the speaker is ignorant about
(55b). On the other hand, (56a) appears neutral with respect to the inference in (56b).
(55) a. If Mary stopped showing up late for class, Bill must be happy.
b. Mary used to show up late for class.
c. I don’t know if Mary used to show up late for class, but If she stopped, Bill must
be happy.
(56) a. If Mary thinks that Bill should be hired, she will say so at the next faculty meeting.
b. Mary has an opinion as to whether Bill should be hired.
c. I don’t know whether Mary has an opinion, but If she thinks that Bill should be
hired, she will say so at the next faculty meeting.
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In other words, one can understand (56a) and not draw the inference in (56b), without the need
for clear contextual information that the inference should be suspended like in (56c).15
In sum, the suspension of soft presuppositions requires explicit information in the context
that the speaker is ignorant about the presupposition, while this doesn’t appear to be the case for
the excluded middle inference; hence, if the excluded middle is a presupposition, it is a strange
one: it does not project as a presupposition and its non-projection appears to be a different
phenomenon from the suspension of suspendable presuppositions.
2.3.3 Summary
We saw that Gajewski’s (2007) proposal can account for the conventionality of neg-raising
inferences, the projection through negation, the licensing of strict-NPIs, the inferences in the
scope of negative quantifiers and negated universals and the partially cyclic behavior of stacked
neg-raising predicates. Furthermore, by connecting to Abusch’s (2010) account of soft triggers,
it can also explain why they appear to be context dependent. However, we also saw that it
has problems explaining the differences between soft triggers and neg-raising predicates in em-
beddings other than negation. Furthermore adopting Abusch’s (2010) account brings in some
empirical issues and extra assumptions about pragmatic principles and the semantics-pragmatic
interface. In the next section, I propose a scalar implicature-based account of neg-raising in-
15Gajewski (2005) discusses another characteristics that appear to distinguish neg-raising inferences from presup-
positions. The observation is that if they behaved as regular presuppositions, we would expect to find (57) hard to
judge if we know that Mary has no opinion, but, as Gajewski (2005:p.69) says, “most people [...] have no problem
judging this sentence false in such a scenario”.
(57) Mary thinks that John is in town.
It is fair to say, however, that while the case of judging (58) seems clearly different from (57), as argued by von
Fintel (2004) our judgements might not be reliable in the case of presupposition failure.
(58) The present King of France is bald.
Furthermore, I am not sure we would not simply judge (59) as false, in a context in which we know that John never
showed up late for class.
(59) John stopped showing up late for class.
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ferences, which like Gajewski’s (2007) localizes the source of neg-raising in a set of lexical
alternatives. However, it does not require non-standard assumptions about the semantics and
pragmatics interface in that it is only based on an independently motivated theory of scalar
implicatures. Furthermore, it straightforwardly predicts the differences between neg-raising
predicates and soft triggers.
2.4 A scalar implicature-based approach
From the data discussed above, the generalization appears to be as follows: when neg-raising
predicates and soft triggers are embedded under negation, the inferences associated with them
arise systematically. For instance (60a) and (61a) are typically read as implying (60b) and (61b),
respectively.
(60) a. John didn’t stop showing up late for class.
b. John used to show up late for class.
(61) a. John doesn’t think that Fred left.
b. John thinks that Fred didn’t leave.
In the presupposition approach, (61b) arises from (61a) and the excluded-middle inference in
(62), so in turn we could assume that (61a) gives rise systematically to (62).
(62) John has an opinion as to whether Fred left.
However, while a soft presupposition like (60b) is also systematically drawn in the case of other
embeddings, like the antecedents of conditionals, the corresponding inference in (62) is not.
For instance, in the antecedent of a conditional like (63a), the inference in (63b) is systematic
unless explicitly suspended, but the corresponding (64b) isn’t there when we utter (64a).
(63) a. If John stopped showing up late for class, Bill will be happy.
b. John used to show up late for class.
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(64) a. If John thinks that Fred left, he will be upset.
b. John has an opinion as to whether Fred left.
Notice that scalar implicatures exhibit the very same pattern. For instance, consider the scalar
implicature coming from a scalar term like every: first, under negation, scalar implicatures like
(66b) from (66a) are intuitively robust.16
(66) a. Not every student came.
b. Some student came.
As discussed in CHAPTER 1, the inference from (66a) to (66b) can be accounted for as a scalar
implicature, by postulating that every and some are alternatives to each other. As Chemla (2008)
observes, we can also describe the inference in (65b) as behaving like a presupposition with
respect to negation. In other words, one could describe the inference in (66b) as projecting
through negation, as both (66a) and (67) give rise to the inference in (66b), the former as an
entailment, the latter as a scalar implicature.
(67) Every student came.
Given this perspective, one might wonder whether the inference in (66c) can “project” out of
other embeddings such as the antecedent of a conditional, in parallel to what presuppositions
do. In other words, one might wonder whether (68a) can lead to the inference in (68b).
(68) a. If every student came, the party was a success
b. Some student came
16Chemla (2009c) calls scalar implicatures coming from strong scalar terms in downward entailing contexts, like
the one in (66b), “negative implicatures”. Chierchia (2004) calls them “indirect scalar implicatures” and claims that
they are weaker than regular ones. I disagree with the intuition for the case of negation: I think (66b) is an inference
of (66a) as robustly as (65b) is an inference of (65a).
(65) a. Some of the students came.
b. Not every student came.
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In fact, (68b) is not predicted to be an inference of (68a) by standard theories of scalar impli-
catures and, indeed, there is a difference between the pair (63a) and (63b) and (68a) and (68b):
assuming that we can infer (68b) from (68a) sometimes we certainly do not need the explicit
suspension like in (69) in order not to draw it.
(69) I don’t know whether any of the students came, but if everyone did, the party was a
success.
From the data above, It appears that the behavior of neg-raising inferences in embeddings re-
sembles scalar implicatures more than soft presuppositions. In the following, I show how we
can derive this pattern: scalar implicatures and neg-raising inferences are drawn systematically
when (strong) scalar terms and neg-raising predicates are embedded under negation, but much
less, if at all, in other embeddings, like the antecedent of conditionals.
2.4.1 The excluded middle as an alternative
I adopt the theory of scalar implicatures as entailments of exhaustified sentences described in
CHAPTER 1 (Fox 2007, Chierchia et al. To appear, Magri 2010b among others). The only
addition specific to neg-raising has to do with the alternatives that I assume for neg-raising
predicates: the proposal is that they have the excluded middle proposition as their alternative.
The semantics of a neg-raising predicate P is non-presuppositional and it is given schematically
in (70), while its alternatives are in (71).
(70) [[P]] = λpλx.P(p)(x)
(71) Alt(P) =
 λpλx.P(p)(x)λpλx.[P(p)(x)∨ P(¬p)(x)]

Given the definition of alternatives’ growth in CHAPTER 1, a sentence like (72a) winds up
having the alternatives in (72c).
43
(72) a. John believes that Bill left
b. believej(p)
c. Alt(believej(p)) =
 believej(p)believej(p)∨ believej(¬p)

A question at this point is of course where these alternatives of neg-raising predicates come
from. I don’t offer more than Gajewski (2007) and Abusch (2010) in this respect: instead
of stipulating that believe(p) has believe(¬p) as an alternative, as Gajewski (2007) does, I
am encoding the excluded middle, that is [believe(p) ∨ believe(¬p)], directly as one of the
alternatives. This might seem just a technical variant of Abusch-Gajewski’s approach, but as
we will see in the next section, it now becomes possible to obtain neg-raising inferences via the
alternatives above and just a regular theory of scalar implicatures.
2.5 Predictions
2.5.1 The basic case and negation
In the unembedded case, exhaustification is vacuous as the excluded middle alternative is en-
tailed by the assertion. For instance, in the case of a neg-raising predicate like believe in (73a),
if John believes that it is raining, then he has an opinion as to whether it is raining, so none of
the alternatives in (73c) is excludable.
(73) a. John believes that it is raining.
b. believej(p)
c. Alt(believejp) =
 believejpbelievejp∨ believej¬p

However, when a sentence like (73a) is embedded under negation as in (74a), we predict the
excluded middle to project out as if it was a presupposition: the alternative of (74a), schematized
in (74b), becomes (75).
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(74) a. John doesn’t believe that it is raining.
b. ¬believejp
(75) Alt(¬believejp) =
 ¬believejp¬[believejp∨ believej¬p]

The negation of the excluded middle proposition is not entailed by (74b), hence when we ex-
haustify we wind up negating the negation of the excluded middle, thus obtaining the excluded
middle again.
(76) [[EXH]](¬believejp) = ¬believejp∧ ¬¬[believejp∨ believej¬p] =
¬believejp∧ [believejp∨ believej¬p]
As we know from above, (76) entails (77), hence we derive the neg-raising inference. Indeed,
the claim that John has an opinion about p together with the assertion that it’s not true that John
believes that p allows us to conclude that he believes that not-p.
(77) believej¬p
2.5.2 Other embeddings and non-projection
2.5.2.1 Non projection
As we just saw, in the case of negation, exhaustifying a sentence like (78a) gives rise to the
excluded middle inference in (78b), from which we can conclude the neg-raising inference in
(78c).
(78) a. John doesn’t think that Fred left
b. John has an opinion as to whether Fred left.
c. John thinks that Fred didn’t leave.
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What about the case of other embeddings? It is easy to show that the present proposal does
not predict that neg-raising inferences should project out of embeddings in the same way as
presuppositions. In other words, we make the same prediction for think and every in cases like
(79a)-(79b) and (80a)-(80b): exhaustification of these cases does not give rise to the inferences
in (79d) and (80d), respectively.
(79) a. If John thinks that Fred left, he will be upset
b. Perhaps John thinks that Fred left
c. Does John think that Fred left?
d. 6 John has an opinion as to whether Fred left
(80) a. If Frank met every student, he will come to our department.
b. Perhaps Frank met every student.
c. Did Frank meet every student?
d. 6 Frank met some student
For instance in the case of (79b), schematized in (81a), the alternatives that we have are in (81b).
It is easy to see that none of the alternatives is excludable, thus no inference is predicted from
exhaustification in this case.
(81) a. ♦[thinkj(p)]
b. Alt(♦[thinkj(p)]) =
 ♦[thinkj(p)]♦[thinkj(p)∨ thinkj(¬p)]

More in general, when a neg raising predicate P is embedded under some upward entailing
operator Oue, EXH(Oue[P]) is always vacuous. When a predicate P is embedded under some
non-upward entailing operator Onon−ue, instead, EXH(Onon−ue[P]), gives rise to the nega-
tion of the excludable alternatives of Onon−ue[P]. These inferences are different from the
projection of the excluded middle predicted by the presuppositional approach, hence, in prin-
ciple, if one could argue for their existence, one would have a strong argument in favor of the
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present approach. As I show in the next section, however, the task is not easy.
2.5.2.2 Novel inferences
Consider the case of the antecedent of conditionals as in (82a), schematized as in (82b), where
I adopt for concreteness a strict conditional semantics for conditionals (von Fintel 1997; see
also CHAPTER 5). The alternatives wind up being (83a) and the exhaustification of (82a) with
respect to such alternatives is in (83b).
(82) a. If Mary believes that it will rain, she will take an umbrella
b. [believe(p)→ q]
(83) a. Alt =
 [believe(p)→ q][(believe(p)∨ believe(¬p))→ q]

b. [[EXH]]([believe(p)→ q]) =
[believe(p)→ q]∧ ¬[(believe(p)∨ believe(¬p))→ q] =
[believe(p)→ q]∧ ♦[(believe(p)∨ believe(¬p))∧ ¬q]
(83b) claims that it’s possible that Mary has an opinion as to whether it is raining and that she
doesn’t take an umbrella. Together with the first conjunct that asserts that if she believes that it
is raining she will take an umbrella, the whole conjunction is equivalent to (84): if she believes
that it is raining, she will take an umbrella and it is possible that she believes that it is not raining
and she won’t take an umbrella.
(84) [believe(p)→ q]∧ ♦[believe(¬p)∧ ¬q]
In this case, however, it is not easy to argue for this inference, because it is entailed by the
so-called “conditional perfection” inference, which conditionals have independently from the
presence of neg-raising predicates.17 Let us turn, then, to another non-UE environment like the
17In this case the inference is that if it’s not the case that Mary believes that it’s raining, then she will not take the
umbrella. This entails that if Mary believes that it’s not raining then she will not take the umbrella. I come back to
this in Appendix A.
47
restrictor of a universal quantifier, as in (85a). In this case, exhaustification gives rise to the
result in (85b) as shown in (86b).
(85) a. Every student who believes that she was accepted will come to the party.
b. Some student who believes that she wasn’t accepted will not come to the party.
(86) a. ∀x[believexp→ Qx]
b. [[EXH]](∀x[believexp→ Qx]) =
(∀x[believexp→ Qx])∧ ¬∀x[(believexp∨ believex¬p)→ Qx] =
(∀x[believexp→ Qx])∧ ∃x[(believexp∨ believex¬p)∧ ¬Qx]
(86b) claims that every student who believes that she was accepted will come to the party and
there is a student who either believes that she was accepted or believes that she wasn’t and won’t
come to the party. The two conjuncts are equivalent to (87): every student who believes that
she was accepted, will come to the party and there is a student who believes that she wasn’t and
won’t come to the party.
(87) ∀x[believexp→ Qx]∧ ∃x[believex¬p∧ ¬Qx]
Given that the presuppositional account does not predict this inference, if we can argue for its
existence we would have an argument for the present proposal.18
An argument for the inference above can be constructed on the basis of the so-called “Hur-
ford’s constraint” outlined in CHAPTER 1. Chierchia et al. (To appear) use Hurford’s constraint
as a diagnostic for scalar implicatures, so we can use it here to test the status of the inference
above. For instance, the present proposal predicts that from (89a) we can have the inference in
18To see that the presuppositional account does not predict it, notice that what we can conclude from (88a) depends
on our assumptions about the projection of presuppositions from the restrictors of universal quantifiers. Suppose, for
the sake of the argument, that we assume a theory that predicts universal projection from the restrictor of universal
quantifiers, what we can conclude from (88a) is (88b).
(88) a. Every student who believes that she was accepted will come to the party.
b. Every student has an opinion on the matter.
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(89b)
(89) a. Every student who thinks I am right will support me.
b. Some student who think that I am not right will not support me.
We can then construct the disjunction in (90) to check whether (89b) is an inference from (89a).
Notice that given the downward entailingness of the restrictor of every the second disjunct in
(90) entails the first one, unless the first one is analyzed as in (91). (91), given the present
proposal, gives rise to the inference in (89b), which disrupts the entailment relation.
(90) Either every student who thinks I am right will support me or every student who has an
opinion on the matter (at all) will.
(91) EXH[every student who thinks that I am right will support me]
To the extent that (90) is felicitous we have an argument for the inference in (87). The same
argument can be reproduced for the inference from (96a) to (96b), given the disjunction in (97).
(cf. section 2.6.3, for the predictions relative to neg-raising predicates embedded under negative
quantifiers).19
19Notice that this argument is undermined by felicitous disjunctions with no neg-raising predicate like (92), in
which the second disjunct entails the first.
(92) We will either test everyone who smokes Marlboro or we will test everyone who smokes (at all).
If (92) is felicitous, there must be another inference disrupting the entailment relation between disjuncts. Katzir
(2007) argues that the restrictor of a universal has its syntactic simplification as alternatives. So in this case the
alternative of (93a) would be (93b). Exhaustification would give then rise to the inference in (94), which, in turn,
would disrupt the entailment relation between the disjuncts of (92).
(93) a. We wil test everyone who smokes Marlboro.
b. We will test everyone who smokes.
(94) ¬[we will test everyone who smokes]
This alternative explanation of the felicity of this type of disjunction is not available for cases in which the entailing
disjunct is more complex than the entailed one, like in (95). In this case it is not straightforward to see what
alternative obtained by syntactically simplify the first disjunct could disrupt the entailment relation between the
second disjunct and the first one.
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(96) a. No student who thinks that I am wrong will support me.
b. Some student who thinks that I am right will support me.
(97) Either no student who thinks that I am wrong will support me or no student who has
an opinion on the matter will.
2.5.2.3 Summary
I proposed that neg-raising predicates have their corresponding excluded middle propositions
as alternatives and that neg-raising inferences arise as a scalar implicature via exhaustification
of sentences containing such predicates. As we saw, the differences between neg-raising infer-
ences and (soft) presuppositions are accounted for straightforwardly in the present approach.
Notice that strictly speaking explaining the difference depends also on the account of soft pre-
suppositions that we assume. This is because once we have an account of neg-raising in terms
of scalar implicatures we do not have to connect neg-raising and soft presuppositions anymore.
In particular, if we have an account of soft presuppositions as real presuppositions, like the
one proposed in Fox 2012b, explaining the difference with neg-raising inferences becomes ex-
tremely easy: one can simply assume that any difference between the two comes from the fact
that they are different things. On the other hand, if you have an account of (soft) presupposi-
tions as scalar implicatures like the one I propose in CHAPTER 3 and 4 or Chemla 2009a, in
preparation, then, like Gajewski (2007), you face the challenge of accounting for the difference
between neg-raising inferences and soft presuppositions. In CHAPTER 3, Appendix A, I show
that, unlike the presuppositional approach, the scalar implicature approach allows us to account
for the differences between soft presuppositions and neg-raising inferences, while treating them
both as scalar implicatures. In CHAPTER 4, Appendix B, I compare the scalar-implicature based
theory of soft presuppositions I propose in CHAPTER 3 to the one in Fox 2012b.
Finally, notice that the present proposal, like Gajewski’s (2007), can account for the fact
(95) Either every student who wants to invite Philippe will come to the meeting or every student who has a
desire on the matter will come.
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that neg-raising inferences are characteristics of certain predicates and not others. What dis-
tinguishes neg-raising and non-neg-raising predicates is their alternatives: the former has the
excluded middle as an alternative but the latter do not.
2.6 Explaining what the presuppositional approach can explain
I turn now to the four aspects of the behavior of neg-raising predicates discussed in section
2.3.1, which are taken as motivations for the presuppositional approach, and I show how the
present proposal can account for them too.
2.6.1 Suspension of neg-raising inferences
The context dependence of neg-raising predicates can be accounted for in the presupposi-
tional account by a mechanism of local accommodation or cancellation of the presupposi-
tion. How can we account for it in the present proposal? In CHAPTER 1, I discussed how the
exhaustification-based theory can account for the context dependence of scalar implicatures. I
show now that we can adopt the same mechanism for the case of neg-raising inferences.
To illustrate, let us start from the case, where the neg-raising inference is not suspended. I
argue that in cases (98a), the most natural question under discussion is (99a).
(98) a. Bill doesn’t think that Fred left.
b. Bill thinks that Fred didn’t leave.
(99) a. What does Bill think about whether Fred left?
(99) in turn gives rise to the partition in (101b) (or refinements thereof), where the cells are
worlds in which Bill thinks that Fred left, the ones in which Bill thinks that Fred didn’t leave
and the ones in which Bill has no opinion on the matter.
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(100) Q =

c1 = thinkbp
c2 = thinkb¬p
c3 = ¬[thinkb(p)∨ thinkb(¬p)]

Recall that we are assuming a notion of relevance such that a proposition is relevant if and
only if it is a cell or a union of cells in the (partition of) the question under discussion. The
alternatives of (98a) as schematized in (101a) are represented in (101b).
(101) a. ¬thinkb(p)
b. Alt =
 ¬thinkb(p)¬[thinkb(p)∨ thinkb(¬p)]

We can now see that they are all relevant: they are either a cell or a union of cells of (100).20
Hence, when we exhaustify as in (102), we obtain the inference in (121d), in the way indicated
above.
(102) EXH[not[Bil thinks[+σ] that Fred left]]]
Let us consider now the case of suspension in (103), repeated from above.
(103) John DOESN’T think that it is raining. He isn’t sure.
The focus on the auxiliary suggests that the question under discussion is (104). (104) is a polar
question, which creates the partition in (105). GivenQ, among the alternatives of (103) in (107)
only the one corresponding to the assertion, ¬thinkj(p), is relevant.21,22
20¬thinkb(p) = c2 ∪ c3 and ¬[thinkb(p)∨ thinkb(¬p)] = c3.
21¬[thinkj(p)∨ thinkj(¬p)] is irrelevant because it distinguishes within the c2.
22When we have an explicit question-answer like in (104a)-(104b), we can understand (104b) as implicating that
John thinks that it’s not raining. In the case in which we draw the neg-raising inference we are accommodating a
different question, namely (152).
(104) a. Does John think that it is raining?
b. John doesn’t think that it is raining.
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(105) Does John think that it is raining?
(106) Q =
 c1 = thinkjpc2 = ¬thinkjp

(107) Alt =
 ¬thinkj(p)¬[thinkj(p)∨ thinkj(¬p)]

In this case, then, no alternative other than the assertion is relevant thus we predict the sus-
pension of the neg-raising inference in (103). This can account for the observation by Gajewski
(2005) that stress on the negation suspends the neg-raising inference, as shown by (108a) versus
(108b), repeated from above.
(108) a. John doesn’t think that Fred left. #He isn’t sure.
b. John DOESN’T think that Fred left. He isn’t sure.
Notice that indeed the same pattern arises with other scalar terms like some in (109a) and (109b).
(109) a. John didn’t correct some of the papers, #he corrected them all.
b. John DIDN’T correct some of the papers, he corrected them all.
Summing up, the suspension of neg-raising inferences is accounted for by simply adopting the
mechanism for suspension of scalar implicature. Furthermore, this accounts for the fact that
stress on negation suspends neg-raising inferences.23
23As Gajewski (2005) observes we can also suspend neg-raising inferences via stress on the predicate.
(110) John doesn’t THINK that it is raining, he is not sure.
Scalar implicatures seem to pattern again in the same way as neg-raising inferences here, as (111) shows.
(111) John didn’t correct ALL of the papers, he corrected none.
How do we account for the suspension of (110) and (111)? I argue that the focus on the predicate suggests that
the question under discussion should be (112a) and the corresponding partition (112b): we are asking what is the
relation is that John does not bear to the propositional complement.
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2.6.2 Interaction with polarity
The present proposal predicts, like Gajewski’s (2007), that negated neg-raising predicates create
anti-additive environments, thus predicting the licensing of strong NPIs like until in sentences
like (115).
(115) John didn’t think that Bill would leave until tomorrow
In fact, the entailment in (116), for any neg-raising predicate P, propositional arguments p,q
and individual x, is also predicted by the semantics proposed here.
(116) [[EXH[not P]]](p)(x)∧ [[EXH[not P]]](q)(x)⇒ [[EXH[not P]]](p∨ q)(x)
Let us go through this in brief: first, consider the meaning of a neg-raising predicate P to
have the form in (117a) (see fn.2 and 13 above), with the alternatives in (117b), and that the
exhaustification of (117a) with respect to the alternatives in (117b), brings about the neg-raising
inference as in (117c).
(117) a. [[not P]](p)(x) = ¬p
b. Alt =
 ¬p¬[p∨¬p]

c. [[EXH[not P]]](p)(x) = ¬p∧ ¬¬[p∨¬p] = ¬(p)
(112) a. What is the R such that John doesn’t bear R with respect to whether it is raining?
b. {¬thinkjp,¬thinkj¬p,¬thinkjp∧ ¬thinkj¬p,¬hopejp, ...}
In this case, the alternative that John does not have an opinion as to whether it is raining is relevant. Therefore, if the
sentence is exhaustified globally, it would lead to the neg-raising inference in (113), which is in contradiction with
the second sentence in (111). We are then allowed to exhaustify locally and suspend the inference.
(113) ¬EXH[John thinks that it is raining], he is not sure.
The same mutatis mutandis applies to the case of all. Notice that it is not clear that focus on a soft trigger like
discover obtain the same effect of suspension. Beaver (2004) argues, indeed, that the intonational pattern in (114)
favors the projection of the soft presupposition, rather than its suspension.
(114) John didn’t DISCOVER that he was accepted, (?)he wasn’t.
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Analogously, the exhaustification of (118a) with respect to (118b) brings about the inference in
(118c).
(118) a. [[not P]](p∨ q)(x) = ¬(p∨ q)
b. Alt =
 ¬[(p∨ q)]¬[(p∨ q)∨¬(p∨ q)]

c. [[EXH[not P]]](p∨q)(x) = ¬(p∨q)∧¬¬[(p∨q)∨¬(p∨q)] = ¬(p∨q)
It is easy to show, then, that (119a) and (119b) together entail (119c): if there are no worlds in
which p is true and there are no worlds in which q is true, there are no worlds in which p ∨ q
is true.
(119) a. [[EXH[not P]]](p)(x) = ¬(p)
b. [[EXH[not P]]](q)(x) = ¬(q)
c. [[EXH[not P]]](p∨ q)(x) = ¬(p∨ q)
Summing up, for arbitrary p,q the present semantics validates the inference in (116), thus
predicting that negated neg-raising predicates create anti-additive contexts.24
I turn now to negative quantifiers and negated universals and show that the inferences pre-
dicted by the present proposal are the right ones and that the licensing of NPIs in such environ-
ments is also correctly predicted.
2.6.3 Negative quantifiers and negated universals
Turning to the case of negative quantifiers, recall that we want to account for the fact that (120a)
gives rise the inference in (120b) and that strict NPIs are licensed in the scope of negative
quantifiers as (121) shows.
(120) a. No student thinks that Mary passed.
24Recently, Gajewski (2009) himself and Chierchia (to appear) have argued that anti-additivity is actually neither
sufficient nor necessary for the licensing of strict NPIs. I come back to this in Appendix C, with a discussion of a
problem for that approach in relation to presuppositional neg-raising predicates.
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b. Every student thinks that Mary didn’t pass.
(121) No student thought that Mary would leave until tomorrow.
Furthermore, as Homer (2012a) discusses, we also want to account for the inference from a
negated universal quantifier like (122a) to (122b).
(122) a. Not every student think that Mary passed
b. Some student thinks that Mary didn’t pass
As we saw above, the presuppositional approach can account for these inferences, assuming the
projection behavior of presuppositions across negative quantifiers and negated universals. Let
me show now that the present account also has no problem accounting for these facts, if we
assume that a sentence with no like (123a) has the corresponding sentence with not every in
(123b) as an alternative.
(123) a. No student came.
b. Not every student came.
This assumption is motivated independently on the following grounds: first, notice that it is
generally assumed that sentences with negative quantifiers like (124a) and negated universals
like (124b) are alternatives of one another (Horn (1972), Levinson (2000)). Indeed as seen
above, this can predict the inference from (124a) to (124c) as the negation of the stronger
alternative in (124b).
(124) a. Not every student came.
b. No student came.
c. Some student came.
Second, there are various independent arguments for decomposing negative quantifiers into
negation plus an indefinite (see Sauerland 2000, Penka 2007, Iatridou and Sichel 2008 among
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many others). Assuming the decomposition of no as not some, given any standard definition
of how alternatives grow (Sauerland 2004; cf. CHAPTER 1) and the assumption that every and
some are scale-mates, we straightforwardly predict that a sentence with no (=not some) should
have the corresponding sentence with not every as an alternative.
Given this assumption, a sentence like (125a) will have (125b) among its alternatives and
so we obtain the universal neg-raising inference in (125c) as shown by the derivation in (126).
(125) a. No student thinks that Mary passed.
b. Not every student thinks that Mary passed.
c. Every student thinks that Mary didn’t pass.
(126) a. ¬∃x[stud(x)∧ thinkm(p)]
b. Alt =

¬∃x[stud(x)∧ thinkm(p)]
¬∃x[stud(x)∧ (thinkm(p)∨ thinkm(¬p))]
¬∀x[stud(x)→ thinkm(p)]
¬∀x[stud(x)→ (thinkm(p)∨ thinkm(¬p))]

c. Excl =
 ¬∃x[stud(x)∧ (thinkm(p)∨ thinkm(¬p))]¬∀x[stud(x)→ (thinkm(p)∨ thinkm(¬p))]

d. [[EXH]](¬∃x[stud(x)∧ thinkm(p)]) =
¬∃x[stud(x) ∧ thinkm(p)] ∧ ∀x[stud(x) → (thinkm(p) ∨ thinkm(¬p))] =
¬∃x[stud(x)∧ thinkm(p)]∧ ∀x[stud(x)→ thinkm(¬p)]
In sum, the present account correctly predicts a universal neg-raising inference in the scope
of negative quantifiers like no. I argue for the existence of this inference in the case of scalar
implicatures in general; for instance, that (127b) can be an inference of (127a) (see CHAPTER 3
and 6 for discussion).
(127) a. None of these ten professors failed all of their students.
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b.  All of these ten professors failed some of their students.
As for the licensing of strict NPIs, notice that we also predict that neg-raising predicates in the
scope of negative quantifiers create an anti-additive environment. In fact, if no one thinks that
p and no one thinks that q the entailment that no one thinks that p or q is predicted. If every
person’s belief worlds are worlds in which p is not true and every person’s belief worlds are
worlds in which q is not true than every person’s belief worlds are worlds in which p or q is not
true. This can account for the licensing of strict-NPIs in sentences like (128).
(128) No student thought that Bill would leave until tomorrow
Turning now to negated universals, it is easy to see that also in this case the present proposal
makes the correct prediction. In other words, it predicts (129b) to be an inference of (129a), as
shown by the derivation in (130).
(129) a. Not every students wants to help me (Homer 2012a)
b. There is some student who wants not to help me
(130) a. ¬∀x[stud(x)→ wantm(p)]
b. Alt =

¬∀x[stud(x)→ wantm(p)]
¬∀x[stud(x)→ (wantm(p)∨ wantm(¬p))]
¬∃x[stud(x)∧ wantm(p)]
¬∃x[stud(x)∧ (wantm(p)∨ wantm(¬p))]

c. Excl =

¬∃x[stud(x)∧ wantm(p)]
¬∃x[stud(x)∧ (wantm(p)∨ wantm(¬p))]
¬∀x[stud(x)→ (wantm(p)∨ wantm(¬p))]

d. [[EXH]](¬∀x[stud(x)→ wantm(p)]) =
¬∀x[stud(x)→ wantm(p)]∧∃x[stud(x)∧wantm(p)]∧∀x[stud(x)→ (wantm(p)∨
wantm(¬p))] = ¬∀x[stud(x) → wantm(p)] ∧ ∃x[stud(x) ∧ wantm(p)] ∧
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∃x[stud(x)∧ wantm(¬p)]
Summing up, we do not need the presuppositional approach to account for the universal in-
ference of neg-raising predicates embedded in the scope of negative quantifiers and the wide
scope existential readings of negated universals, nor do we need it to account for the licens-
ing of strict-NPIs in such environments. Let me now turn to the last putative presuppositional
behavior of neg-raising predicates, that is their behavior when stacked one into another.
2.6.4 Partial cyclicity
As discussed above, a negated neg-raising belief predicate embedding a neg-raising desire-one
like in (131a) allows a reading as if negation was taking scope at the lowest level like in (131b),
while a desire-predicate embedding a belief-one like (132a) does not.
(131) a. I don’t believe Bill wanted Harry to die.  
b. I believe Bill wanted Harry not to die.
(132) a. I don’t want Bill to believe Harry died. 6 
b. I want Bill to believe Harry didn’t die.
Furthermore, strict-NPIs are licensed in sentences like (131a) but not in (132b) as shown by
(133a) and (133b), respectively.
(133) a. I don’t believe John wanted Harry to die until tomorrow. (Gajewski 2007)
b. *I don’t want John to believe Harry died until yesterday.
As we saw, the presuppositional approach can explain this pattern quite elegantly. I show that
the present proposal can account for it, given a condition that regulates the interaction between
presuppositions and exhaustification. Let us first go through what happens if we exhaustify
(132a) or (131a).
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2.6.4.1 Symmetric predictions
As it stands, the present system overgenerates, in that it predicts that both the negation of be-
lieve(want) and that of want(believe) should lead to the reading as if negation was taking the
lowest scope below both predicates. To illustrate, consider the sentence in (134a), schematized
in (134b) and with the alternatives in (134c).
(134) a. Mary doesn’t believe that John wants Fred to leave
b. [[EXH]][¬[belm[wantj(p)]]]
c.

¬[belm[wantj(p)]]
¬[belm[wantj(p)∨ wantj(¬p)]]
¬[belm[wantj(p)]∨ belm[¬[wantj(p)]]]
¬[belm[wantj(p)∨ wantj(¬p)]∨ belm[¬[wantj(p)∨ wantj(¬p)]]]

Once we exhaustify and negate all the alternatives that are not entailed by the assertion we
obtain the conjunction of (135a), (135b), and (135c).
(135) a. ¬believem(wantj(p))
b. believem(wantj(p))∨ believem¬(wantj(p))
c. believem(wantj(p)∨ wantj(¬p))
It is easy to see that from (135a) and (135b) we can conclude (136a) and from (136a) and (135c)
we can infer that (136b).
(136) a. believem¬(wantj(p))
b. believem(wantj(¬p))
So we rightly predict that (134a) can lead to the inference in (137).
(137) Mary believes that John wants that Fred didn’t leave
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The predictions, however, are the same also for want embedding believe, as they only depend
on the combination of alternatives. We have of course various ways to suspend this inference
(non-activation of alternatives and local exhaustification) but the question is why the inference
appears to be always suspended, in a way that differs from the one coming from believe(want).
In response to this issue, I propose that there is a condition on EXH, which requires that EXH
should not tinker with the presupposition of its prejacent. As I show below, this blocks ex-
haustification in the case of want embedding believe, but not in the case of believe embedding
want.
2.6.4.2 A condition on EXH
The idea in informal terms is that the exhaustification of a sentence should leave untouched the
presupposition of its prejacent. As I show below, if we were to exhaustify a sentence like (138)
we would end up strengthening its presuppositions and thus we cannot do it.
(138) I don’t want Bill to believe Harry died.
Before formulating the condition, let us make some explicit assumptions about what hap-
pens when EXH applies to a presuppositional prejacent. First, we need to adopt the notion
of strawson-entailment, as defined in (139) (Gajewski 2011, von Fintel 1999).
(139) Strawson entailment
a. For p,q of type t,
p ⊆s q iff p→ q
b. For f,g of type 〈σ, τ〉,
f ⊆s g iff for all a of type σ such that g(a) is defined then f(a) ⊆s g(a)
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The notion of Strawson entailment allows us to look at entailment relations by ignoring presup-
positions. We can, hence, define EXH as in (140).25
(140) a. [[EXH]](φ)(w) = ∀ψ ∈ Excl(φ)[¬ψw]
b. Excl(φ) = {ψ ∈ Alt(φ) : φ *s ψ}
The presuppositions of an exhaustified sentence are, hence, going to be those of the prejacent
and those of the negated alternatives. We can now formulate the condition in (141), which
requires EXH to leave the presuppositions of its prejacent untouched. In other words, the ex-
haustivity operator should be just a “hole” in Karttunen’s (1973) sense and not add anything to
the presuppositions of the prejacent. The condition is formulated as a presupposition of EXH
as in (141) (to be revised in Appendix B, to accommodate cases not involving only neg-raising
predicates).
(141) EXH[φ] is defined only if pi(φ) = pi(EXH[φ])
(where for any α, pi(α) indicates the presuppositions of α)
I show now that (141) blocks exhaustification in the case of want embedding believe, but before
that let us go through a semantics for want that I adopt.
A semantics for want I adopt the doubly-relative modal semantics of want proposed by von
Fintel (1999), and defended further in Crnic 2011.26 A sentence like a wants p roughly says
that among a’s doxastic alternatives, the most desirable to a are p-worlds. von Fintel (1999)
formalizes this intuition with a modal semantics, relativized to two conversational backgrounds:
the first is the modal base, that is the set of a’s doxastic worlds, and the second is a set of
propositions, representing a’s desires and used to impose an ordering on the modal base. These
two conversational backgrounds are obtained through the use of the two functions in (142a) and
25We can define the notion of innocent exclusion on the basis of Strawson entailment. I just use the simpler notion
here for the sake of presentation.
26This is not essential and an analogous argument could be made with Heim’s (1992) non-monotonic semantics.
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(142b).
(142) a. f(a,w) = {w ′ ∈W : w ′ is compatible with what a believes in w}
b. g(a,w) = {p ⊆W : p is (the content of) a desire of a in w}
We now define a strict partial ordering on f(a,w) using the set of propositions g(a,w), as in
(143): w ′ is better than w ′′ relative to P iff all propositions in P that hold in w ′′ also hold in
w ′ and some that hold in w ′ do not hold in w ′′.
(143) for any set of propositions P, worlds w ′,w ′′:
w ′ <p w ′′ iff ∀p ∈ P : p(w ′′)→ p(w ′)∧ ∃q ∈ P : p(w ′)∧ ¬p(w ′′)
Then we define a selection function BESTP, which picks the worlds in the modal base that are
best according to <p
(144) given a partial ordering <p, BESTP selects the best P worlds in any set of worlds X:
∀X ⊆W : BESTP(X) = {w ∈ X : ¬∃w ′ ∈ X : w ′ <p w}
Finally, we can define the meaning of want as in (145).
(145) [[want]](f)(g)(p)(a) = λw . ∀w ′ ∈ BESTg(a,w)(f(a,w))[p(w ′)]
The semantics above has to be refined, because as Heim (1992) and von Fintel (1999) notice, it
has some unwanted consequence in relation to what the attitude holder believes. In particular,
if a believes that p, it follows that a wants that p is automatically true (if all a’s belief worlds
are p-worlds, then the most desirable worlds to a among them will also be). Analogously, if
a believes that p is false, it follows automatically that a wants that p is false (if none of a’s
belief worlds are p-worlds, then none of the most desirable to a among them are p-worlds).
To avoid this problem, von Fintel (1999), following Heim (1992), postulates that the semantics
above also has a presupposition that the attitude holder neither believes that the propositional
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argument of want is true nor believes that it’s false.27
(147) [[want]](f)(g)(p)(a) =
λw : ∅ 6= f(a,w) ∩ p 6= f(a,w) . ∀w ′ ∈ BESTg(a,w)(f(a,w))[p(w ′)]
Back to partial cyclicity Let us go back to the case of want embedding believe like in (148).
(148) Mary doesn’t want John to believe that Fred left.
I am assuming that the meaning of (148) is (149a) with the presuppositions in (149b). I show
now that if we were to exhaustify (149) we would strengthen the presuppositions in (149b).
(149) a. ¬∀w ′ ∈ BESTg(m,w)(f(m,w))[belj,w ′(p)]
b. ∃w ′ ∈ f(m,w)[belj,w ′(p)]∧ ∃w ′′ ∈ f(m,w)[¬belj,w ′′(p)]
Let us simplify the notation and write (149b) as (150), where ♦m[p] indicates that p is possible
according to Mary’s beliefs.
(150) ♦m[belj(p)]∧ ♦m[¬belj(p)]
Consider now what would happen if we were to exhaustify (148) as in (151) with respect to its
alternatives in (152).
(151) EXH[Mary doesn’t want John to believe that Fred left]
27Notice that this has to be further refined to accommodate examples such as (146) from Heim (1992), where the
attitude holder does not appear to have doubts about where he will be tonight.
(146) (John hired a baby-sitter) because he wants to go to the movies tonight.
Heim (1992:p.199) proposes that what (146) teaches us is that “when we assess someone’s intention [...] we don’t
take into account all his beliefs, but just those that he has about matters unaffected by his own future actions”. In
other words, in the semantic adopted here, we should not consider in f(α,w) the set of doxastically accessible
worlds, but rather the set of worlds compatible with what α believes to be the case no matter how he or she chooses
to act. For our purposes, this modification is immaterial, so I will just ignore it.
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(152)

¬[wantm[belj(p)]]
¬[wantm[belj(p)∨ belj(¬p)]]
¬[wantm[belj(p)]∨ wantm[¬[belj(p)]]]
¬[wantm[belj(p)∨ belj(¬p)]∨ wantm[¬[belj(p)∨ belj(¬p)]]]

The result of exhaustification is the conjunction of (153a), (153b), and (153c).
(153) a. ¬wantm(belj(p))
b. wantm(belj(p))∨ wantm¬(belj(p))
c. wantm(belj(p)∨ belj(¬p))
As for the assertion part, in parallel to the case of believe embedding want, from (154a) and
(154b) we could conclude (154c) and from (155a) and (155b) we could conclude (155c). In
other words, we would obtain the reading equivalent to negation taking scope below both neg-
raising predicates.
(154) a. ¬wantm(belj(p))
b. wantm(belj(p))∨ wantm¬(belj(p))
c. wantm(¬(belj(p))
(155) a. wantm(¬belj(p))
b. wantm(belj(p)∨ belj(¬p))
c. wantm(belj(¬p))
However, I show now that the presupposition of the exhaustified sentence is stronger than that
of the prejacent, thus exhaustification is blocked by the condition in (141). To see this, let us go
through the presupposition of each conjunct of the exhaustified assertion. The first conjunct in
(153a) is simply the prejacent so its presupposition in (156a) is just that of the prejacent. The
presupposition of the second conjunct in (153b) is the same as the one in (156a) as shown in
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(156b).28 Finally, that of the third conjunct (153c) is the one in (156c).
(156) a. ♦m[beljp]∧ ♦m[¬beljp]
b. ♦m[beljp]∧ ♦m[¬beljp]
c. ♦m[beljp∨ belj¬p]∧ ♦m[¬[beljp∨ belj¬p]]
The presupposition of the exhaustified assertion would, hence, be (157a), that is the conjunction
of the presuppositions in (156a), (156b) and (156c).
(157) a. ♦m[beljp]∧ ♦m[¬[beljp∨ belj¬p]]
b. ♦m[beljp]∧ ♦m[¬beljp]
It is easy to see that (157a) is stronger than the presupposition of the prejacent repeated in
(157b), thus exhaustification is blocked by the condition in (141) above.
Notice that the case of unembedded want is not blocked by (141). To see this consider
the exhaustification of a sentence like (158a), which gives rise to the meaning in (158b): the
presuppositions is that in (159), which is identical to that of the prejacent.
(158) a. EXH[John doesn’t want that p]
b. ¬wantjp∧ wantjp∨ wantj¬p =
wantj¬p
(159) ♦jp∧ ♦j¬p
Furthermore, the case of believe embedding want like (164a) repeated from above is also al-
lowed by (141) because believe is non-presuppositional, so we predict that EXH can apply and
thus gives rise to the inference in (164b).
Notice that by blocking EXH in (160a) we not only predict that negation cannot take scope
below think, but we also seem to incorrectly predict that it should not even take scope below
28Notice that this is the case regardless of the assumptions about the projection of presuppositions in disjunctive
sentences.
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want. In other words, we do not predict the inference from (160a) to (160b)
(160) a. John doesn’t want that Mary think that p
b. John wants that it’s not true that Mary think that p
However, we have a way to predict the inference from (160a) to (160b), through the LF in (161).
In fact, the most embedded EXH is vacuous, as think is the strongest among its alternatives,
however it “eats” the alternatives of think. Hence, at the global level we are free to exhaustify
again only over the alternatives of want in (162), thereby getting the reading that we want, as
shown in (163). This reduces to the case of want not embedding other scalar terms above, which
is allowed by (141).
(161) EXH[¬[wantsj[EXH[thinkm(p)]]]]
(162)
 ¬[wantm[thinkmp]]¬[wantm[thinkmp]∨ wantm[¬[thinkmp]]

(163) wantj¬[thinkmp]
(164) a. Mary doesn’t believe that John wants that Fred left.
b. Mary believes that John wants that Fred didn’t leave.
In sum, given (141) we correctly predict that, contrary to (164a), (165a) cannot be exhausti-
fied and thus cannot give rise to the inference in (165b). Also the last putative argument for
the presuppositional status of neg-raising predicates can, hence, be accounted for in the scalar
implicature-based proposal here.
(165) a. I don’t want Bill to believe Harry died 6 
b. I want Bill to believe Harry didn’t die.
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2.7 Conclusion
I proposed a scalar implicatures-based approach to neg-raising inferences, which accounts for
the conventionality and the context dependence of neg-raising inferences. The proposal presents
three advantages over Gajewski’s (2007) presuppositional account. First, it accounts for the
non-presuppositional aspect of the behavior of neg-raising inferences, that is their projecting
through negation but not through other embeddings. Second it predicts novel inferences when
neg-raising predicates are embedded in non-upward entailing contexts that the presuppositional
account does not predict. Third, it is based on an independently justified theory of scalar impli-
catures and it does not need to adopt the system by Abusch (2010), which, as discussed above,
has conceptual and empirical problems. Furthermore, it can explain the suspension of neg-
raising inferences, the interaction with the licensing of strict NPIs, the behavior of neg-raising
predicates in the scope of negative quantifiers and negated universals and when they are stacked
one into the other.
2.8 Appendix A: conditional perfection and neg-raising
As pointed out by Geis and Zwicky 1971, a conditional like (166a) can be read as implying
(166c) (von Fintel 2001, Franke 2011 among others). From (166a) and (166b) we can conclude
(166c).
(166) a. If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you $5 dollars.
b. If you don’t mow the lawn, I won’t give you $5 dollars.
c. I’ll give you $5 dollars if and only if you mow the lawn.
This phenomenon is known as “conditional perfection.” What is relevant for us here is that
conditional perfection appears to interact with neg-raising inferences: (167a) is generally also
read as implicating (167c). In other words, there appears to be a neg-raising inference arising
from a conditional perfection one.
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(167) a. If John believes that it’s raining, he’ll take the umbrella.
b. If he believes that it isn’t raining, he won’t take the umbrella.
Notice, however, that (167b) is entailed by (168), hence if we can derive (168), we derive
(167b).
(168) If he doesn’t believe that it’s raining, he won’t take the umbrella.
In section 2.6.2, I discussed that the inference that we obtain through the exhaustification of the
alternatives of a neg-raising predicate in the antecedent of a conditional is at most (171), which
I show is equivalent to the one in (172).
(169) [believe(p)→ q]
(170) a. Alt =
 [believe(p)→ q][(believe(p)∨ believe(¬p))→ q]

(171) ¬[(believe(p)∨ believe(¬p))→ q]
(172) ♦[believe(¬p)∧ ¬q]
So, how do we derive (168)? In the following, I show that we can account for the inference in
(168) adopting an account of conditional perfection.
First, we need an assumption about the semantics of conditionals. I adopt the strict condi-
tional semantics defended in von Fintel (1997) (cf. CHAPTER 5). This is not essential, for our
purposes here we could adopt any other semantics that validates conditional excluded middle,
that is the inference from (173) to (174) (see Lewis 1979 and Stalnaker 1980 for discussion).
(173) a. It’s false that if Mary is in town, she’ll come visit.
b. If Mary is in town, she won’t come visit.
The semantics is a strict conditional semantics, whereby if p,q says that all p-worlds in some
contextually delimited domain are q-worlds.
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(174) [p→ q]
Furthermore, it comes with two presuppositions: (a) the entertainability or compatibility pre-
supposition in (175) that requires that there are p-worlds in the domain of quantification, and
(b) the homogeneity presupposition in (176) which requires that all p-worlds are homogeneous
with respect to q: either they are all q-worlds or they all are not q-worlds. This latter presup-
position directly validates conditional excluded middle.
(175) compatiblity presupposition: ♦p
(176) homogeneity presupposition: [[p→ q]∨[p→ ¬q]]
Second, we need a way to account for conditional perfection. Given that nothing relies on this,
I will not commit myself to any specific account. For our purposes it is enough that from a
conditional if p, q the inference that it’s false that if ¬p, q can sometimes be derived (see von
Fintel 2001 and Franke 2011 for two different proposals on how to derive this). Given these
two assumptions, we can now go back to the case in (167a), schematized in (177).
(177) [believejp→ q]
The inference that we get from (177) given an account of conditional perfection is (178a). The
homogeneity presupposition allows us to conclude (178b), which entails (179), the inference
we wanted: in all worlds in which John believes that it’s not raining, he won’t take an umbrella.
(178) a. ¬[¬believejp→ q]
b. [¬believejp→ ¬q]
(179) [believej¬p→ ¬q]
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2.9 Appendix B: an open issue for the condition on EXH
I discussed above that exhaustification of a sentence like (180a) is not blocked by the condition
above in (141), so that we correctly obtain the neg-raising inference in (180b).
(180) a. EXH[John doesn’t want Mary to come]
b. John wants Mary not to come.
However, if the sentential complement of want contains a strong scalar term like every as in
(181) a problem arises.
(181) Mary doesn’t want every student to come to the party.
To see the problem, notice that (181) can be read as implying (182a) and furthermore at the
same time it can also give rise to the scalar implicature in (182b).
(182) a. Mary wants not every student to come to the party.
b. Mary wants some of the students to come to the party.
If we combine the alternatives of every and want, we obtain both the neg-raising inference in
(182a) and the scalar implicature in (182b): schematically the alternatives that we obtain are
those in (183) and it is easy to show that when we exhaustify (181) with respect to them we
obtain (184).
(183)

¬[wantm[all]]
¬[wantm[some]]
¬[wantm[all]∨ wantm[¬[all]]
¬[wantm[some]∨ wantm[¬[some]]

(184) EXH[¬[wantjall]] = wantj¬all∧ wantjsome
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The predictions would, therefore, be correct. However, we are in the same as we were in in
the case of want embedding believe above: the presuppositions of the exhaustified sentence are
stronger than those of the prejacent: the presuppositions of the prejacent are in (185a) and those
after exhaustification are in (185b).
(185) a. ♦jall∧ ♦j[¬[all]]
b. ♦jall∧ ♦j[¬[some]]
What we are forced to do, therefore, is substitute the condition in (141) repeated in (186) with
the one in (187), which is restricted to the case of exhaustification with respect to alternatives
that only contain neg-raising alternatives.29
(186) EXHφ is defined only if:
pi(φ) = pi(EXH[φ])
(187) EXHφ is defined only if:
if the alternatives are uniformly neg-raising then pi(φ) = pi(EXH[φ])
2.10 Appendix C: A different approach to strict NPIs and a prob-
lem with neg-raising predicates
Gajewski (2005, 2007) assumes the anti-additivity hypothesis by Zwarts (1998) on the licensing
of strong NPIs. However, he himself in a different paper, Gajewski (2011), and Chierchia (to
appear) discuss various issues for the anti-additivity, both empirical and conceptual. They also
propose a new theory of strong NPI licensing, based on the idea that strong NPIs are sensitive
to non-truth conditional meanings, while weak NPIs are not. In the following, I summarize the
idea briefly and then show that presuppositional neg-raising predicates like want constitute a
29Notice that we have to introduce a distinction between the alternatives of neg-raising from the scalar alternatives
of “regular” scalar terms. However, given that the alternatives of neg-raising all have a characteristic disjunctive form
we can see them as forming a natural class.
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challenge for this account. Finally, I propose a tentative solution by weakening the presupposi-
tion of such predicates.
2.10.1 The problems for anti-additivity
Anti-additivity is successful in explaining a variety of contexts that license strong NPIs. How-
ever, as Chierchia (to appear) discusses, it leaves open three problems: first, certain anti-additive
contexts like the restrictor of every and no do not license strong NPIs, as (190a) and (190b), from
Chierchia to appear.30
(190) a. *Every student who left until his birthday missed many classes
b. *No student who has seen Mary in weeks is upset with her
Second, von Fintel (1999) has shown that we should ignore presuppositions for the purpose of
licensing weak NPIs. As seen above, he defines a notion of entailment, Strawson-entailment,
that makes it possible to define a notion of downward monotonicity that, in turn, explain the
distribution of weak NPIs in the scope of presuppositional triggers. However, presuppositional
triggers do not appear to license strong NPIs, despite the fact that when we define anti-additivity
in terms of Strawson-entailment, we have many contexts, in particular all Strawson-downward
entailing contexts, that are Strawson anti-additive and yet do not license strong NPIs (Gajewski
2011). Finally, anti-additivity is a descriptive generalization, and an approach like Gajewski
(2011) and Chierchia (to appear) wants instead to predict why such contexts should license
strong NPIs and not others.
30The anti-additivity of the restrictors of ever and no is shown by the equivalences in (188) e (96c).
(188) a. Every red or blue book is on the table.
b. Every red book is on the table and every blue book is on the table
(189) a. No red or blue book is on the table.
b. No red book is on the table and no blue book is on the table
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2.10.2 Gajewski-Chierchia proposal
Gajewski (2011) and Chierchia (to appear) propose a new theory based on the idea that strong
NPIs are sensitive to non-truth conditional meanings. Informally, the idea is that while presup-
positions and scalar implicatures do not matter for the licensing of weak NPIs, they do matter
for strong NPIs. To illustrate, consider the contrast between (191) and (192), which shows that
a strong NPI like until thursday can appear in the scope of negation like in (191), but cannot
appear felicitously in downward entailing contexts like the restrictor of a universal quantifier as
shown by (192).
(191) Mary didn’t leave until Thursday.
(192) *Every student who left until Thursday, missed the class on presuppositions.
The gist of the idea is that the relevant difference between (192) and (191) is that the former,
but not the latter, has a presupposition (i.e., that the domain of quantification, indicated as D,
and the restrictor have a non-empty intersection). The two components of the meaning of (192)
can be schematized as (193a) and (193b).
(193) a. presupposition: ∃x ∈ D[[[left until thursday]](x)]
b. assertion: ∀x ∈ D[[[left until thursday]](x)→ Q(x)]
Gajewski (2011) and Chierchia (to appear) argue that in evaluating downward entailingness for
the purpose of licensing strong NPIs, we should look at the conjunction of assertion, scalar
implicatures, and presuppositions. Indeed, if we do this in the case of (193a) and (193b), we
do not have a downward entailing environment anymore. In other words, (194) does not entail
(195), for any predicate P.
(194) ∃x ∈ D[[[left until thursday]](x)]∧ ∀x ∈ D[[[left until thursday]](x)→ Q(x)]
(195) ∃x ∈ D[([[left until thursday]](x)∧P(x))]∧∀x ∈ D[([[left until thursday]](x)∧P(x))→
Q(x)]
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In sum, the Gajewski-Chierchia approach predicts that presuppositions should always interfere
with the licensing of strong NPIs. Now I turn to show that when we consider neg-raising desire
predicates, we run into a problem for this hypothesis.
2.10.3 The problem with neg-raising desire predicates
The problem arises when we look at the case of neg-raising predicates like want or intend. The
semantics we assumed is the one in (196).
(196) [[want]](f)(p)(a)(w)
a. only defined iff
∃w ′ ∈ f(a,w)[p(w ′)]∧ ∃w ′ ∈ f(a,w)[¬p(w ′)]
b. when defined true iff
∀w ′ ∈ BESTg(a,w)(f(a,w))[p(w ′)]
Notice now that in the case of (197) the licensing of the strong NPI until Thursday is not ex-
pected.
(197) John doesn’t want Mary to leave until Thursday.
This is because once we consider the conjunction of assertion and presupposition the context
in which until Thursday is in is not downward entailing anymore, as schematically shown in
(198), where φ = “Mary leave until Thursday”.
(198) ∃w ′ ∈ f(j,w)[φ(w ′)]∧ ∃w ′ ∈ f(j,w)[¬φ(w ′)]∧ ¬∀w ′ ∈ BESTg,w(f(j,w))[φ(w ′)]
In essence, what (198) says is that it’s possible for John that Mary leave until thursday
and it’s possible for John that Mary doesn’t leave until thursday and John doesn’t want that
Mary leaves until thursday. So the presupposition creates a positive context that disrupts the
75
downward monotonicity, hence we predict that (197) should be infelicitous.31
2.10.4 The solution
The solution that I propose is to weaken the presupposition of want.32 Recall that the presup-
position of a wants p adopted above is in (201).
(201) [[want]](f)(p)(a)(w)
a. only defined iff
∃w ′ ∈ f(a,w)[p(w ′)]∧ ∃w ′ ∈ f(a,w)[¬p(w ′)]
b. when defined true iff
∀w ′ ∈ BESTg(a,w)(f(a,w))[p(w ′)]
I propose now that we should weaken it to that in (202), which only requires that if a thinks that
p is possible, then a thinks that also ¬p is.
(202) [[want]](f)(p)(a)(w)
a. only defined iff
∃w ′ ∈ f(a,w)[p(w ′)]→ ∃w ′ ∈ f(a,w)[¬p(w ′)]
b. when defined true iff
∀w ′ ∈ BESTg(a,w)(f(a,w))[p(w ′)]
Notice that both occurrences of p are now in a downward entailing environment, hence no
intervention is predicted. There remains, however, the issue that a sentence like (203) in the
31Notice that it is irrelevant for the problem whether or not, given an account of neg-raising, we also conclude
(199), schematized in (200), from (197), as the presupposition part remains the same.
(199) John wants Mary not to leave until Thursday.
(200) ∃w ′ ∈ f(j,w)[φ(w ′)]∧ ∃w ′ ∈ f(j,w)[¬φ(w ′)]∧ ∀w ′ ∈ BESTg,w(f(j,w))[¬φ(w ′)]
32thanks to Gennaro Chierchia (p.c.) for this suggestion.
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semantics adopted here would be false, instead of a presupposition failure, if Mary believes that
p is not possible.
(203) Mary wants that p
As von Fintel (2004) among others discusses, it is unclear that our intuitions about the differ-
ence between presuppositions failure and falsity are reliable, so this new prediction might be
defensible.
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Chapter 3
The presuppositions of soft triggers are
obligatory scalar implicatures
3.1 Introduction
In CHAPTER 2, I introduced the distinction between soft and hard presuppositional triggers, a
much discussed topic in the presupposition literature.1 The challenge for presupposition theo-
ries is explaining both the differences and similarities between the two classes of triggers. Let
us go through them here briefly. First, soft and hard presuppositions appear to pattern alike with
respect to the projection behavior when embedded in propositional connectives. To see this,
consider the case of win and it-clefts, a paradigmatic example of a soft and hard trigger, respec-
tively. A sentence with win like (1a) gives rise to the inference in (1b) and so do its negation in
(1c), a conditional with (1a) embedded in the antecedent like (1d) and the questioned version of
(1a) in (1e). Analogously, (2a) and also (2c)-(2d) give rise to the inference in (2d).
(1) a. Bill won the marathon.
b. Bill participated in the marathon.
c. Bill didn’t win the marathon.
1see Karttunen 1971, Stalnaker 1974, Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000, Simons 2001, Abusch 2002, 2010,
Abbott 2006 and Klinedinst 2010 among others.
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d. If Bill won the marathon, he will celebrate tonight.
e. Will Bill win the marathon?
(2) a. It is Mary who broke that computer.
b. Somebody broke that computer.
c. It isn’t Mary who broke that computer.
d. If it is Mary who broke that computer, she should repair it.
Second, however, soft and hard presuppositions differ with respect to to whether they can be
easily suspended. In particular, the test that I used in CHAPTER 2 and that I will use throughout
this thesis as the diagnostic for softness is “the explicit ignorance test” by Simons (2001). The
idea is creating a context in which the speaker is evidently ignorant about the presupposition;
those triggers that do not give rise to infelicity in such contexts are soft triggers. The following
two examples modeled from Abusch 2010 show that according to this test win and it-clefts are
indeed soft and hard triggers respectively.2
2The boundaries of the soft vs. hard distinction are not uncontroversial (see Abbott 2006 and Klinedinst 2010 for
discussion). There are two main controversial cases: the first case is the status of definite descriptions or possessives,
which in some cases like (3) appear to behave like soft triggers, while in others like (4) they do not.
(3) I do not know if Jane has a brother, but if that guy she came in with is her brother the party will be fun
(4) I don’t know if Jane has a brother, #but if her brother comes tonight the party will be fun
The distinction between (3) and (4) might be traced back to a difference between argumental and predicative posi-
tions (cf. Doron 1983; see also von Fintel 2004). In the following, I put aside these controversial cases, and focus
on paradigmatic cases like win and stop.
The second case regards some apparent differences among factive predicates. Karttunen (1971) observes that
discover and regret pattern differently in cases like (5a) and (5b) (from Karttunen 1971): the presupposition that I
didn’t tell the truth is suspended in (5a) but appears to go through in (5b).
(5) a. If I discover later that I didn’t tell the truth, I will confess it to everyone.
b. If I regret later that I didn’t tell the truth, I will confess it to everyone.
Karttunen (1971) proposes to distinguish between two different classes of factives. Stalnaker (1974) argues that
the difference between cases like (5a) and (5b) can, instead, be given a pragmatic explanation. I ignore this issue
here and treat all factives uniformly as soft triggers. Notice that the present proposal is compatible with a pragmatic
explanation a` la Stalnaker (1974), which can provide a source of difference among soft triggers.
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(6) I don’t know whether Bill ended up participating in the Marathon yesterday.
But if he won, he will celebrate tonight.
(7) I don’t know whether anybody broke that computer.
#But if it is Mary who did it, she should repair it.
In addition to the speaker saying that she is ignorant about the presupposition, we can also
create explicit ignorance contexts, when we make it clear that the speaker does or cannot know
whether the presupposition is true. The case in (8) uttered in a conversation between two people
who are meeting for the first time is an example of this sort (from Geurts 1995 reported in
Simons 2001): (8) is felicitous and the presupposition of stop, i.e. that the addressee used to
smoke, is clearly suspended.
(8) I noticed that you keep chewing on your pencil. Have you recently stopped smoking?
Finally, soft and hard presuppositions also differ when embedded in quantificational sentences
(Charlow 2009, Fox 2012b; see also Chemla 2009b). The observation, due to Charlow (2009),
is that a sentence like (9a) with the hard trigger also typically leads to the universal inference in
(9b), while the sentence in (10a), with the soft trigger stop, does not lead to the corresponding
inference in (10b).
(9) a. Some of these 100 students quit smoking.
b. Each of these 100 students used to smoke.
(10) a. Some of these 100 students also smoke [Marlboro]F
b. Each of these 100 students smoke something other than Marlboro.
In sum, a theory of the soft-hard presuppositions distinction has to account for the difference
with respect to suspendability and the similarity and differences with respect to projection that
they exhibit.
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Another point of debate is that while the defeasibility of soft presuppositions may suggest an
analysis that treats them as implicatures, as I discuss below there are also differences between
them, suggesting that any proposal that tries to account for one in terms of the other, has to
account for their differences too.
In CHAPTER 2, I have defended a scalar implicature-based account of neg-raising infer-
ences building on two ideas which have been put forward in the literature in connection to (soft)
presuppositions: first, soft triggers can be thought of as non-presuppositional items associated
to lexical alternatives (Abusch 2002, 2010; see also Chierchia 2010). Second, the projection
behavior of presuppositions can be given an account in terms of a theory based on scalar im-
plicatures (Chemla 2009a, Chemla in preparation). In this and CHAPTER 4, I extend this scalar
account to give a theory of soft presuppositions. I focus, in particular, on five aspects of the
proposal. First, in this chapter, I propose an account for why soft presuppositions are similar
and different from hard presuppositions, on one hand, and scalar implicatures, on the other,
based on the notion of obligatoriness of scalar implicatures (Chierchia 2006, to appear, Spector
2007a, Magri 2010a). Second, I discuss how the proposal here can account for the projection
behavior of soft presuppositions from the scope and the restrictor of quantificational sentences,
a combination of predictions that is not made by any of the existing alternative theories that
I am aware of. Third, I follow Abrusa´n’s (2011a) solution to the triggering problem of soft
presuppositions, that is the question about where the presupposition of soft triggers come from.
In particular, I adopt and adapt her algorithm in order to give a principled explanation about the
source of the lexical alternatives of soft triggers. Fourth, in CHAPTER 4, I show that given its
syntactic-semantic nature, the present proposal can account for the intervention effects by soft
presuppositions in the licensing of negative polarity items (NPIs) (Homer 2010, Chierchia to ap-
pear). As I discuss below, this account of intervention constitutes one of the main arguments for
a syntactic-semantic approach like the one proposed here, versus purely pragmatic alternatives
in the literature. Finally, I show that the present proposal can also account for some puzzling
cases of the interaction between soft presuppositions and “regular” scalar implicatures.
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This chapter is organized as follows: in section 3.2, I summarize the three main ideas from
Abusch 2002, 2010, Chemla 2009a and Abrusa´n 2011b,a, together with some historical prede-
cessors in the literature. In section 3.3, I outline the implementation of the proposal and its first
predictions. In section 3.4, I show how to account for the differences between soft and hard
presuppositions, on one hand, and soft presuppositions and scalar implicatures, on the other. In
section 3.5, I discuss the predictions for quantificational sentences, and in section 3.6, I sum-
marize and conclude the chapter. Finally, in Appendix A, I discuss the connection between the
account of neg-raising inferences outlined in CHAPTER 2 and the one of soft presuppositions
presented in this chapter.
3.2 Alternatives, projection and triggering
As mentioned above, this chapter builds on three ideas/observations: (a) the class of presuppo-
sitions is not homogeneous, (b) a principled explanation can be given for how such suspend-
able presuppositions come about in the first place, (c) those presuppositions can be reduced
to (scalar) implicatures in how they project. While these ideas in their most developed forms
are due to Abusch (2002, 2010), Abrusa´n (2011b) and Chemla (2009a), respectively, before
summarizing their proposals, I want to briefly point to some predecessors in the literature.
The observation that certain triggers appear more easily suspendable than others goes back
to a discussion between Karttunen (1971) and Stalnaker (1974) about apparent differences be-
tween factive verbs (see fn. 3 above). Stalnaker (1974) is also one of the first to explore the role
of implicatures in the suspension of presuppositions, by proposing that the differences between
triggers could in fact be accounted for by taking into consideration general conversational prin-
ciples. Gazdar (1979) develops a theory of presuppositions in which implicatures play a crucial
role in the projection/non-projection of presuppositions, and Soames (1979), in a different way,
also maintains the idea that implicatures play a role in the non-projection of presuppositions.3
3More recently, Beaver (2004) proposes that the relevant factor in soft presupposition suspension is intonation,
rather than implicatures. See, however, Wagner 2012:pp.8-9 for some challenging examples for this idea. Other
recent accounts of the soft-hard trigger distinction are Simons 2001, Abbott 2006 and Klinedinst 2010. I don’t
discuss their attempts here for lack of space; for detailed criticism of Simons’s (2001) proposal, see Abrusa´n 2011a.
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Attempts at giving an answer to the question of how presuppositions arise go back to Sperber
and Wilson (1979) and Stalnaker (1974) again. The idea was to distinguish among the en-
tailments of a sentence and give a principled explanation for deciding which ones should be
perceived as presuppositions rather than simple entailments. Abrusa´n 2011b,a constitute an
explicit development of these early attempts.4 Finally, the attempt of reducing the projection
of presuppositions to implicatures can be traced back to Kempson 1975 and Wilson 1975. In
particular, Wilson (1975) explicitly defends the idea that an unembedded sentence like (11a)
simply entails (11d), while its negation and a complex sentence embedding (11a) like (11c),
conversationally implicate (11d).
(11) a. John regrets that Bill is ill.
b. John doesn’t regret that Bill is ill.
c. If John regrets that Bill is ill.
d. Bill is ill
In other words, she reduces the projection of presuppositions to an epiphenomenon arising
from looking together at the entailments of unembedded sentences and (certain) implicatures of
(certain) complex sentences embedding them. While Wilson’s (1975) account faces a variety of
problems, as discussed in detail by Soames (1979), the spirit of the idea is the same as the one
by Chemla (2009a), that I discuss below.
Summing up, the observation of the non-homogeneity of the class of presuppositions, at-
tempts at giving principled explanations to the triggering problem and reducing their projection
behavior to implicatures have been present in the literature in one form or other, for a while.
However, it is only recently that these ideas have taken sufficiently empirically adequate forms
in the works of Abusch (2002, 2010), Chemla (2009a) and Abrusa´n (2011b). In the next section,
I summarize each of them, by also drawing a brief comparison with the present proposal.
Abbott (2006) herself points out some empirical problems for her proposal. I leave the comparison with Klinedinst’s
(2010) proposal for further research.
4See Abrusa´n 2011b,a and Abusch 2010 for discussion of the problems of the accounts by Sperber and Wilson
(1979) and Stalnaker (1974).
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3.2.1 Abusch (2002 2009): soft triggers and lexical alternatives
In CHAPTER 2, I discussed the the pragmatic account of soft presuppositions based on lexical
alternatives proposed by Abusch (2002, 2010). The gist of the proposal is that the semantics
of a soft trigger does not contribute a semantic presupposition but it provides a set of lexical
alternatives. For instance (12a), schematized in (12b), has the alternatives in (12c).
(12) a. Bill won.
b. won(b)
c. Alt(12b) =
{
won(b), lost(b)
}
Furthermore, she postulates a pragmatic principle which optionally applies on these alternatives
by requiring that their disjunctive closure, indicated as∨Alt, is true. The hypothesis is that this
pragmatic principle is the source of the soft presupposition inference. For instance in the case
above the disjunctive closure of the alternatives entails (13b).
(13) a. ∨{won(b), lost(b)} = (won(b)∨ lost(b))
b. participated(b)
Once generated in this way, soft presuppositions project into complex sentences given a dy-
namic framework along the lines of Heim 1983 and the fact that, formulated as in (14), the
principle makes reference to the local contexts created by the context change potentials of the
dynamic meanings that make up the sentences.
(14) If a sentenceψ is uttered in a context with common ground c andψ embeds a clause φ
which contributes an alternative setAlt, then typically c is such that the corresponding
local context d for φ entails that some element of Alt is true.
As Abusch (2010) shows, this effectively mimics the projection behavior of semantic presup-
positions, by applying the pragmatic default globally, in a way that makes reference to the local
context of the trigger. However, as I mentioned in CHAPTER 2, this is at odds with standard
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assumptions about the semantics-pragmatics interface, whereby pragmatics only has access to
an output of the semantics, generally thought to be a proposition (or a set of propositions). (14),
instead, makes reference to local contexts from the global level, thus it needs the semantics to
keep track of the history of the semantic composition in terms of the context change potentials
and then make it somehow visible to pragmatics. Abusch (2002) acknowledges this issue.
The pragmatic generalization [...] refers to an embedded information state d. If we
just have the semantic value of the sentence (a certain dynamic proposition or file
change potential), it is not possible to apply the condition, because to apply it, one
has to find the d which corresponds to the global c. To apply the condition, one
has to have access to something like a structured proposition (Lewis 1972) which
stores the pieces from which the semantic value is composed. [...] This is a less
strict separation of semantics from pragmatics, because more of the semantics is
visible to the pragmatics.”
Beyond this conceptual issue, I also discussed two empirical problems for Abusch’s (2010)
proposal: first, it fails to predict any differences between the projection behavior of soft and hard
presuppositions. However, this appears to be wrong in the case of quantificational sentences,
where, as mentioned above, soft and hard triggers project differently. Second, as noticed by
Sauerland (2008), it makes predictions that are too weak in the case of a soft trigger embedded
into another. For instance, it predicts that (15a) should give rise to the inference in (15b) but not
to the attested inference in (15c).
(15) a. John didn’t stop winning.
b. John used to participated.
c. John used to win.
Chemla (2009a) proposes to look at presuppositions as a scalar phenomenon and points out
that doing so could account for the projection facts without having to postulate any of the extra
assumptions in Abusch 2010. We encountered already this idea in CHAPTER 2, I now want to
look at it in more detail in connection to soft presuppositions.
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3.2.2 Chemla (2009): the projection of presuppositions as a scalar phenomenon
The proposal in Chemla 2009a is based on the idea that presuppositional triggers are identical
to strong scalar items like every. In other words, in his approach, an atomic expression φ
that intuitively presupposes p has p as its weaker alternative. For instance, (16b) is both an
entailment and an alternative of (16a), as shown in (31c).5
(17) a. Bill won.
b. Bill participated.
c. Alt(17b) =
{
won(b), participated(b)
}
As Chemla shows, the proposal predicts the apparent projection behavior through negation,
since the negation of (17a), in (18a), has the alternatives in (18c). Given that negation inverts
entailment relations, the alternative Bill didn’t participate is stronger than the assertion (i.e., Bill
didn’t win). Assuming any theory of scalar implicatures, we obtain the negation of Bill didn’t
participate (i.e., Bill participated) as an inference of (18a). In other words, we obtain (18b) as
a scalar implicature of (18a).6
(19) a. Bill didn’t win.
b. Bill participated.
5The fact that (31b) is an entailment of (31a) is shown by (16).
(16) Bill won #but didn’t participate.
6As Chemla (2009a) points out, one could describe the inference of (16a) in (16b) as projecting through negation,
when (16a) is negated in (17a); however, like in Wilson’s (1975) proposal above, in this account, this inference is a
simple entailment in the case of (16a) and a scalar implicature in the one of (17a). Chemla (2009a) also observes
that this is entirely parallel to the behavior of scalar implicatures coming from strong scalar terms, like the ones in
(33a) and (33b), which both give rise to the inference in (22) (see also Beaver 2001).
(18) a. Every student came.
b. Not every student came.
c. Some student came
(22) is a plain entailment of (33a) and, as I show below, it is predicted to be a scalar implicature of (33b).
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c. Alt(19b) =
{
¬won(b),¬participated(b)
}
In the same way as above, the fact that both (18a) and its negation in (19a) give rise to the same
inference is what creates the appearance of projection through negation.
Beyond negation, the proposal also predicts that in the case of quantificational sentences
the projection behavior should depend on the quantifier involved. The pattern predicted by this
proposal is that a sentence like (20a) gives rise to the universal inference in (20b), while (21a)
and (36a) do not give rise to the corresponding inferences in (21b) and (36b). As I discuss
below, this is in line with the experimental results reported in Chemla (2009b).
(20) a. Each of these ten students won.
b. Each of these ten students participated.
(21) a. More than three of these ten students won the marathon.
b. Each of these ten students participated in the marathon.
(22) a. Less than three of these ten students won the marathon.
b. Each of these ten students won the marathon.
While successful with the cases above, as Chemla (2009a) observes, the proposal as it is does
not make the right predictions for presupposition projection from the scope of negative quan-
tifiers. This is because it predicts the existential inference in (23b), while the participants of
Chemla’s (2009b) experiment reported the strong universal inference in (23c) for sentences like
the one in (23a).
(23) a. None of these ten students won the marathon.
b. Some of these ten students participated in the marathon.
c. Each of these ten students participated in the marathon.
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More precisely, the inference in (23c) from (23a) was accepted more often than the analogous
inference with a scalar implicature in (24c) from (24a).
(24) a. None of these ten students did all of the readings.
b. Some of these ten students did all of the readings.
c. All of these ten students did some of the readings.
This difference constitutes a challenge for any proposal that reduces the behavior of soft pre-
suppositions to that of scalar implicatures, since it would predict parallel behavior across the
board, contrary to the data just discussed.
Chemla (in preparation) following his idea in Chemla 2009a, proposes a novel unified ac-
count of presuppositions and scalar implicatures. I refer the reader to his paper for the details
of his account, here I want to emphasize three aspects that are relevant for the comparison with
the present proposal.
The first aspect regards the fact that he responds to his own challenge about the difference
between presuppositions and scalar implicatures by abandoning the idea that presuppositional
triggers are identical to strong scalar items, and assuming different alternatives for scalar im-
plicatures and presuppositions. In doing so, he can account for the difference between the
projection from the scope of negative quantifiers just discussed, because he only predicts exis-
tential inferences in the case of scalar implicatures, while universal inferences for the case of
presuppositions. In other words, he only predicts the inference in (24b) for a case like (24a),
while he predicts the inference in (23c) from (23a). I argue, however, that while there is a dif-
ference with the inference in (23c), the universal inference in (24c) from (24a) is also present in
some cases and this is not predicted by Chemla (in preparation).7
7Chemla himself, in a different paper (Chemla 2008), discusses the example in (25a) and observes that it could
have the inference in (25b).
(25) a. None of these 10 teachers killed all of their students.
b. All of these 10 teachers killed some of their students.
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In this chapter, I propose to develop Chemla’s (2009a) idea differently, responding to his
challenge about negative quantifiers in a way that allows us to predict the inferences from (23a)
to (23c), from (30a) to (30c), and their difference. The proposal has two components: first, I
show that if we look carefully at the alternatives of negative quantifiers, we do actually predict
the possibility of universal projection from their scope, both for soft presuppositions and for
scalar implicatures. Second, I propose a way to account for the difference between soft presup-
positions and scalar implicatures in terms of the notion of obligatory implicatures. As a further
consequence, the alternatives assumed here allow an account of the projection of soft presup-
positions within negative quantifiers and in particular of the asymmetry between nuclear scope
and restrictor, which is not accounted for by Chemla (in preparation) and other recent accounts
An argument for the existence of inferences like (25b) comes from the felicity condition on the utterance of disjunc-
tive sentences that I presented in CHAPTER 1, also known as “Hurford’s constraint” (Hurford 1974; see also Singh
2008b). On the basis of this constraint, Chierchia et al. (To appear) construct a case for the existence of the inference
in (26b) from (26a).
(26) a. All of the students did some of the readings
b. None of the students did all of the readings
The logic of the argument is as follows: one creates a disjunction, where one of the disjunct entails the other in all
readings of (29a) but the one with the scalar implicature in (29b). The case Chierchia et al. (To appear) construct is
(27), which is felicitous and is compatible with Hurford’s constraint, only if we interpret (27) as (28).
(27) Every student solved some of the problems, or Jack solved all of them and all the other students solved
only some of them.
(28) Every student solved some but not all of the problems, or Jack solved all of them and all the other students
solved only some of them.
We can apply the same logic to the case in (29a), repeated from above, and construct a disjunction that is felicitous
under Hurford’s constraint only if we assume that the first disjunct has the scalar implicature in (29b).
(29) a. None of the students did all of the readings.
b. All of the students did some of the reading.
The disjunction in (30) is such that the second disjunct entails the first one unless the latter has the implicature in
(29b).
(30) None of my professors failed all of their students or Gennaro failed none and all of the others failed just
some.
To my ears, while a little involved as a sentence, (30) is felicitous, thereby supporting the existence of the inference
in (29b).
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I am aware of.
The second aspect that distinguishes the present proposal from Chemla’s (in preparation)
account is that the former is not a theory of presuppositions in general but it is restricted to soft
presuppositions. As I discuss below, this can account for the differences between soft and hard
presuppositions in terms of ease of suspension and projection in quantificational sentences.8
The third relevant difference regards the fact that the present proposal is based on the gram-
matical theory of scalar implicature, which postulates the presence of a syntactically realized
exhaustivity operator. As I show below, this operator in the syntax predicts the intervention
effects of soft presuppositions in the licensing of NPIs.
Summing up, the present proposal develops the idea proposed in Chemla (2009a), differ-
ently from the alternative route proposed in Chemla in preparation. As I show below in detail,
the contributions of the present proposal are: first, the alternatives for negative quantifiers pro-
posed here make better predictions both for the case of scalar implicatures and for the one
of soft presuppositions from scopes and restrictors of negative quantifiers. Second, restricting
the theory to soft presuppositions, we can account for the differences between them and hard
presuppositions. Furthermore, assuming a difference between scalar implicatures and soft pre-
suppositions in terms of obligatoriness, we can account for their different behavior. Finally, the
fact that the proposal here is based on an exhaustivity operator in the syntax allows an account
of the intervention effects of soft presuppositions. I turn now to the triggering problem for the
case of soft presuppositions.
— The proposal in Chemla 2009a is based on the idea that presuppositional triggers are
identical to strong scalar items like every. In other words, an expression X that intuitively pre-
supposes p, has p as its weaker alternative. For instance, (31a), would have (31c) as alternatives,
that is, (31b) is, both an entailment and an alternative of (31a).
(31) a. Bill won.
8Notice that one could also restrict Chemla’s (in preparation) account to soft presuppositions. If one doesn’t,
however, one has to provide a different way to account for the differences between soft and hard presuppositions
with respect to context dependence and projection (see Chemla in preparation:p.41 for discussion).
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b. Bill participated.
c. Alt(31b) =
{
won(b), participated(b)
}
As he shows, the proposal immediately predicts the apparent projection behavior through nega-
tion, since the negation of (31a), in (32a), has the alternatives in (32c). Given the fact that
negation inverts entailment relations, the alternative Bill didn’t participate is stronger than the
assertion, Bill didn’t win, hence, assuming any theory of scalar implicatures, we obtain the nega-
tion of Bill didn’t participate as an inference of (32a). Now, it is easy to see that the negation of
Bill didn’t participate is just (32b). In other words, we obtain (32b) as a scalar implicature of
(32a).
(32) a. Bill didn’t win.
b. Bill participated.
c. Alt(32b) =
{
¬won(b),¬participated(b)
}
As Chemla (2009a) points out, one could describe the inference of (31a) in (31b) as projecting
through negation, when (31a) is negated as in (32a); however, like in Wilson’s (1975) proposal,
in this account, this inference is a simple entailment in the case of (31a) and a scalar implicature
in the one of (32a). Chemla (2009a) also observes that this is entirely parallel to the behavior
of scalar implicatures coming from strong scalar terms, like the ones in (33a) and (33b), which
both give rise to the inference in (22) (see also Beaver 2001).
(33) a. Every student came.
b. Not every student came.
c. Some student came
In the same way as above, the fact that both (33a) and its negation in (33b) give rise to the same
inference in (33c) is what creates the appearance of projection through negation.
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Beyond negation, the proposal also predicts that in the case of quantificational sentences
the projection behavior should depend on the quantifier involved. The pattern predicted by this
proposal is that a sentence like (34a) gives rise to the universal inference in (34b), while (35a)
and (36a) do not give rise to the corresponding inferences in (35b) and (36b). As I discuss
below, this is in line with the experimental results reported in Chemla (2009b).
(34) a. Each of these ten students won.
b. Each of these ten students participated.
(35) a. Some of these ten students won the marathon.
b. Each of these ten students participated in the marathon.
(36) a. Less than three of these ten students won the marathon.
b. Each of these ten students won the marathon.
While successful with the cases above, as Chemla (2009a) observes, the proposal as it is does
not make the right predictions for presupposition projection from the scope of negative quan-
tifiers. This is because it predicts the existential inference in (37b), while the participants of
Chemla’s (2009b) experiment reported the strong universal inference in (37c) for sentences like
the one in (37a).
(37) a. None of these ten students won the marathon.
b. Some of these ten students participated in the marathon.
c. Each of these ten students participated in the marathon.
More precisely, the inference in (37c) from (37a) was accepted more often than the analogous
inference with a scalar implicature in (38c) from (38a).
(38) a. None of these ten students did all of the readings.
b. Some of these ten students did all of the readings.
c. All of these ten students did some of the readings.
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This is, hence, a challenge for any proposal that reduces the behavior of soft presuppositions to
the one of scalar implicatures, since it would predict parallel behavior across the board, contrary
to the data just discussed.
In this chapter, I develop Chemla’s (2009a) idea and respond to his challenge about negative
quantifiers. First, I argue that while there is a difference with the inference in (37c), the universal
inference in (38c) from (38a) is also possible in some cases. Chemla himself, in a different paper
(Chemla 2008), discusses the example in (39a) and observes that it could have the inference in
(39b).
(39) a. None of these 10 teachers killed all of their students.
b. All of these 10 teachers killed some of their students.
The theory that I propose in this chapter can account both for the inference from (39a) to (39b)
and for the difference between the latter and the corresponding case involving soft presup-
positions like (37a) above. The proposal has two components: first, I show that if we look
carefully at the alternatives of negative quantifiers, we do actually predict the possibility of
universal projection from their scope, both for soft presuppositions and for scalar implicatures.
Second, I propose a way to account for the difference between soft presuppositions and scalar
implicatures in terms of the notion of obligatory implicatures. As a further consequence, the
alternatives assumed allow an account of the projection of soft presuppositions within negative
quantifiers and in particular of an asymmetry between soft presuppositions coming from soft
triggers embedded in the nuclear scope on one hand and the one coming from soft triggers
embedded in the restrictor on the other; a difference that is not accounted for by alternative
accounts in the literature I am aware of. Chemla (in preparation) following his idea, proposes
an account of presuppositions as scalar implicatures, responding to his own challenge about the
difference between presuppositions and scalar implicatures differently: he abandons the idea
that presuppositional triggers are identical to strong scalar items, and assume different alterna-
tives for scalar implicatures and presuppositions. I compare his account and the one proposed
here in the Appendix A of CHAPTER 4.
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In sum, building on Chemla’s (2009a) idea, I propose here a scalar approach to soft pre-
suppositions. As I discuss below in detail, the contributions of the proposal are: first, the
alternatives for negative quantifiers that I propose here make the right predictions both for the
case of scalar implicatures and for the one of soft presuppositions from scopes and restrictors
of negative quantifiers. Second, restricting the theory to soft presuppositions, we can account
for the difference between them and hard presuppositions. Furthermore, assuming a difference
between scalar implicatures and soft presuppositions in terms of the notion of obligatory im-
plicatures, we can, in turn, account for their different behavior. I turn now to the triggering
problem for the case of soft presuppositions.
3.2.3 Abrusan (2011, to appear): the triggering of soft presuppositions
Abrusa´n (2011b,a) proposes a solution to the triggering problem for soft presuppositions, in
the form of a selection process among the entailments of a sentence. The intuition, following
Stalnaker (1974), is the idea that entailments of a sentence that are not about the main point con-
veyed by the sentence are perceived as presupposed. She uses a notion of aboutness formalized
by Demolombe and Farinas del Cerro (2000); without going into the detail of the formalization,
for which I refer the reader to Abrusa´n’s (2011b) paper, the intuition behind this notion is that
a sentence is about an entity if and only if its truth value can change if we change the truth
value of the facts about that entity. The way this notion is applied to soft presuppositions is as
follows: entailments that are about the event time of the matrix predicate of the sentence are
part of the main point of the sentence, while the ones that are not about the event time of the
matrix predicate are independent and end up being presupposed. Consider the example in (40a)
and its entailments in (40b) and (40c).
(40) a. John knows (at t1) that Fred left (at t2)
b. John believes (at t1) that Fred left (at t2)
c. Fred left (at t2).
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Intuitively, (40b) is about the time denoted by t1 and (40c) is not: changing the properties of
the world at time t1 won’t change the truth-value of (40c) but might change the one of (40b).
The definition of the triggering of soft presuppositions she proposes is (42).9
(42) Soft presupposition triggering Entailments of a sentence S that can be expressed by
sentences that are not about the event time of the matrix predicate of S are presupposed.
Notice that Abrusa´n (2011a) assumes that the definition in (42) only applies to unembedded
sentences. Abrusa´n (2011b,a) assumes that a separate projection mechanism derives the presup-
positions of complex sentences, on the basis of the atomic ones generated by such mechanism.
What I do below is modify trivially the definition above, in order to make it an algorithm for
selecting which entailments become alternatives and not presuppositions directly. Then, I use
Chemla’s (2009a) idea for predicting the projection of soft presuppositions.
3.3 An exhaustivity-based theory of soft presuppositions
In this section, I present a development of the scalar approach to presuppositions in terms of
the exhaustification-based theory of scalar implicature presented in CHAPTER 1. As I discuss
in CHAPTER 4, the fact that this theory is based on syntactically realized exhaustivity operators
will turn out to be crucial, in particular when we turn to explaining the intervention effect of
soft presuppositions in the licensing of NPIs. Furthermore, I show that since this theory of SIs
relies on the notion of obligatory implicatures, we can also appeal to it as a means to account for
the differences between soft presuppositions and scalar implicatures. Finally, I discuss how by
9Notice that the time of the embedded sentence can coincide with the one of the matrix predicate, in the sense
that both are true at the same time, like in (41a). In this case, changing the properties of the world at time t1
would change the truth-value of (41c). However, this being at the same time is accidental and not intrinsic like the
one of (40a) and (40b) (or (41a) and (41b)). In order to distinguish between these cases, Abrusa´n (2011b) uses a
representation of sentences in which accidental temporal overlap is ignored.
(41) a. John knows (at t1) that Fred is here (at t1).
b. John believes (at t1) that Fred is here (at t1)
c. Fred is here (at t1).
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assuming independently motivated alternatives for negative quantifiers, we can account for the
pattern of projection in quantificational sentences, and in particular for the asymmetry between
the projection from the restrictor and from the scope of negative quantifiers.
3.3.1 Alternatives for soft presuppositions and the triggering problem
Following Chemla (2009a), I assume that soft triggers are strong scalar items: they are associ-
ated with a set of lexical alternatives, of which they are the strongest elements.10 For instance,
we associate soft triggers like win, know and stop with lexical alternatives as in (43b), (44b) and
(45b).
(43) a. [[win]] = λx[win(x)]
b. Alt(43a) = {λx[win(x)], λx[participate(x)]}
(44) a. [[know]] = λpλx[knowx(p)]
b. Alt(44a) = {λpλx[knowx(p)], λpλx[p]}
(45) a. [[stop]] = λPλx[stop(x,P)]
b. Alt(45a) = {λPλx[stop(x,P)], λPλx[used-to(x,P)]}
I assume that these alternatives become sentential alternatives in the way outlined in CHAP-
TER 1, so that for instance, in (46a), the alternatives are the ones in (46b) and similarly the
alternatives of (47a) are the ones in (47b) and the ones of (48a) are in (48b).
(46) a. John won.
b. {won(j), participated(j)}
(47) a. John doesn’t know that it is raining
b. {¬knowj,w(p),¬p(w)}
(48) a. Mary didn’t stop smoking.
10I am assuming the notion of generalized entailment defined in CHAPTER 1.
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b. {¬stop(m, smoke),¬used-to(m, smoke)}
The question at this point is of course where these alternatives come from. Notice that this is
once again the triggering problem (i.e., where presuppositions come from) but this time in a
different guise. This is because theories of presuppositions that are based on alternatives do
not automatically solve the triggering problem, but rather reframe it so as to question the origin
of the alternatives instead: where the alternatives come from and why those alternatives and
not others (see Schlenker 2010 for discussion). Here is where I adopt Abrusa´n’s (2011b) idea
and propose that these alternatives represent a subset of their lexical entailments which can be
characterized systematically. Her notion of aboutness gives us a way to characterize this subset
of lexical entailments. Specifically, it tells us why, for instance, John believes that it is raining
is not an alternative of (49a). Recall that her idea is that a lexical entailment of a sentence is not
about the event time of the matrix predicate if it does not co-occur with it. As seen above, (49a)
entails (49b) and (49c), but only (49c) is not about the matrix event time in Abrusa´n’s (2011b)
system.
(49) a. John knows that it is raining.
b. John believes that it is raining.
c. It is raining.
While she argues that (49c) becomes a presupposition of (49a), I propose to trivially modify
her procedure so that (49c) becomes an alternative of (49a), while (49b) does not. Her notion
can systematically distinguish the entailments that I assume are among the alternatives from the
ones that are not. In other words. For instance, it tells us that (50b), but not (50c), should be an
alternative of (50a).11
11One might ask at this point why we should treat certain entailments as alternatives in the case of soft triggers
but not do the same in the case of hard triggers (see also Abbott 2006 for a similar criticism of Abusch’s (2002)
system). Notice that Abrusa´n’s (2011b) algorithm can only apply to presuppositional verbs, or triggers for which
the presupposition can be traced back to the presence of a verb in the sentence. Hence, if she is right, the proposed
algorithm is indeed expected to apply only to soft triggers. There is an open question here about the status of definite
descriptions or possessives (see footnote 3 above). Thanks to Marta Abrusan (p.c.) for discussion on this point.
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(50) a. John stopped smoking.
b. John used to smoke.
c. John doesn’t smoke.
Finally, there appears to be a difference between the alternatives of strong scalar items like every
and soft triggers like win which is worth emphasizing: while the alternatives of strong scalar
items appears to be symmetric, in that, for instance, some is an alternative of every and every is
an alternative of some, the ones of soft triggers do not. In other words, I am assuming that win
has participate as an alternative but not that participate has win as an alternative. This in turn
predicts that we should not expect participate to behave like a weak scalar item, a prediction
that is confirmed by the pattern of win and participate in certain disjunctions. In CHAPTERS
1 and 2, I discussed the so-called “Hurford’s constraint”, a felicity condition on the utterance
of disjunctive sentences (Hurford 1974; see also Chierchia et al. To appear and Singh 2008c).
Chierchia et al. (To appear) use Hurford’s constraint as a diagnostic for scalar implicatures, so
given the present proposal, we can use it here to explore soft presuppositions. In particular, the
present proposal expects soft triggers like win to behave like a strong scalar term like all. As
(51a) and (52a) show this prediction is borne out: in both cases the second disjunct would entail
the first, unless we analyze them as (51b) and (52b), which are equivalent to (51c) and (52c),
respectively, with no entailment relation between the disjuncts.
(51) a. Either John didn’t do all of the readings or he didn’t do any of them.
b. Either EXH[not[John did all of the readings] or not[he did any of the readings]
c. Either John did some but not all of the readings or he didn’t do any.
(52) a. Either John didn’t win or he didn’t participate.
b. Either EXH[not[John win] or not[he participate]
c. Either John participated and didn’t win or he didn’t participated.
On the other hand, given that we are not assuming that participate has any alternative, we do
not expect expressions like participate to behave like (weak) scalar terms. This prediction again
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is borne out. To see this, consider (53a) and (54): in both cases the second disjunct entails the
first, however if we analyze (53a) as (53b), we predict the reading in (53c), with no entailment
relation between the disjuncts. On the other hand, given that we are assuming that participate
has no alternative, we cannot exhaustify the first disjunct and obtain an inference from the first
disjunct of (54), thus the infelicity is expected.
(53) a. Either John did some of all of the readings.
b. Either EXH [John did some] or all of the readings.
c. Either John did some but not all or all of the readings.
(54) #John participated or he won.
I turn now to a reminder on the theory of scalar implicatures that I am assuming outlined in
CHAPTER 1.
3.3.2 Reminder on the theory of scalar implicatures
I adopt the theory of scalar implicatures as entailments of exhaustified sentences presented in
CHAPTER 1. Recall the main ingredients are the following: first, an exhaustivity operator EXH
projected in the syntax with the semantics in (55)
(55) [[EXHAlt(p)]](p)(w) = p(w)∧ ∀q ∈ Excl(p)[¬q(w)]
Second, a notion of excludable alternatives as all the alternatives that are in all maximal consis-
tently excludable subsets of the alternatives.
(56) Exclie(φ) is the intersection of all maximal consistently excludable subsets ofAlt(φ)
Third, the distribution of EXH is constrained by a version of the strongest meaning hypothesis.
(see Chierchia et al. To appear and references therein).
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(57) Do not weaken!: Do not insert EXH in a sentence S if it leads to an equivalent or
weaker meaning than S itself.
With these ingredients in place, let us now turn to the first predictions of this system.
3.3.3 First predictions
3.3.3.1 Negation
In the case of a soft trigger embedded under negation, we predict the apparent projection behav-
ior observed by Chemla (2009a). When negation is applied to the alternatives, the entailment
relations are reversed. As a result, exhaustification yields the negation of the negated alterna-
tives and both a sentence and its negation yield the same inference. So for instance both (58a)
and (59a) lead to the inference that John participated.
(58) a. John won.
b. Alt = {won(j), participated(j)}
c. [[EXH]][won(j)] = won(j)
(59) a. John didn’t win.
b. Alt = {¬won(j),¬participated(j)}
c. [[EXH]][¬won(j)] = ¬won(j)∧ ¬¬participated(j) =
¬won(j)∧ participated(j)
3.3.3.2 Disjunctions and Conjunctions
In the case of a disjunction like (60a), the present proposal predicts nothing other than the
conditional entailment in (60b).
(60) a. John was not in good shape or he won the marathon.
b. If John was in good shape, he participated.
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While (60b) appear intuitively correct in certain contexts, in others intuitively we would want
to derive the stronger (61).
(61) John participated.
This is a well-known phenomenon in the literature, also known as the “proviso problem” (Geurts
1999) and there are various accounts in the literature, which derive the non-conditional inference
in (61) from (or in addition to) the conditional one in (60b) (Perez-Carballo 2008, Singh 2008a,
Franke 2010, van Rooij 2007 among many others). As Chemla (in preparation) points out, most
of the solutions proposed are based on considerations about the plausibility that the speaker
believes only the conditional inference, regardless of how this is derived in the first place. So
adopting one of these solutions, we can also derive non-conditional inferences like (61) where
needed. Notice that in other cases, like (62), we can derive the non-conditional inference in (61)
directly with exhaustification.
(62) John didn’t win or he is upset for other reasons.
(61) is obtained because the alternative ¬participated(j) in (64) is excludable and hence gets
negated by EXH, thus giving rise to (61), as shown in (65).12
12Notice also that this case is an argument for the need of the notion of innocent exclusion (cf. CHAPTER 1).
In particular, if we only were to exclude all alternatives that are not entailed by the assertion, we would negate
(¬participated(j) ∨ q). However, its negation entails ¬q (i.e., that John is upset) which is not an inference of the
disjunction in (62). However, this alternative is not innocently excludable: it’s exclusion together with the assertion
entails the inclusion of another alternative, namely ¬win(j). Notice also that the same problem arises with strong
scalar terms like every, in cases like (63a), whose non-weaker alternative in (63b), if excluded, would lead to the not
attested inference in (63c).
(63) a. Mary is happy or not every student finished the exam.
b. Mary is happy or no student finished the exam.
c. Mary isn’t happy.
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(64) Alt =

¬win(j)∨ q
q
¬win(j)
¬par(j)
¬par(j)∨ q
¬win(j)∧ q
¬par(j)∧ q

, Excl =

¬par(j)
¬win(j)∧ q
¬par(j)∧ q

(65) [[EXH]](¬win(j)∨ q) =(¬win(j)∨ q)∧ par(j) ∧(¬q∨ win(j))∧ (¬q∨ par(j))
In the case of a conjunction like (66a) and (66b), we get the right inference in (66c) either by
simple entailment or by inserting EXH globally or in one of the conjuncts.
(66) a. John wasn’t sick and won the race.
b. John was sick and he didn’t win the race.
c. John participated.
To illustrate, we analyze (66b) as having the LF in (69). The alternatives are the ones in (70)
and exhaustification gives rise to the inference in (66c), as shown in (71).13
13An issue connected in particular to conjunctive sentences is the one of asymmetry. In other words, why there is
a contrast between (67a) and (67b), which only differ in terms of the position of the trigger.
(67) a. John participated and won.
b. ??John won and participated.
As Chemla (in preparation) points out, however, the same contrast can be replicated with non-presuppositional
sentences as in (68a) vs. (68b).
(68) a. Daniel has a car and it is a Ferrari.
b. ?Daniel has a Ferrari and it is a car.
If the asymmetry comes from some independent mechanism, it can then be added to the theory proposed here. For
instance, it could be linked to the distribution of EXH (Fox and Spector 2009). I leave a more detailed exploration
of the asymmetry for further research; for discussion on asymmetry see (Schlenker 2008a,Chemla in preparation,
Rothschild 2011, Chemla and Schlenker To appear for discussion).
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(69) EXH[John was sick and not[he won the race]
(70) Alt =

q∧ ¬win(j)
q
¬win(j)
¬par(j)
q∧ ¬par(j)
q∨ ¬win(j)
q∨ ¬par(j)

, Excl =
 q∧ ¬par(j)¬par(j)

(71) [[EXH]](q∧ ¬win(j)) =(q∧ ¬win(j))∧ par(j)
3.3.3.3 Conditionals
The case of a soft trigger embedded in the consequent like (72) is analogous to the correspond-
ing case of disjunction in the preceding section: the conditional inference that if John wasn’t
sick he participated in the marathon is predicted as an entailment. In the same way as in the case
of disjunction, we can rely on a solution to the proviso problem and obtain the non-conditional
inference that he participated in the marathon.
(72) If John wasn’t sick, he won the marathon.
Let us now look at the predictions of the present proposal for the case of a soft trigger embedded
in the antecedent of a conditional, like (73a). The inference that we want to obtain, at least in
some cases is (73b).
(73) a. If Jane won, she is celebrating right now.
b. Jane participated.
I first show that we predict the weaker inference in (74) and then suggest two ways to strengthen
(74) to (73b).
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(74) It’s possible that Jane participated.
Weak projection There are a number of possible analysis of conditionals on the market, so
first we need to decide which one to adopt. One such analysis of conditionals is the material
implication, p → q, which states that a conditional is false only if the antecedent is true and
the consequent is false. As I show now, this analysis can account for the cases of projection
of soft presuppositions from antecedents of conditionals. However, it also make wrong predic-
tions about the consequent. By way of illustration, consider the case in (75a), schematically
represented in (75b).
(75) a. If Jane won, she is celebrating right now.
b. won(j)→ cel(j)
c. Alt =
{
won(j)→ cel(j), par(j)→ cel(j)
}
When we exhaustify (75b) as in (76a), over its alternatives in (75c), we negate the non-weaker
alternative part → cel(j) and we obtain two inferences: first, given that the falsity of a condi-
tional analyzed as material implication entails the truth of its antecedent, we obtain the inference
that Jane participated. This could account for the apparent projection behavior of the presup-
position of Jane won embedded in the the antecedent. Second, however, we also obtain the
non-attested inference to the negation of the consequent, that is she isn’t celebrating right now.
(76) a. [[EXH]](won(j)→ cel(j)) =
(won(j)→ cel(j))∧ ¬(par(j)→ cel(j)) =
(won(j)→ cel(j))∧ (par(j)∧ ¬cel(j))
Material implication combined with the theory of soft presuppositions given here gives rise to a
problematic prediction. Notice, however, that since this prediction carries over to cases involv-
ing “regular” scalar implicatures, a solution for this problem is needed independently. Indeed
for a case like (77a), involving the scalar term all, we obtain in the same way the prediction that
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John corrected some of the assignment but also that he will not go out tonight. Again the latter
is certainly not an attested inference of (77a).
(77) a. If John corrected all of the assignments, he will go out tonight.
b. John corrected some of the assignments and he won’t go out tonight.
If we move to a different theory of conditionals, like strict implication, (p → q), we do not
make this incorrect prediction anymore: we only predict that it is possible that Jane participated
and that she is not celebrating right now. This is illustrated in (78a)-(78d).
(78) a. If Jane won, she is celebrating right now.
b. [won(j)→ cel(j)]
c. Alt =
{
[won(j)→ cel(j)],[par(j)→ cel(j)]
}
d. [[EXH]]([won(j)→ cel(j)]) =
([won(j)→ cel(j)])∧ (¬[par(j)→ cel(j)]) =
([won(j)→ cel(j)])∧ (♦[par(j)∧ ¬cel(j)])
Furthermore, it is easy to see that (78d) is equivalent to the claim that it is possible that Jane
participated and did not win and that she is not celebrating right now. This appears an attested
inference for conditionals like (78a). Indeed, it is entailed by an inference that we generally
draw from conditionals, the so-called “conditional perfection” inference, which in this case
would be (79) (see von Fintel 2001 and references therein; see also CHAPTER 2, Appendix A).
(79) [¬win(j)→ ¬cel(j)]
I come back to the inferences predicted in this non-upward entailing contexts like antecedent
of conditionals in section 3.6, when I talk about the restrictors of universal sentences. Now
let us discuss instead the issue that, while on one hand we solved the problem of the non-
attested inference to the negation of the consequent, now the projection out of the antecedent is
weakened: we only get that it’s possible that Jane participated, which seems too weak, at least
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in some cases. In the next paragraph, I sketch two possible ways to strengthen this inference to
Jane participated.
Strong projection A first strategy to account for the strong inference in (80c) from (80a) in
the present account would be to say that the prediction from a conditional like (80a) to the weak
inference in (80b), is another instance of the proviso problem.
(80) a. If Jane won, she is celebrating right now.
b. It’s possible that Jane participated.
c. Jane participated.
In particular, Singh (2009) argues that we should analyze also cases like (81) and (82) as giving
rise to another instances of the proviso problem and propose a way to derive the inferences from
(81b) to (81c) and from (82b) to (82c).
(81) a. John believes that Bill’s brother will come.
b. John believes that Bill has a brother.
c. Bill has a brother.
(82) a. It’s possible that John won.
b. It’s possible that John participated.
c. John participated.
It is conceivable, then, that the inference from (80b) to (80c) is of the same nature and should
be solved by an account of the proviso problem, which accounts for the inference from (81b) to
(81c) and from (82b) to (82c).
In Romoli 2011, I propose a different solution by postulating that conditionals also introduce
their own alternatives. I adopted a strict conditional semantics of conditionals, with the (hard)
presupposition that the antecedent must be compatible with the modal base (von Fintel 1999).
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The proposal is that conditionals like (83a) are associated with the alternatives in (83b).14
(83) a. [[if p, q]] is defined if ♦p
when defined = [p→ q]
b. Alt =
{
[p→ q],♦¬p,♦q,♦¬q
}
One can show that in simple cases, where no scalar item appears in the antecedent, none of the
three alternatives is excludable, hence exhaustification is predicted to be vacuous. On the other
hand, if we go back to the crucial case involving a scalar item embedded in the antecedent, we
end up with more alternatives. In these cases, with (84) as an example, exhaustification is no
longer vacuous and we end up with the right prediction, namely that Jane participated.15,16
(86) a. If Jane won, she is celebrating right now
b. Alt =
 [won(j)→ cel(j)],[par(j)→ cel(j)]♦¬won(j),♦¬par(j),♦¬cel(j),♦cel(j)

c. [[EXH]]([won(j)→ cel(j)]) = [won(j)→ cel(j)]∧ ¬♦¬par(j) =
14Where these alternatives come from is left open in Romoli 2011. I leave this open here as well, noting that one
direction for future exploration might be to observe that the alternatives of conditionals posited here are what they
are generally thought as the clausal implicatures, minus the one that is missing, ♦p, which is already presupposed
(cf. Gazdar 1979). The hope is that a theory of clausal implicatures will motivate independently the alternatives
here.
15More precisely, we obtain that it is true that Jane participated in all worlds in the relevant modal base, which I
take to be epistemic in these cases. I leave for further research to explore the predictions for cases of non-epistemic
conditionals.
16Notice that at this point the present system predicts that also scalar implicatures coming from strong scalar items
should “project” out of the antecedents of conditionals. In other words, it predicts that (84b) can be an inference of
(84a).
(84) a. If John failed all of his students, the dean will be upset.
b. John failed some of his students.
It is unclear whether (84a) can ever have (84b) as an inference, but if it can, it is intuitively much weaker than the
inference from (85a) to (85b), repeated from above. Below, when I discuss the differences between soft presuppo-
sitions and scalar implicatures I show that we can account for the difference between (84a) and (84b), on one hand,
and (85a) and (85b) on the other, via the notion of obligatory scalar implicature.
(85) a. If Jane won, she is celebrating right now
b. Jane participated
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[won(j)→ cel(j)]∧par(j)
In the following, I tentatively adopt the second strategy from Romoli 2011 to account for the
projection of soft presuppositions from the antecedents of conditionals and leave for further
research the exploration of the first one based on an account of the proviso problem.
In the next section, I sketch the predictions for the case of polar questions and then I turn
to the behavior of stacked soft triggers, which as discussed in CHAPTER 2 is problematic for
Abusch’s (2010) account, and show how the present proposal can straightfowardly predict their
behavior.
3.3.3.4 Polar Questions
Let us go through a sketch on how to integrate the inference from (87a) to (87b) in the present
account.
(87) a. Did John win?
b. John participated.
First, assume a semantics for polar questions as denoting the pair of its positive and negative
answers (Hamblin 1973 among many others). So for instance the question in (87a) denotes the
set of propositions in (89).
(88) λp.p = win(j)∨ p = ¬win(j)
Second, we can define a version of EXH, call it EXHq, as in (89), which applies to sets of
propositions, by exhaustifying each member of the set (cf. Menendez Benito 2006).
(89) [[EXHq]](Q〈s,t〉) = {[[EXH]][p] : p ∈ Q}
Given these two assumptions, we predict the inference in (87b) from (87a). In particular, given
the results about negation above, the result of exhaustifying (87a) is in (90).
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(90) [[EXHq]](87a) = λp.p = EXH[win(j)]∨ EXH[¬win(j)] =
λp.p = win(j)∨ (par(j)∧ ¬win(j))
Assuming that polar questions themselves introduce the felicity condition that one of the an-
swers is true, then the proposition that John participated becomes an inference of the question
itself.17 Notice that we predict the same possible inference in the case of other scalar terms
embedded in a polar question. I argue that this is a good prediction: for instance, (91a) appears
to give rise in some cases to the implication in (91b) (see Chemla (2008) for discussion).
(91) a. Did John fail all of his students?
b. John failed some of his students.
3.3.3.5 Stacked soft triggers
We saw above that Abusch (2010) makes too weak predictions in the case of a soft trigger
embedded under another. For instance, (92a) and (92b) give rise to the inference in (92c), but
her system only predicts the weaker inference in (92d).
(92) a. John stopped winning
b. John didn’t stop winning
c. John used to win
d. John used to participate
The present proposal can, instead, account for this case too. The inference from (92a) to (92c)
is not a problem given that the latter is an entailment of the former. The inference from (92b) to
(92c), instead, can be obtained by exhaustifying the combination of alternatives as in (93b).
(93) a. ¬stop(win(j))
17Here I remain neutral on how to derive this condition. Although Abusch (2010) does not discuss polar questions,
one advantage of her system over the present one, is that it can predict this inference as arising from the disjunctive
closure of the alternatives of the question.
109
b. Alt(93a) =
 ¬stop(win(j)),¬stop(par(j))¬used-to(win(j)),¬used-to(par(j))

When we exhaustify (93a) with respect to the alternatives in (93b) we negate in particular the
alternative ¬used-toj(win), which is not entailed by the assertion in (93a), and we obtain the
inference that John used to win.
(94) [[EXH]][¬stop(win(j))] =
¬stop(win)(j)]∧ used-to(win(j))∧ used-to(par(j))
This works with the simplified notion of excludable alternatives given in (39). It can be shown,
however, that once we turn to a more sophisticated notion of excludable alternatives (cf. fn. 19),
the alternative used-to(win) cannot be excluded anymore and thus we only obtain the weaker
inference that John used to participate.18 We can, nonetheless, account of this inference by
exploiting the embeddability of the exhaustivity operator and analyze (92b) as (95).19
(95) EXH[not[stop[EXH[PRO winning]]]]
The exhaustification of the embedded clause is just vacuous, because win is the strongest mem-
ber of its alternatives, represented in (96). However, it crucially “eats up” the alternatives of
win, so that the matrix exhaustification just operates on the alternatives of stop in (97b).
(96) a. [[EXH]](win(j))
b. Alt(96a) =
 win(j)participate(j)

(97) a. [[EXH]](¬stop(win(j)))
18Thanks to Irene Heim (p.c.) for discussion on this point.
19I have defined EXH as a propositional operator, therefore it is convenient to analyze the clausal argument of stop
as a proposition. However, this is just for convenience, if one wants the argument of stop to be a property, it is easy
to generalize EXH to any type “that ends in t” (see also Magri 2011b).
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b. Alt(97a) =
 ¬stop(win(j))¬used-to(win(j))

At this point, the matrix exhaustification in (97a) is just like the simple case of negation that we
saw above: we obtain the inference that John used to win, by negating the stronger alternative
that he didn’t used to win.20
Summing up, the account sketched above can account for the apparent projection behavior
of soft presuppositions under negation and other embeddings like the antecedents of condition-
als. Furthermore, it does not run into a problem in the case of a soft trigger embedded into
another. I turn now to the differences between soft presuppositions and scalar implicatures on
one hand and hard presuppositions on the other.
3.4 Soft versus hard triggers and soft triggers versus strong scalar
terms
The differences between soft and hard triggers depend on the theory assumed for the latter. For
our purposes, we do not need to decide on a specific theory, in order to account for the differ-
ences between soft and hard triggers. It is enough that we assume a theory that predicts universal
projection for the presupposition of hard triggers embedded under quantificational sentences.21
20Abusch (p.c. to Sauerland) suggests a similar solution by proposing that her pragmatic principle of disjunctive
closure should apply every time a soft trigger is encountered. This would ensure that there would never be a combi-
nation of the alternatives of soft triggers. However, given the assumption that the alternatives of soft triggers grow
compositionally, the same problem would arise with other alternative bearers like scalar terms. For instance, in the
case of (98a) the predicted inference is only (98b) and not the intuitively correct (98c).
(98) a. (Now that he is retired), John didn’t stop meeting all the students
b. John used to meet some of the students
c. John used to meet all of the students
In her system, one would have to add a constraint on alternative construction so that the alternative of soft triggers
and the ones of other scalar terms do not mix. In the present account, however, they are allowed and expected
to combine and, in fact, this combination is at the basis of the account of some puzzles regarding the interaction
between soft triggers embedding other scalar terms (see Author 2011 and Chemla in preparation).
21See Schlenker 2008c for a discussion of different recent theories of presuppositions and their predictions.
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Furthermore, we also predict the difference between soft and hard presuppositions in terms of
suspendability, simply by assuming that if there is a way to cancel hard presuppositions, it is
more marked than the mechanism of suspending soft presuppositions, which I discuss below.22
The differences between soft triggers and “regular” strong scalar terms to be accounted for
are the following: under negation they behave in the same way, in that they both appear to
project systematically, as shown for instance by the inference from (102a) to (102b) and from
(103a) to (103b).
(102) a. Mary didn’t win.
b. Mary participated.
(103) a. Mary didn’t meet all of the students.
22There is a further property generally assumed to be a characteristic of presuppositions, which is a peculiar
discourse status: presuppositions are generally felt to be taken for granted in the context at the moment of utterance
of the presupposing sentence. This is captured in the approach initiated by Stalnaker (1974), by a requirement that
presuppositions should be entailed in the context at the moment of utterance of the presupposing sentence. Notice,
however, that while this appears correct for the case of hard presuppositions, it is unclear to me that this should
also apply to soft presuppositions. In a context in which it is not know whether John participated or not, we can
nonetheless utter (99).
(99) John didn’t win the race
The response from the stalnakerian approach is that there is a process of accommodation of presuppositions. How-
ever, one could instead say that there is no condition that requires soft presuppositions to be contextually entailed;
they just can happen to be. Here I am saying that soft presuppositions are inferences and when they happen to be
contextually entailed already, then we do not exhaustify vacuously (this could be traced back to the do not weaken
condition). On the other hand, if they are not contextually entailed, whereas in the stalnakerian approach we would
resort to accommodation, here we just exhaustify and get the inference.
Finally, notice that the “hey wait a minute test”, generally used as a diagnostic for the discourse status of presup-
positions, applies to soft presuppositions, as (100) shows (von Fintel 2008).
(100) a. John stopped smoking.
b. Hey wait a minute! I didn’t even know that he used to smoke.
However, the hey wait a minute test is problematic as a test for presuppositions. This is because it seems to be
applicable also to entailments (thanks to Danny Fox (p.c.) for pointing this out to me). Consider (101a) and (101b)
below, where we are talking about John who is currently on a trip from Rio to New York.
(101) a. John is in Miami.
b. Hey wait a minute, I didn’t even know he left Brazil already .
In sum, if we can use this test with entailments as in (101b), we cannot rely on this test to decide whether something
is a presupposition or not.
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b. Mary met some of the students.
In other embeddings, like the antecedent of conditionals, soft presuppositions typically project
out, while scalar implicatures do not or do so very weakly. While (104b) is definitely an infer-
ence of (104a), unless it is contradicted in the context, it is not clear that (105b) is an inference
of (105a).
(104) a. If Mary won, she will be very happy.
b. Jane participated.
(105) a. If all of the students came, Jane is happy.
b. Some of the students came.
Another important difference is the projection from the scope of negative quantifiers. While I
argue that the inference from (107a) to (107b) is possible, this is intuitively less robust than the
inference from (106a) to (106b), as also experimentally shown by Chemla (2009b).
(106) a. No student discovered that he was accepted.
b. Every student was accepted.
(107) a. No student did all of the readings.
b. Every student did some of the readings.
I argue that soft triggers are strong scalar terms, and the their differences from other strong scalar
terms can be traced back to the fact that the former give rise to obligatory scalar implicatures,
in a sense to be specified below, while the latter do not. In the following, I first discuss how the
grammatical approach adopted here accounts for the suspension of scalar implicatures and then
I show how we can account for the suspension of soft presuppositions in a way that accounts
for the differences between the two.
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3.4.1 Suspension of Scalar Implicatures
In CHAPTER 1, I outlined how the theory of scalar implicatures that I adopt can account for the
suspension of scalar implicatures. In particular, the account is based on two components: one
morphosyntactic and one pragmatic. The morphosyntactic component is the assumption that
scalar terms bear a feature σ, which is valued “+” or “-”, depending on whether the alternatives
are active or not. If the alternatives are active, [+σ] forces the scalar term to enter in agreement
relation with a c-commanding exhaustivity operator.23
(109) EXH[...scalar term[+σ]]
If the alternatives are not active, no exhaustification occurs.
(110) [...scalar term[−σ]]
The choice between (109) and (110) is a matter of structural ambiguity analogous to a sentence
like (111), which can be analyzed with an LF in which the prepositional phrase attaches to the
verb phrase or one in which it attaches to the noun phrase.
(111) Mary shot the soldier with a gun.
In addition to the grammatical feature mechanism, I also assumed a pragmatic mechanism of
relevance. In CHAPTER 1, I adopted the notion of relevance in (112) based on the notion of
question under discussions. The definition in (112) says that a proposition is relevant if and
only if it doesn’t distinguish among the cells (of the partition) of the question under discussion.
In other words, it is relevant if and only if it does not provide irrelevant information.
23The notion of c-command adopted here is in (108).
(108) A c-command B if A doesn’t dominate B and the first relevant branching node that dominates A domi-
nates B.
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(112) Relevance A proposition p is relevant to a questionQ iff p is equivalent to the union
of some subset of Q.
In sum, I am assuming a grammatical feature-based mechanism according to which each scalar
term is ambiguous between a version that needs to agree with an exhaustivity operator and one
that does not. Furthermore, I am assuming a pragmatic mechanism that reduces alternatives
depending on the question under discussion. I will not provide a detailed implementation of
how to integrate these two mechanisms here. As discussed in CHAPTER 1, for our purposes it is
sufficient to assume the following constraints on their interaction: when the grammatical mech-
anism allows an ambiguity between scalar terms, then the alternatives are subject to relevance.
When instead the grammatical mechanism gives us no choice between active and non-active
forms, then relevance plays no role (see also Chierchia to appear for a similar idea).
Given this notions of (de)activation of alternatives and relevance, let us now go through how
we can account for the differences between scalar implicatures and soft presuppositions.
3.4.2 Suspension of scalar implicatures vs. suspension of soft presuppositions
Returning to the difference in defeasibility between soft triggers and strong scalar terms, I ar-
gue that we can account for this phenomenon if we take into account the varying availability of
the activated alternatives. The feature-based implementation, adopted from Chierchia (2006, to
appear), provides us with the option of having the alternatives of certain elements obligatorily
active. I propose that soft triggers are such elements. The way to capture this is by assuming
that soft triggers are endowed with the feature [σ], which is, however, necessarily valued as “+”.
As a consequence, the alternatives of soft triggers are always active and require exhaustifica-
tion. Furthermore, I am assuming that when alternatives are always active, the question under
discussion plays no role. In other words, the alternatives of strong scalar terms are subject to
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relevance while the ones of soft triggers are not.24,25
Taking the alternatives of soft triggers to be obligatory predicts prima facie that their pre-
suppositions should never be suspendable. However, we observed earlier that this is not always
the case. If we want to maintain that alternatives are always active and yet that they don’t
always give rise to presuppositions, we need to appeal to a different source for this suspendabil-
ity. I argue that the difference source of suspension is the scope of EXH. This is because in the
case of strong scalar items local exhaustification is always vacuous and thus represent a way of
suspending their inference. To illustrate consider (113).
(113) If Mary won, she is celebrating.
Given the hypothesis above, the alternatives of win are always active, exhaustification always
occurs and there are in principle two sites at which this can happen: at the global level as in
(114a), or within the antecedent of the conditional as in (114b).
(114) a. EXH[if Mary won[+σ] she is celebrating]
b. [If [EXH[Mary won[+σ]] she is celebrating]
(114a) gives rise to the soft presupposition that Mary participated in the way proposed in section
3.3.2. (114b), on the other hand, does not give rise to any inference, since the exhaustification
of the embedded complement is vacuous.26 Notice that given the principle do not weaken! in
24Simons et al. (2010) propose a theory of the projection of presuppositions (and other inferences) which is also
connected to the notion of questions under discussions. Roughly, they propose that presuppositions project when
they are not at issue relative to the question under discussion. I leave the comparison between the present account
and theirs for further research. See Abrusa´n 2011a for detailed criticism of their proposal.
25Notice that, as an anonymous reviewer points out, a prediction of this feature-based account is that there might
be languages in which strong scalar terms like every would only have a [+σ], while soft triggers could have [+σ] or
[−σ], thus we expect their behavior to change accordingly.
26To see this notice that exhaustification at that scope site is like exhaustifying the unembedded sentence in (115a),
with respect to the alternatives in (115b).
(115) Mary won.
(115) {Mary won, Mary participated}
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(57), (114b) is dispreferred, as it is equivalent to the meaning without EXH. The inference that
Mary participated is, then, predicted to be the default unless we make it clear in the context
that it should be suspended; more precisely, we do not insert exhaustification locally unless
information in the context contradicts the result of global exhaustification, like in (116).
(116) I don’t know whether Mary ended up participating, but if she won, she is celebrating.
In sum, contrary to scalar implicatures which can be suspended by virtue of there not being
active alternatives to exhaustify, soft presuppositions can only be suspended via local exhaus-
tification.27 Let us now go through to how this mechanism can account for the differences
between scalar implicatures and soft presuppositions.
I proposed above that scalar implicatures are subject to relevance while soft presuppositions
are not. I argue now that it is precisely this difference that gives rise to the different behavior
that they exhibit. Consider the case of negation first, where we saw that both scalar implicatures
and soft presuppositions seem to project robustly. A possible question under discussion for a
sentence like (118a) appears to be (119a), which corresponds to the partition in (119b), which
divides the logical space in a cell in which John did all of the readings, one in which John did
some but not all of the readings, and one in which John didn’t do any of the readings.
(118) a. John didn’t do all of the readings
b. {¬[John did all], ¬[John did some]}
(119) a. How much of the readings didn’t John do?
b. {c1 = all, c2 = ¬all∧ some, c3 = ¬some}
27Notice that in principle also scalar implicatures coming from strong scalar items could be suspended via local
exhaustification: in fact, in principle the scalar implicature of (117a) could be suspended as in (117b) but also as in
(117c). This creates a redundancy in the system; I come back to this below.
(117) a. John didn’t do all of the readings
b. ¬[John did all[−σ] of the readings]
c. ¬[EXH[John did all[+σ] of the readings]]
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Both the alternatives in (118b) correspond to a cell or a union of cell in (119b), hence they are
both relevant.28 When we then exhaustify (118a), we obtain the inference that John did some
of the readings.
Consider, instead, what happens in somewhat more complex cases involving scalar terms
embedded under the antecedent of a conditional like (120a) or (120b). The question here is
whether we predict the inference in (120c).
(120) a. If John did all of the readings, he will go out tonight.
b. John will go out tonight, if he did all of the readings.
c. John did some of the readings.
Natural questions under discussion for (119a) and (119b) are (122a) and (122b), respectively.29
(121) a. What will John do if he did all of the readings?
b. Under what conditions will John go out?
It can be shown that in both of these cases the alternatives that would give rise to the inference
in (120c) are not relevant. By way of illustration, consider the case of (121b) Recall that the
alternatives assumed above for cases like (120a) or (120b) are the ones in (122).
(122) Alt =
 [all→ go-out(j)],[some→ go-out(j)]♦¬all,♦¬some,♦¬go-out(j),♦go-out(j)

The partition corresponding to (121b) is in (123), where p and q are propositions that represent
possible conditions under which John will go out. It is easy to see that ♦¬some does not
correspond to any cell or union of cells of (123) and it is then irrelevant.
(123) {c1 = go-out(j) if and only if p, c2 = go-out(j) if and only if q, ....}
28Namely ¬[John did some] corresponds to c3, while ¬[John did all] corresponds to c2 ∪ c3
29See von Fintel (1994) for discussion.
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Therefore, in the case of scalar terms embedded in the antecedents of conditionals like (120b) or
(120a), given reasonable questions under discussion, the alternatives that would give rise to the
inference in (120c) are not going to be relevant. This is the reason why (120c) is not predicted
as an inference from (120a) and (120b).
In sum, we can account for the suspendability difference between scalar implicatures and
soft presuppositions by postulating a difference in terms of their being subject to relevance or
not, as modeled with the obligatoriness of activation of the alternatives.
3.5 Novel Predictions for Projection in Quantificational Sentences
As Chemla (2009a) points out, one motivation for the scalar approach to presuppositions is that
it makes fine-grained predictions for quantificational sentences, which map nicely to Chemla’s
(2009b) empirical results. In particular, as shown below, it predicts that the projection in quan-
tificational sentences should be sensitive to the type of determiner involved in the sentence. The
present proposals makes three novel contributions with respect to quantificational sentences:
first, by being restricted to soft presuppositions, together with any theory of hard presupposi-
tions which predicts that they project universally, it can account for the differences between
triggers observed by Charlow (2009). Second, by assuming independently justified alternatives
for negative quantifiers, it correctly predicts both universal projection from the scopes of nega-
tive quantifiers and non-universal projection from their restrictors, a combination of predictions
that is not made by any account that I am aware of. Furthermore, these new alternatives also pre-
dict universal inferences like (124b) for strong scalar terms embedded in the scope of negative
quantifiers like all in (124a).
(124) a. None of these professors failed all of their students.
b. All of these professors failed some of their students.
Finally, given the differences in obligatoriness of alternatives, it can also account for the dif-
ference in robustness between the inference from (124a) to (124b) and the corresponding cases
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involving soft presuppositions like (125a) and (125b).
(125) a. None of these students won.
b. All of these students participated.
3.5.1 The Empirical Landscape
The main result reported in Chemla 2009b is that the predictions for quantificational sentences
appear to depend on the quantifier involved. In particular, strong universal inferences are
obtained when presuppositional triggers are embedded in the scope of universal or negative-
existential quantifier sentences. A further result is that in the case of a trigger appearing in the
restrictor no evidence for universal projection is found with any quantifier. The following ex-
amples, adapted from Charlow 2009, illustrate and summarize these facts about nuclear scopes,
(126)-(128), and restrictors, (129).
(126) a. Each of these ten students stopped smoking.
b.  Each of these ten students used to smoke.
(127) a. None of these ten students stopped smoking.
b.  Each of these ten student used to smoke.
(128) a. Some/at least 5/less than 5 of these ten students stopped smoking.
b. 6 Each of these ten students used to smoke.
(129) a. Of these ten students, none/two of the ones who stopped smoking ate.
b. 6 Each of these ten students stopped smoking.
As we saw above, Chemla (2009a) points out that the scalar approach correctly predicts uni-
versal inferences for universal sentences and non-universal inferences for cases like (128a).
However, he claims that this approach makes the wrong prediction for the case of negative
quantifiers, in that it would predict an existential inference, rather than a universal one, in cases
like (127a). In the following I show that given independently motivated alternatives for nega-
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tive quantifiers we, in fact, predict the universal inference in (127a), while also predicting the
non-universal inference from the restrictor like in (129a).
Chemla (2009b) made use in his experiments of triggers that are generally claimed to be
soft: possessives, factives and change of state predicates.30 Charlow (2009) points out that there
appears to be a difference between the triggers that Chemla used (know, stop, and possessives)
and strong ones like too, also. He argues that the latter, but not the former, project uniformly
across all quantifiers. Some of the examples he uses are the following in (77a), which would all
have the inference in (131).
(130) a. None of these 100 students [smokes [Marlboros]F too] at recess.
b. Some of these 100 students [also smokes [Marlboros]F]
c. (At least) two of these 100 students [smoke [Marlboros]F too] at recess.
d. Of these 100 students,
none of the ones who [also smoke [Marlboros]F] are blonde.
e. Of these 100 students,
two of the ones who [also smoke [Marlboros]F] are blonde.
(131) Each of these 100 students smokes something other than Marlboro.
As Charlow (2009) points out this is problematic for all theories in the literature. In particular, it
is problematic for those approaches that can instead account very well for the non-universal pro-
jection of the cases seen above, as nothing in their theory distinguishes between these cases.31
The predictions of the present proposal, instead, fits naturally with this pattern. In fact, as it is
supposed to apply only to soft triggers and assuming a theory of hard presuppositions which
predicts universal projection, we expect a difference in projection between these two classes of
triggers.
30The status of possessives is actually unclear in this respect; see footnote 3 above.
31In particular it is problematic for Chemla in preparation, Fox (2008) and George (2008). Fox (2012b) proposes
a new trivalent approach, which can account for the differences between triggers in projection, however it does not
account for the different projection of soft presuppositions from the restrictor and the scope of negative quantifiers.
I leave a detailed comparison with his proposal for future research.
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3.5.2 The Predictions
3.5.2.1 Projection from nuclear scopes
The general predictions are the ones already pointed out by Chemla (2009a) and they are in line
with his experimental results, apart from negative quantifiers, to which I return below. In the
following, a few examples illustrate the pattern of predictions. In the case of upward entailing
quantifiers, simple entailments derive the relevant inferences, whereas for downward entailing
and non-monotonic quantifiers the contribution of exhaustification and its scope are crucial.
Upward entailing quantifiers like each and more than three simply entail their alternatives, thus
the relevant inferences are plain entailments.
(132) a. Each student won.
b. Each student participated.
(133) a. More than 3 students won.
b. More than 3 students participated.
Turning now to cases of downward entailing quantifiers like no, I propose to account for the
projection behavior by claiming that the alternatives of no should include not every. This is
motivated independently on the following grounds: first, notice that it is generally assumed that
negative quantifiers like no and negated universals like not every are alternatives (Horn (1972),
Levinson (2000)). This is because, as seen above, this can predict the inference from (134a) to
(134b) as a scalar implicature.
(134) a. Not every student came.
b. Some student came.
(134a) shows that in order to derive the inference in (134b) we need to assume ”no” is an alterna-
tive of ”not every”. But by the standard assumption that the alternatives of scalar implicatures
are symmetric, we also have that not every is an alternative of no. Second, there are vari-
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ous independent arguments for decomposing negative quantifiers as negation plus an indefinite
(see Sauerland 2000, Penka 2007, Iatridou and Sichel 2008 among many others). Assuming
the decomposition of no as not some, given any standard definition of how alternatives grow
(Sauerland 2004) and the assumption that every and some are scale-mates, we straightforwardly
predict that no (=not some) should have the alternative not every. Given these new alternatives,
we can go back to the case of negative quantifiers and we can now replace no with not every in
the alternatives. For instance, now for a sentence like (135a), we have the alternatives in (136).
(135) a. No student won.
b. ¬∃x[st∧ won(x)]
(136) Alt(135) =
 ¬∃x[st(x)∧ won(x)],¬∃x[st(x)∧ part(x)]¬∀x[st(x)→ won(x)],¬∀x[st(x)→ part(x)]

When we exhaustify (135a) with respect to (136), ¬∀x[st(x)→ part(x)] is excludable, thus we
obtain the universal inference that every student participated.
(137) [[EXH]](¬∃x[st(x)∧ won(x)]) = ¬∃x[st(x)∧ won(x)]∧ ∀x[st(x)→ part(x)]
The prediction for negative existentials like no is a universal projection, in line with Chemla’s
(2009b) findings, where the universal inference was robustly accepted in this context with soft
triggers. Furthermore, as I argued above, despite the fact that the acceptance of the correspond-
ing inference for scalar implicatures was much lower in the results of Chemla (2009b), universal
inferences also arise in scalar implicature cases like (138a) (cf. fn. 12).
(138) a. None of these ten professors failed all of his students.
b.  All of these ten professors failed some of his students.
Finally, the approach discussed here also predicts a difference in robustness between the infer-
ence in (138b) from (138a) and the one of from (139a) to (139b).
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(139) a. No student won
b. Every student participated
Recall that I am assuming that the alternatives of a soft trigger like win are always active, while
those of a strong scalar items like all to be subject to relevance. Under this analysis, we can
predict that the inference from (138a) to (138b) can only be cancelled with local exhaustifi-
cation, as in (140). As we know from above, this is a dispreferred option so it is going to be
chosen only if information in the context contradicts the universal inference we would obtain
with global exhaustification. An example of this case is in (141).
(140) No [student] λx[EXH[x won]]
(141) I don’t know whether each of the students participated, but none of them won.
On the other hand, since the alternatives of scalar implicatures are optional, the inference from
(138a) to (138b) can be suspended simply by deactivation of the alternatives of all, as in (142).
Given that this option does not violate do not weaken!, it can be done without any special
information in the context.
(142) a. None of these professors failed all[−σ] of his students
In sum, we predict the possibility of universal projection for strong scalar term from the scope
of negative quantifiers and we also predict the difference between soft triggers and other strong
scalar terms in this respect. I turn now to the predictions for the case of the restrictors.
3.5.2.2 Projection out of restrictors
As mentioned above, the experimental data in Chemla (2009b) for the cases of the restrictors
show a weaker acceptance of universal inferences for all quantifiers. The predictions of the
present account here are in line with this result. Importantly, non-universal inferences are pre-
dicted both for the restrictors and the scope of no and every. Let me sketch both cases below.
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In the case of the universal quantifier, a non-universal inference, analogous to the one we
obtained above for the antecedent of conditionals, is predicted.
(143) a. Every student who won will celebrate.
b. There is at least a student who participated but did not win and will not celebrate.
(144) EXH(∀x[(stud(x)∧ won(x))→ celeb(x)]) =
∀x[(stud(x)∧ won(x))→ celeb(x)]∧ ¬∀x[(stud(x)∧ part(x))→ celeb(x)] =
∀x[(stud(x)∧ won(x))→ celeb(x)]∧ ∃x[(stud(x)∧ part(x))∧ ¬celeb(x)]
If the first conjunct is verified all students that won will celebrate. So if some students partici-
pated and did not celebrate, it must be a student that did not win, for the whole conjunction to
be true. So we predict the inference in (143b) and more generally we predict that soft presup-
positions do not project universally out of the restrictor of universal sentences.
The account here also makes the right predictions for the case of no. In fact, it predicts that
(145a) only gives rise to the non-universal inference in (145b).
(145) a. None of the students who won were upset.
b. There is at least a student who participated but didn’t win and was upset.
To see this, consider the schematic version of (145a) in (146).
(146) EXH(¬∃x[(stud(x)∧ won(x))∧ upset(x)])
(147) Alt =

¬∃x[(stud(x)∧ won(x))∧ upset(x)]
¬∃x[(stud(x)∧ part(x))∧ upset(x)]
¬∀x[(stud(x)∧ won(x))→ upset(x)]
¬∀x[(stud(x)∧ part(x))→ upset(x)]

Notice that crucially the only excludable alternative is (148).32 Hence we derive the non-
32The alternative ¬∀x[(stud(x)∧part(x))→ upset(x)] is entailed by the assertion, hence it cannot be excluded:
if none of the students who won were upset, then it must be the case that not all of the students who participated was
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universal inference in (149): there is some student who participated and was upset. This is
provably equivalent to (150): there is some student who participated but did not win and was
upset.
(148) Excl = {¬∃x[(stud(x)∧ part(x))∧ upset(x)]}
(149) EXH(¬∃x[(stud(x)∧ won(x))∧ upset(x)]) =
¬∃x[(stud(x)∧ won(x))∧ upset(x)]∧ ∃x[stud(x)∧ part(x)∧ upset(x)]
(150) ¬∃x[(stud(x)∧won(x))∧upset(x)]∧∃x[stud(x)∧part(x)∧¬win(x)∧upset(x)]
Summing up, the alternatives of negative quantifiers proposed here allow us to make pre-
dictions about projection of soft presuppositions from their restrictors and their scope, which
are completely in line with the experimental evidence in Chemla (2009b).
3.5.3 Summary of Quantifiers
As discussed above, the pattern of projection of soft presuppositions in quantificational sen-
tences, which emerges from the results in Chemla 2009b are: (a) the projection appears to
depend on the quantifier involved, (b) the projection depends on whether the trigger is embed-
ded in the scope or in the restrictor of the quantifier. The present theory can derive both of
these results. Also, by being restricted to a theory of soft presuppositions, the present proposal
predicts the differences between soft and hard presuppositions observed by Charlow (2009).
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I proposed a development of Chemla’s (2009a) idea that presuppositions are
actually plain entailments in some cases and scalar implicatures in others, by restricting it to
a theory of soft presuppositions, along the lines of what proposed in Abusch 2010. I showed
that this can explain how soft presuppositions can be suspended, while also accounting for the
upset.
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apparent projection behavior when they are not, without the assumptions and the problems of
Abusch’s (2010) system discussed above. Furthermore, I showed how the proposal can be con-
nected to Abrusa´n’s (2011a) account of the triggering problem for soft triggers, by modifying
it slightly as to become a theory of how their alternatives, rather than presuppositions, come
about. The two main contributions of the proposal presented in this chapter are: (a) an account
of how soft presuppositions are similar and different from hard presuppositions on one hand
and scalar implicatures on the other based on the notion of obligatoriness of scalar implicatures
(Chierchia 2004, to appear, Spector 2007a, Magri 2010a) and (b) an account of the projection
behavior of soft presuppositions both from the scope and the restrictors of quantificational sen-
tences, in line with the experimental results reported in Chemla 2009b. In CHAPTER 4, I turn
to two other contributions of the system proposed here with respect to the intervention effects
by soft presuppositions in the licensing of NPIs and some puzzling cases of the interaction
between soft presuppositions and “regular” scalar implicatures. In Appendix A, I discuss the
connection between the the scalar-implicature account of neg-raising proposed in CHAPTER 2,
and the theory of soft presuppositions proposed here.
3.7 Appendix: the differences between neg-raising inferences and
soft presuppositions
In this chapter, I argued that soft triggers are scalar implicatures of sort, while in CHAPTER
2, I defended a scalar-implicature based account of neg-raising inferences, based on the argu-
ment that they are different from soft presuppositions. The question at this point is: am I not
in the same footing as Gajewski (2007)? In other words, instead of saying that they are both
presuppositions I am saying now that they are both scalar implicatures. Shouldn’t we expect
no difference in the same way as Gajewski (2007) does? The answer is no, because the scalar
implicature-approach that I adopted allows us to make a distinction between the two inferences
based on the notion of obligatoriness of alternatives. I proposed that the difference in defeasi-
bility between soft presuppositions and scalar implicatures should be traced back to a difference
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with respect to the (non)-obligatoriness of the activation of their alternatives. I argue that this
is also the difference between soft presuppositions and neg-raising inferences. In fact, I am ar-
guing for the following typology: regular scalar implicatures (e.g., scalar implicatures coming
from scalar term like every) and neg-raising inferences are optional scalar implicatures, subject
to relevance and with all properties generally attributed to scalar implicatures. Soft presupposi-
tions are obligatory scalar implicatures: they are not subject to relevance, although they can be
suspended, if they are in contradiction with information in the context. Finally hard presuppo-
sitions are real presuppositions, and this can account for the differences between soft and hard
presuppositions.
Let us now go through the differences between neg-raising inferences and soft presuppo-
sitions in a little more detail. Before that it is worth pointing out that while the theory of soft
presuppositions and the one of neg-raising that I am proposing are naturally connected, as one
can be seen as the extension of the other, they are independent: one could adopt one without
adopting the other, that is one could adopt the analysis of neg-raising as a scalar implicature but
think that soft triggers should be treated as regular presuppositions and find a different way to
account for the differences with hard-ones (see fn. 25 above).
Recall that the pattern that we want to account for is the following: scalar implicatures and
neg-raising inferences are generally drawn when the corresponding scalar terms and neg-raising
predicates are embedded under negation, but are not in the case of other embeddings like the
antecedent of conditionals. Soft presuppositions, on the other hand, are systematically drawn
when the corresponding soft trigger is embedded under negation and in other embeddings, un-
less they are suspended by conflicting information in the context. As argued in this chapter, I
propose to account for this difference in terms of relevance and the (non)-obligatoriness of alter-
natives. This can be straightforwardly extended to neg-raising inferences. We saw in CHAPTER
2 that for a case like (151a), given a question under discussion like (152a), the alternative in
(151b) is relevant and thus its exclusion gives rise to (151c).
(151) a. Bill doesn’t think that Fred left.
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b. Bill doesn’t have an opinion as to whether Fred left.
c. Bill thinks that Fred didn’t leave.
(152) What does Bill think about whether Fred left?
In the case of other embeddings like the antecedents of conditionals, however, the most natural
questions under discussions are not going to include the alternatives that in turn would give rise
to the neg-raising inference. We saw in this chapter that in a case like (153), the most natural
questions under discussion is going to be along the lines of (154).
(153) John will take an umbrella, if he thinks that it’s raining
(154) Under what conditions will John take an umbrella?
The partition corresponding to (154) is in (155), where p and q are propositions that represent
possible conditions under which John will take an umbrella.
(155) {c1 = take-umbrella(j) if and only if p, c2 = take-umbrella(j) if and only if q, ....}
Adopting the analysis of conditionals sketched in this chapter, the alternatives of (153) are
the ones in (156) and given the question under discussions in (155), it is easy to see that the
alternative that it’s possible that John is not opinionated, ♦¬some, does not correspond to any
cell or union of cells of (156) and it is then irrelevant. This in turn means that the inference to
(157), which corresponds to its negation, is not expected.
(156) Alt =

[thinkj(p)→ take-umbrella(j)]
[(thinkj(p)∨ think(¬p))→ take-umbrella(j)]
♦¬thinkj(p)
♦¬(thinkj(p)∨ think(¬p))
♦¬take-umbrella(j)
♦take-umbrella(j)

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(157) John is opinionated as to whether it is raining.
As we saw above, in the case soft presuppositions, given that I am assuming that alternatives
are not subject to relevance, the corresponding inference from (158a) to (158b) is predicted to
arise, regardless of the question under discussion.
(158) a. Mary is celebrating, if she won.
b. Mary participated.
As I discussed, the only way to suspend (158b) is via local exhaustification as in (159). Given
that (159) violates the do not weaken! requirement, it can only happen in there is explicit
information in the context in contradiction with what global exhaustification would yield.
(159) If [EXH[Mary won[+α]]] she is celebrating.
In sum, if we assume both the account of neg-raising inferences as scalar implicatures out-
lined in CHAPTER 2 and the one of soft presuppositions as scalar implicatures defended in this
chapter, we can account for the difference between the two, given the assumption about the
difference in terms of obligatoriness of alternatives activation.
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Chapter 4
Extensions: intervention and
interactions
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss how the scalar implicature-based account of soft presuppositions out-
lined in CHAPTER 3 can provide an account of their intervention effects in the licensing of NPIs
and some puzzling cases regarding the interactions between soft presuppositions and regular
scalar implicatures. As I discuss below, in both cases the grammatical theory of scalar impli-
catures adopted, based on exhaustivity operators projected in the syntax, will turn out to be
crucial. The chapter is organized as follows: in section 4.2.1, I introduce intervention effects by
scalar implicatures, in section 4.2.2, the gist of the proposal in informal terms, in section 4.3.3,
I briefly summarize a previous account of the intervention of soft presuppositions and in section
4.3.4, I outline the proposal in detail. In section 4.3.4, I discuss the account of some puzzling
cases regarding the interactions between soft presuppositions and other scalar implicatures and
in section 4.5, I conclude the chapter. Furthermore, in Appendix A, I briefly compare the theory
of soft presuppositions proposed in this and CHAPTER 3 to the scalar approach to presupposi-
tions defended in Chemla in preparation and in Appendix B, I compare it to the theory of the
soft-hard distinction proposed by Fox (2012b).
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4.2 Soft presuppositions and intervention effects
One of the central discoveries of modern linguistics is the fact that although sentences are po-
tentially unbounded, syntactic processes apply within domains that are limited by locality con-
straints. One important such constraint is represented by the so-called (Relativized) Minimality
effects (Rizzi 1990, 2001, 2004). The idea behind minimality is simply that an operator should
relate to its closest target. An abstract description of the configuration which gives rise to mini-
mality effects is in (1).
(1) In a configuration X...Z...Y
X cannot be related to Y if Z intervenes and Z has certain characteristics in common
with X.
These effects show up across a variety of domains; one prominent example is in the area of
so-called “chains”. A chain depicts the relation between an element in the position in which it
appears and the position where it is interpreted.1 The effect is that in general, a chain cannot be
built between X and Y if something intervenes between them like in the configuration in (1).
To illustrate, consider a chain between a question element and an adverbial position like (2).2
(2) How did you solve the problem <how>?
If there is another wh-element, like who, intervening between how and its trace, the result is
degraded.
(3) *How do you wonder who could solve this problem <how>?
1How chains have to be analyzed is not important here: they can be established by movement or some other
alternative implementation.
2The angle brackets indicates that the element is interpreted but does not appear in that position; see Rizzi 2001
and references therein.
132
A central characteristic of the present proposal is the assumption that exhaustivity operators
are projected in the syntax. These operators enter in agreement relations with scalar elements
(e.g. every or win). This makes the prediction that the relation between EXH and its targets
should be subject to minimality. A prediction which appears to be borne out in the case of
scalar implicatures, as shown by Chierchia (2004, to appear). As I show below, this extends
also to soft presuppositions. I will return to the details of this implementation later, but first I
informally provide the gist of the idea by Chierchia (to appear) in the next subsection.
4.2.0.1 The intervention effects by scalar implicatures: a first pass
The main puzzle facing any account of NPIs is the fact that they appear to be grammatical
only in the scope of downward entailing (DE) functions, like negation (Ladusaw 1979).3 For
instance, (7a) is grammatical but (7b) is not.
(7) a. Mary didn’t make any mistake.
b. *Mary made any mistake.
Following Krifka (1994), Chierchia (2004, 2006, to appear) proposes a theory of NPIs as al-
ternatives bearers which have to be obligatorily exhaustified. In his approach, NPI indefinites
(e.g. any) are existential quantifiers associated with alternatives and exhaustified, they result in
a contradiction unless they happen to be in the scope of a downward entailing (DE) function.4
3A DE function is defined as in (4) (from Gajewski 2007, where⇒ indicates cross-categorial entailment).
(4) A function f is downward entailing iff for any a,b in the domain of f such that a⇒ b, then f(b)⇒ f(a).
To see that negation is a DE function, notice that while (5a) entails (5b), (6b) entails (6a).
(5) a. It rained hard.
b. It rained.
(6) a. It didn’t rain hard.
b. It didn’t rain.
4More precisely, the DE function has to be in the scope of EXH and the NPI has to be in the scope of the DE
function. See Chierchia to appear for discussion about details and complications, to which I cannot do justice here.
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The hypothesis is that such contradictory meanings are the source of the ungrammaticality of
cases like (7b).5 From this, it follows that whenever we have a configuration like (8), with a DE
element like negation and an NPI in its scope, exhaustification has to take scope above negation
as in (8), or the result will be contradictory.
(8) EXH[not [... NPI ]]
If an element that can also enter into an agreement relation with EXH intervenes between EXH
and the NPI we expect a minimality effect. In other words, the exhaustivity operator cannot
enter into a relation with the NPI in a configuration like (9) by skipping the closer target, that is
the scalar term.
(9) EXH[not ... [scalar term [... NPI ]]]
The only configuration allowed is the one in which a relation is first established with the closest
scalar term and then with the NPI. Notice, however, that, if the scalar term is a strong one, a
scalar implicature is expected to arise, when it is embedded under negation. In other words,
from a sentence like (10a) we expect the scalar implicature in (10b).
(10) a. Theo didn’t both play the guitar and drink coffee
b. Theo played the guitar or drank coffee
Once this implicature is considered, the environment in which the NPI lies is not downward
entailing anymore. This, in turn, has the effect that when we exhaustify the NPI with respect
to its alternatives, we get a contradiction. In this approach, therefore, the ungrammaticality of
(11) is the result of a semantic crash due to the implicature.
(11) *Theo didn’t both play the guitar and drink any coffee
5For this notion of contradictions that leads to ungrammaticality see Gajewski 2002 and Chierchia to appear.
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The crucial role of the implicature is shown by the fact that a sentence parallel to (11) but with a
weak scalar item like in (12), which does not give rise to any implicature, is instead completely
grammatical.
(12) Theo didn’t both play the guitar or drink any coffee
In sum, in a configuration like (13), exemplified by (11), we have no option: we cannot ex-
haustify below negation or we get a contradiction. Furthermore, given minimality, we have to
exhaustify the scalar term before the NPI. This, however, gives rise to the scalar implicature in
(10b) above, which disrupts the downward monotonicity of the context and, therefore, causes a
contradiction when the NPI is exhaustified.
(13) EXH[not ... [strong scalar term [... NPI ]]]
4.2.0.2 The intervention effects by soft presuppositions: a first pass
The present analysis treats soft triggers on par with strong scalar terms, so we expect that they
should give rise to intervention effects in the same way. As I will show below in detail, this
prediction is indeed borne out. Consider the case of because clauses: because leads to the
inferences that its propositional arguments are true and these inferences appears to project as
presuppositions, as shown by (14a)-(14c) which all give rise to the inferences in (14d) and
(14e).6
(14) a. John is going to NY because Mary is there.
b. Is John going to NY because Mary is there?
c. It’s not true that John is going to NY because Mary is there.
d. Mary is in NY.
6Some of the speakers I have consulted did not share the judgement that (14)[a] gives rise to the inferences in
(14)[b]-(14)[e]. This could be accounted for by analyzing because not a soft trigger but as a regular scalar term like
every. In this case, the theory of intervention by Chierchia (to appear) would apply to it without modifications or
extensions. I leave the exploration of this hypothesis for further research.
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e. John is going to NY.
Furthermore these inferences appear to be soft presuppositions, as the ignorance diagnostic
applied in (15a) and (15b) shows.
(15) a. I don’t know where Mary is now, but if John is going to NY because she is there,
they have an affair.
b. I don’t know whether John is going to NY, but if he is going, because Mary is
there, they have an affair.
Therefore, because appears to be a soft trigger and we expect that it should intervene in the
licensing of NPIs, in the same way we saw that everyone intervenes. Indeed, it has been known
since Linebarger 1987 that because clauses do intervene. Consider the contrast betwen (16a)
and (16b).
(16) a. *Dogs don’t hear because they have any eyes. They hear because they have ears.
b. Dogs don’t hear because they have eyes. They hear because they have ears.
This is precisely what we expect in the present account: the configuration we have in (16a) is
(17). Given minimality and the fact that because is an alternative bearer, it needs to enter into a
checking relation with EXH before the NPI. It’s only upon computing the exhaustification of the
because clause that the NPI’s alternatives can be exhaustified, but by this point the environment
is no longer DE given the soft presupposition that arises from the EXH of because.
(17) EXH[not[ because [ ... NPI ]]]
In the following, I discuss the intervention of presuppositions and the previous proposal by
Homer (2010) and then I come back in detail to how the proposal here can account for the
intervention by soft presuppositions.
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4.2.1 The Intervention effects of presuppositions and previous accounts
Homer (2010), building on Linebarger 1987 and Chierchia 2004, observes that beyond scalar
implicatures also presuppositions give rise to intervention effects. He discusses precisely the
case of because-clauses and also cognitive factives in French, which behave in the same way.7
(19) (Context: Peter broke your Chinese vase.)
You are mad at Peter, not because he broke anything, but because he won’t own up to
it. Homer 2010:ex.43
(20) *Pierre
Pierre
n’
NEG
a
has
pas
NEG
de´couvert
found-out
que
that
Marie
Marie
a
has
e´crit
written
quoi que ce soit
anything
a`
to
sa
her
me`re.
mother
Homer 2010:ex.26
‘Pierre hasn’t found out that Marie has written anything to her mother.’
In both cases, he argues, that the intervention effects should be traced back to the presupposition.
Building on Chierchia’s (2004) account, he proposes to extend the idea that scalar implicatures
disrupt the licensing of NPIs to presuppositions. In other words, the proposal is that in order
to check whether an NPI is in a downward entailing environment, we should not only look at
the assertion (and its scalar implicatures) but we should also factor in its presuppositions. This
means that if a sentence φ containing an NPI presupposes p, we should not ask whether φ
creates a downward entailing contexts for the NPI but whether the conjunction p∧ φ does. To
illustrate, consider the example above in (19): we saw above that because leads to the inference
that its propositional arguments are true. Assuming that these inferences are presuppositions,
it is easy to see how they are predicted to disrupt the licensing of the NPI in Homer’s (2010)
7Importantly, he also discusses the case of the strong trigger too, exemplified by (18a), which is degraded (for
some speakers) as compared to the minimal variant in (18b).
(18) (Context: Mary said something interesting during the meeting.)
a. *I doubt that John said anything interesting too. Homer 2010:ex.21
b. I doubt that John said something interesting too.
too is not a soft trigger given the diagnostics above, it is therefore outside the coverage of the present proposal.
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system. In a case like (19), repeated schematically in (21a), the relevant meaning for NPI
licensing is not simply (21a) but it is (21b).
(21) for any propositional argument φ[NPI],ψ:
a. ¬(ψ, because φ[NPI])
b. ψ∧ φNPI ∧ ¬(ψ, because φNPI)
One occurrence of the NPI is in a positive (non-DE) environment (the second conjunct in red),
thus the licensing is predicted to be disrupted.
In sum, Homer’s (2010) proposal predicts that the presuppositions of because and French
cognitive factives intervene in the licensing of NPIs. Notice, however, that while this is an
important step towards the understanding of the intervention effects of presuppositions and
while it presents some analogies with the case of scalar implicatures, it is not clear how far
the analogy goes. More specifically, in the first case, given an account of scalar implicatures
as entailments of exhaustified sentences based on the presence of operators in the syntax and
an independently motivated minimality constraint we immediately predict intervention effects.
In other words, we have a syntactic and a semantic aspect going hand in hand: an agreement
relation between an operator and its targets obeying minimality and the result of exhaustification
giving rise to contradictions if the semantic environment does not have a certain property (DE-
ness). It is the combination of these two factors that gives rise to an explanatory account in
the case of scalar implicatures. In the case of presuppositions, instead, we have to assume
that a different component of meaning, the presuppositional level, should play a role in the
notion of monotonicity required for the licensing of NPIs. This, in turn, conflicts with claims in
the literature which requires exactly the opposite: the presuppositional level should be ignored
for NPI-licensing purposes (see von Fintel 1999, Homer 2012b for discussion) The present
proposal, on the other hand, directly extends the syntax-semantics account of the intervention
effects by scalar implicatures to the ones of soft presuppositions, thereby explaining the latter
without further assumptions.
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4.2.2 The proposal
In this section, I discuss the case of because in detail and then I point to how this account could
be extended to other soft triggers. Before turning to the case of soft triggers, however, let’s
first discuss in more detail Chierchia’s theory and how it can account for intervention effects by
scalar implicatures.
4.2.2.1 Back to the case of scalar implicatures
As we saw above, NPIs are grammatical in cases like (7a) but not in a simple positive sentence
like (7b). Chierchia’s (to appear) exhaustivity-based theory of NPI licensing sketched above
is based on three components: first, an NPI like any has the same basic lexical entry as that
of a plain indefinite: an existential quantifier over some pragmatically determined domain of
individuals, indicated as D, like in (22).
(22) [[any]] = λPλQ[∃x ∈ D[P(x)∧Q(x)]]
Second, any is associated with a particular set of alternatives, so called domain alternatives.
Domain alternatives are obtained by replacing the variable D with variables D ′ of the same type
ranging over smaller non-empty domains, as illustrated in (23).8
(23) AltD([[any]]) = {λPλQ[∃x ∈ D ′[P(x)∧Q(x)]] : D ′ ⊆ D}
Third, domain alternatives are assumed to be obligatorily active, in the same way as we assume
for the alternatives of soft presuppositions. This means that any bears a domain alternative
feature [D], in addition to the feature [σ] and the combination of σ and D can only be assigned
value “+”. As a result, NPIs must enter into an agree relation with a higher operator carrying
the same feature, i.e. EXH and hence they must be exhaustified.
(24) EXH¬[Mary make any[+σ],[+D] mistake]
8I indicate domain alternatives as AltD to distinguish them from scalar ones.
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This set of ingredients derives the distribution and interpretation of NPIs, in that it correctly
predicts a contradictory meaning, unless the NPI lies in a DE environment.9 Furthermore, this
account of NPIs licensing can be extended to provide a treatment of intervention effects by
scalar implicatures, and as I propose below, by soft presuppositions as well.
The Intervention effects of scalar implicatures Chierchia (to appear) offers an analysis of
intervention effects caused by conjunction and quantifiers, both scalar terms endowed with
alternatives. An example of an intervention effect case is (28b), versus its minimal variant
(28a).
(28) a. Theo didn’t play the guitar or drink any coffee
b. ??Theo didn’t play the guitar and drink any coffee
Accounting for contrasts such as the on in (28) is done by appealing to both a semantic and
syntactic requirement. Semantically, the intervention effect arrises as a result of the scalar
implicature which comes about as a result of having the conjunction in the scope of negation.
Syntactically, the relation between the exhaustifying operator EXH and NPIs or scalar terms is
subject to minimality, in the sense above. Let’s look at each of these requirements in detail
below.
9To illustrate, consider how this account can explain why (7a) is grammatical, while (7b) is not: if we exhaustify
(7b) in (25a) with respect to its domain alternatives in (25b), we get (26).
(25) a. ∃x ∈ D[mistake(x)∧make(m, x)]
b. {∃x ∈ D ′[mistake(x)∧make(m, x)] : ∅ 6= D ′ ⊆ D}
(26) [[EXH]](26a) = ∃x ∈ D[mistake(x) ∧ make(m, x)] ∧ ¬∃y ∈ D ′[mistake(y) ∧ make(m,y)] for all non
empty D ′ such that D ′ ⊆ D
(26) says is that there is at least one mistake in some domain D that Mary made, but that for all non-empty subsets
D ′ of D, there is no mistake that Mary made. This is clearly impossible, hence we end up with a meaning that can
never be true. In the case of (7a), instead, represented in (27a) with its alternatives in (27b), the domain alternatives
are all entailed by (27a). If there is no mistake in some domainD that Mary made, there won’t be any mistake in all
subdomains D ′ of D. Hence, given the definition of EXH, it will turn out to be vacuous in this case.
(27) a. ¬∃x ∈ D[mistake(x)∧make(m, x)]
b. {¬∃x ∈ D ′[mistake(x)∧make(m, x)] : D ′ ⊆ D}
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The semantic side of the intervention effects can be illustrated in three steps. First step:
consider two variants of (28a) and (28b) without NPIs, like (29a) and (29b), and notice that a
difference between the two is that (29a) gives rise to the inference in (29c), while (29b) does
not.
(29) a. Theo didn’t play the guitar and dance.
b. Theo didn’t play the guitar or dance.
c. Theo played the guitar or danced
Second step: as we saw in the last section, a sentence like (30) is predicted to be felicitous
in Chierchia’s (to appear) account, because exhaustification of an NPI in the scope of a DE
function is just vacuous (it does not result in a contradictory meaning).
(30) Theo didn’t drink any coffee
Third step: putting these two pieces together and going back to the contrast in (28a) versus
(28b), we can now see that the scalar implicature makes it so that the NPI any does not lie
in a DE environment anymore and thus it cannot be licensed. Consider (28a) first. Following
Chierchia (to appear), I assume the LF in (31), where the NPI and the scalar term each have
their own exhaustivity operator, as indicated by the co-indexing.10
(31) EXHiEXHj[¬[Theo play the guitar andj[+σ] [drink any
i
[+σ,+D] coffee ]]]
In the interpretation of (31) we first exhaustify (32a) with respect to its alternatives in (32b) and
we obtain (33).
(32) a. ¬[play-guitar(t)∧ ∃x ∈ D[coffee(x)∧ drink(t, x)]
b. Alt(32a) =
 ¬[play-guitar(t)∨ ∃x ∈ D[coffee(x)∧ drink(t, x)]¬[play-guitar(t)∧ ∃x ∈ D[coffee(x)∧ drink(t, x)]

10See Chierchia (to appear:ch. 7) for arguments in favor of separate exhaustification of the scalar and domain
alternatives.
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(33) ¬[play-guitar(t)∧ ∃x ∈ D[coffee(x)∧ drink(t, x)]
∧[play-guitar(t)∨ ∃x ∈ D[coffee(x)∧ drink(t, x)]]
One can see that once the scalar implicature is added the second conjunct (in blue) in (33) is
positive making the conjunction as a whole no longer DE. This means that when we exhaustify
with respect to the domain alternatives of any in (34b), all alternatives are logically independent.
Since they are all logically independent, the exhaustification negates them all and a contradic-
tion ensues (I show this in Appendix C).
(34) a. ¬[play-guitar(t)∧ ∃x ∈ D[coffee(x)∧ drink(t, x)]
∧[play-guitar(t)∨ ∃x ∈ D[coffee(x)∧ drink(t, x)]]
b. AltD(34a) = {¬[play-guitar(t)∧∃x ∈ D ′[coffee(x)∧drink(t, x)]∧[play-guitar(t)∨
∃x ∈ D[coffee(x)∧ drink(t, x)]] : D ′ ⊆ D}
On the other hand, in (28a), since or is in the scope of negation, it does not give rise to any
scalar implicatures and thus the exhaustification of the NPI proceeds as if it were directly under
negation.
(35) EXHiEXHj[¬[Theo play the guitar orj[+σ] [drink any
i
[+σ,+D] coffee ]]]
In sum, the approach can account for the contrast in (28a) versus (28b); there are, however, two
open issues at this point: the first regards the order between exhaustification of the scalar term
and exhaustification of the NPI; to obtain the intervention effect above, the order of exhaustifi-
cation between scalar and domain alternatives is crucial. To illustrate, consider the LF in (36),
where we first exhaustify the NPI and then the scalar term and.
(36) EXHjEXHi[¬[Theo play the guitar and
j
[+σ] [drink any
i
[+σ,+D] coffee ]]]
Notice that at the point of the first exhaustification the NPI lies in a downward entailing en-
vironment, thus exhaustification is just vacuous; then we exhaustify again and add the scalar
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implicature and the result is obviously non-contradictory: Theo didn’t both played the guitar
and drink coffee, but he did one or the other. The first question is, then, what rules out the LF
in (36).
The second issue regards the fact that, as we saw above, scalar terms can have the alterna-
tives inactive, so why can’t we have the LF in (37), where and has no active alternatives? In this
case the scalar term and would not be exhaustified and would thus not create intervention.
(37) EXHi[¬[Theo play the guitar and[−σ] [drink anyi[+σ,+D] coffee ]]]
These two issues are resolved on syntactic grounds. Recall that we are assuming that NPIs
bear the feature [σ] and the feature [D] and that the combination [σ, D] can only get the value
“+” (the alternatives of NPIs are obligatorily active). This means that an exhaustivity operator
C-commanding them has to be present or the derivation will crash. A precise formulation of
minimality is (38).11
(39) Minimality: EXH must target the closest potential alternative bearer
a. A bearer XP of [σ]/[D] is closest to EXH iff:
(i) EXH asymmetrically C-commands XP
(ii) There is no other bearer YP of the relevant features (σ, D) such that EXH
asymmetrically C-commands YP and YP C-commands XP
We can now see that this notion of minimality rules out the first problematic case in (36),
repeated in (40), in which the order of exhaustification makes it so that the result is not contra-
dictory.
(40) EXHjEXHi[¬[Theo play the guitar and
j
[+σ] [drink any
i
[+σ,+D] coffee ]]]
11The notion of C-command assumed here is (39).
(38) C-command: A C-commands B iff A doesn’t dominate B and the first relevant branching node that domi-
nates A dominates B
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Notice that in (40) the first exhaustivity operator is not targeting the closest potential alter-
native bearer, in the sense in (39) above, thus the configuration turns out to be syntactically
ill-formed.12 Finally, the second problematic case in (42) is also ruled out in the way above: the
exhaustivity operator has to target the closest potential bearer, thus it cannot skip it and target
any.
(42) EXHi[¬[Theo play the guitar and[−σ] [drink anyi[+σ,+D] coffee ]]]
Summing up, the scalar implicature based approach, together with a syntactic constraint of
minimality, can account for the intervention effects in a case like (28b), repeated below in (43).
(43) ??Theo didn’t play the guitar and drink any coffee
(43a) can be analyzed as (44a), (44b) or (44c). However, (44a) and (42) are ruled out on
syntactic grounds via minimality above, while (44c) is syntactically well-formed, but it gives
rise to a contradictory meaning.
(44) a. EXHjEXHi[¬[Theo play and
j
[+σ] [drink any
i
[+σ,+D] coffee ]]]
b. EXHi[¬[Theo play and[−σ] [drink anyi[+σ,+D] coffee ]]]
c. EXHiEXHj[¬[Theo play and
j
[+σ] [drink any
i
[+σ,+D] coffee ]]]
In the following, I show how we can extend this approach straightforwardly to the case of soft
presuppositions.
12Notice that minimality allows the configuration with the opposite order in (41), repeated from above. However,
as we saw, (41) gives rise to a contradiction, thus it is ruled out by the semantic side of the account.
(41) EXHiEXHj[¬[Theo play the guitar and
j
[+σ] [drink any
i
[+σ,+D] coffee ]]]
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4.2.3 Intervention effects by soft presuppositions
4.2.3.1 The case of because-clauses
I argued above that because leads to the soft presuppositions that its propositional arguments are
true. I analyze because-clauses as strong scalar items, like all other soft triggers; for concrete-
ness, I adopt Schlenker’s (2008b) simplified semantics of because, where p because q roughly
means p and q and if not q then not p.13 Furthermore, I assume that the two entailments p and
q are also alternatives.14
(45) a. [[because]](p)(q) = [(p∧ q)∧(¬q→ ¬p)]
b. Alt(45a) =
{
(p∧ q)∧(¬q→ ¬p),p,q
}
Given the meaning in (45a) and the alternatives in (45b), it is easy to see that the inferences to
the truth of the arguments of because behave as the other soft presuppositions illustrated above.
So for instance, the inference that Mary is in NY arises as a plain entailment in the case of (46a)
and as a scalar implicature in the case of (46b).
(46) a. John is going to NY because Mary is there.
b. It’s not true that John is going to NY because Mary is there.
On the other hand, the negation case in (46b), represented in (47a), has the alternative in (47b),
thus its exhaustification is going to give rise to the result in (47c).
(47) a. [[EXH]](¬[because(p)(q)])
b. Alt =
{
¬[(p∧ q)∧(¬q→ ¬p)],¬p,¬q
}
c. ¬[(p∧ q)∧(¬q→ ¬p)]∧ p∧ q
13See also Lewis 1973a and Dowty 1979. Schlenker (2008b) analyzes the conditional as a version of Stalnaker’s
(1975) semantics of conditionals. For consistence with the above, I adopt a strict conditional semantics of condi-
tionals, but nothing hinges on this point.
14Notice that under Abrusa´n’s (2011a) algorithm we only predict that the because clause, p, should be an alter-
native. The matrix sentence, q, is not independent from the matrix sentence. Nothing changes with respect to the
intervention effects from the because-clause discussed below.
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Because-clauses as interveners We saw above that because clauses are also interveners.
More precisely, as Homer (2010) discusses, the generalization appears to be that NPIs can-
not be licensed within because-clauses when the presuppositions of the latter go through but
are instead felicitous in contexts in which they appear to be suspended (Homer 2010, Chierchia
to appear see also Linebarger 1987). To illustrate, consider the contrast between (48) repeated
from above and (49) also from Homer 2010.
(48) (Context: Peter broke your Chinese vase.)
You are mad at Peter, not because he broke anything, but because he won’t own up to
it.
(49) You are mad at Peter, not because he broke anything (of course, he never did such a
thing), but because he says you are on the chubby side.
As we are analyzing because as a strong scalar item, we can straightforwardly extend Chier-
chia’s (to appear) account to analyze its intervention effect. Let me illustrate this: first, the
semantic side of the account predicts that a sentence like (50) with the LF in (51) winds up
being contradictory.
(50) *You are mad at Peter not because he broke anything.
(51) EXHiEXHj[¬[You are mad at Peter becausej he broke anythingi]]
When we first exhaustify because with respect to the alternatives in (52a), we get the result in
(52b): the inferences that you are mad at Peter and that he broke something.
(52) a. Alt =
{
¬[because(∃x ∈ D[qx])(p)],¬∃x ∈ D[qx],¬p
}
b. [[EXH]](¬[because(∃x ∈ D[qx])(p)]) =
¬[(p∧ ∃x ∈ D[qx])∧(¬∃x ∈ D[qx]→ ¬p)]∧ p∧ ∃x ∈ D[qx]
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These inferences disrupt the DE character of the context in which any occurs. As a result, when
we exhaustify with respect to the domain alternatives a contradiction arises (I show in Appendix
C that (53) and the negation of all alternatives in (54) is a contradiction).
(53) ¬[(p∧ ∃x ∈ D[qx])∧(¬∃x ∈ D[qx]→ ¬p)]∧ p∧ ∃x ∈ D[qx]
(54) {¬[(p∧ ∃x ∈ D ′[qx])∧(¬∃x ∈ D ′[qx]→ ¬p)]∧ p∧ ∃x ∈ D ′[qx] : D ′ ⊆ D}
Furthermore, the present proposal can also account for the fact that when the inferences are sus-
pended intervention effects do not arise. Recall that contrary to (48), (49) above is grammatical.
I propose that (49) should be analyzed with the LF in (55), where we exhaustify the scalar term
because below negation.
(55) EXHi[¬[EXHj[You are mad at Peter becausej he broke anythingi]]]
As seen above, exhaustification of because below negation is vacuous, thus no inference is pre-
dicted and the DE-ness of the environment in which any appears is not disrupted. We then
exhaustify the NPI and again the result is vacuous, so we predict the felicity of (49).15 Fi-
15Notice that the proposal predicts that whenever the presupposition is not triggered, the intervention effect should
be suspended. As Chierchia (2004, to appear) notices, on the other hand, the intervention effects appear to remain
even in the absence of scalar implicatures, as the following example shows.
(56) I think no student read anything, therefore...??I doubt that every student read anything. Homer 2010
A question at this point is why can’t we do the same as above for because, that is, why we can’t have the LF in (57),
which does not give rise to a contradictory meaning.
(57) EXHj[¬EXHi[everyi student read anythingj]]
I argue that this can be traced back to the difference between scalar terms and soft triggers, which is the (non)-
obligatoriness of the alternatives. We saw above that the theory of scalar implicature by Chierchia (to appear) has
a redundancy in the way scalar implicatures coming from strong scalar items can be suspended: via deactivation of
alternatives as in (58a) or via local exhaustiication as in (58b).
(58) a. Not every[−σ] student came
b. Not EXH[every[+σ] student came]
I assume the economy condition in (59), which requires that if you can obtain suspension via the deactivation of the
alternatives, then you should not obtain it through local exhaustification.
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nally, the syntactic side of Chierchia’s (to appear) account guarantees that (60), which is not
contradictory, is excluded by minimality.16
(60) EXHjEXHi[¬[You are mad at Peter becausej he broke anythingi]]
Summing up, the present proposal can account for the intervention effect of because by adopting
Chierchia’s (to appear) scalar implicature-based account of intervention. In the next section, I
discuss the case of the other soft triggers.
4.2.3.2 Other soft triggers
We saw that because leads to intervention effects and that the present account predicts this
straightforwardly. The same analysis can be extended to French cognitive factives so that to
predict the intervention of (61) and the non-intervention of (62).17
(61) *Pierre
Pierre
n’
NEG
a
has
pas
NEG
de´couvert
found-out
que
that
Marie
Marie
a
has
e´crit
written
quoi que ce soit
anything
a`
to
sa
her
me`re.
mother
Homer 2010:ex.26
‘Pierre hasn’t found out that Marie has written anything to her mother.’
(62) Si
if
Pierre
Pierre
de´couvrait
found-out
que
that
Marie
Marie
ait
have.SUBJ
e´crit
written
quoi que ce soit
anything
a`
to
sa
her
me`re,
mother
il
he
serait
would-be
fache`.
mad
‘If Pierre found out that Mary had written anything to her mother, he would be mad.’
(59) Do not exhaustify locally if you have other options:
EXH[... + σ...] is disallowed if EXH[... + σ...] = [−σ]
It is easy to see that (59) rules out the LF in (58b).
16It is not contradictory, for the same reason as above: the exhaustification of the NPI happens in a DE context,
hence it is vacuous, and only after the inferences of because are added.
17In (121d) assume a context in which Marie hasn’t written to her mother, that is where the presupposition is
suspended.
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As Homer (2010) discusses, when we look at other triggers the picture is more complicated.
For instance, when we look at aspectuals like stop there appears to be no intervention.
(63) John hasn’t stopped smoking anything Homer (2010:ex.92)
As Chierchia (to appear) discusses, however, (63) shows that stop does not intervene only if we
can be sure that anything scope below stop.18
The case of English factives like know in (65) appears to show more convincingly a case of
non-intervention by a soft trigger. (65) is felicitous and the NPI is arguably taking scope below
the factive, because an inverse scope interpretation would violate general constraints on scope
taking operations (e.g., clause-boundedness).
(65) John has kissed his neighbor. Mary doesn’t know that he kissed anybody. Homer
(2010:ex.80)
Homer (2010) leaves open on how to account for the difference between triggers.19 How can we
integrate this data into the present account? I am assuming that soft triggers are also endowed
with [σ]. As we discussed, we expect that the relation between EXH, NPIs, and scalar items is
subject to minimality. Notice that one characteristic of minimality effects is that they occur with
elements that are “similar enough”. In other words, in a configuration X...Z...Y, Z intervenes in
the potential relation between X and Z only if Z is in some sense similar enough to Y, otherwise
it can be ignored. What notion of “similar enough” should we use? Rizzi (2001, 2004) discusses
18A similar explanation in terms of scope applies to the case of win in (64), as win doesn;t take propositional
or property objects, so there is just no scope-site for the NPI below win (thanks to Irene Heim (p.c.) and Nathan
Klinedinst (p.c.) for discussion on this point)
(64) John didn’t win any race
19In Homer 2012b, he sketches an idea in terms of derivation timing of sentences and their presuppositions, in
which the introduction of presuppositions can occur before or after NPI licensing, depending on the trigger and on
the language.
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the issue at length and proposes an implementation in terms of classes of features.20 We can
assume that there is a feature [pi] which is analogous to [σ] but does not belong to the same class
of feature for the purpose of minimality. The hypothesis is that there is variation both within a
language and across languages among soft triggers in terms of which feature they bear between
[σ] and [pi]: English factives would have the feature [pi] while because and French factives the
feature [σ]. Given that [pi] is not of the same class of σ, EXH can skip it and target the NPI in a
configuration like (68).21
(70) EXH[ ... soft triggerpi ... NPI[σ,D]]
4.2.3.3 Summing up
I have shown how the present proposal provides an account of the intervention effects exhib-
ited by because and French cognitive factives. Furthermore, I also sketched how the non-
intervention of other soft triggers can be accommodated in the present feature-based account.
As we saw, adopting the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures in that it allows us to appeal
20One example of this aspect of minimality effects, is that different adverbs intervene differently, so for instance
in French beaucoup (a lot) intervenes in (66) but attentivement (carefully) does not as shown in (67).
(66) *Combien
How many
a-t-il
did he
beaucoup
a lot
consulte´ <combien>
consulted
de
of
livres?
books?
(67) Combien
How many
a-t-il
did he
attentivement
carefully
consulte´ <combien>
consulted
de
of
livres?
books?
Rizzi (2001, 2004) proposes to distinguish between these cases by using a notion of classes of features and that those
adverbs belong to different classes.
21Consider the case in (68), from above: we can analyze it with the LF in (68), where we first exhaustify the NPI
and no contradictory meaning is predicted.
(68) EXHj[EXHi¬[Mary know
j
[+pi] that he kissed anybody
i
[+σ,+D]]]
Notice that either a new EXH targets the soft trigger, thus giving rise to the presupposition or if the soft presupposition
is suspended, we first exhaustify the strong scalar item below negation suspending the presupposition. Then we
exhaustify the NPI.
(69) [EXHi¬EXHj[Mary know
j
[+pi] that he kissed anybody
i
[+σ,+D]]]
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to minimality relations between the operator, the NPI and other scalar items in order to account
for the exclusion of certain configurations that otherwise present no problems from a purely
semantic perspective. Insofar that this account of intervention can be shown to be successful,
it constitutes an argument for the present syntactic-semantic approach against purely pragmatic
alternatives like Chemla in preparation (see Appendix A).
4.3 The interactions with “regular” scalar implicatures
The interaction between presuppositions and scalar implicatures has been recently discussed by
Chierchia (2004), Simons (2006), Russell (2006, 2012), Geurts (2010), Chemla (in preparation)
and Gajewski and Sharvit (2012). Chierchia (2004) discusses the case in (71a) in which a scalar
implicatures is apparently computed on the presupposition.22
(71) a. John knows that some of the students are waiting for him.
b.  Some but not all of the students are waiting for him.
One way to account for the inference above in the present system is by globally exhaustifying
the sentence with respect to the combined alternatives of the factive predicate and the ones of
the scalar item some. This is because, abbreviating (71a) as in (72a), the alternatives are the
ones in (72b) and crucially all of the students are waiting for John (p∀) is among the excludable
ones, hence we get the prediction that its negation is among the implicatures of the sentence. In
other words, that it’s not the case that all students are waiting for John.23
(72) a. knowjφSOME
22Chierchia (2004) uses it as an argument in favor of local application of scalar implicatures, which we can of
course reproduce here as local application of EXH. In the following cases I focus on the global application of EXH.
23We also get the less surprising inferences that it’s not true that John believes that all of the students are waiting
for him.
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b. Alt =

knowjφSOME
knowjφALL
φALL
φSOME

c. Excl =
{
knowjφALL,φALL
}
d. EXH(knowjφSOME) = knowjφSOME ∧ ¬knowjφALL ∧ ¬φALL
We can, hence, account for some simple cases of the interaction between soft presuppositions
and scalar implicatures. Recently, Simons (2006) has pointed out two more challenging cases
for theories of scalar implicatures. I will show that in the present system these cases can simply
be treated as cases of multiple scalar items.
4.3.1 Two puzzling cases
4.3.1.1 Sorry
The first case is one in which a scalar item is embedded in the scope of an emotive factive like
sorry. The relevant reading can be informally described as one in which there is an implicature
at the presuppositional level, as John believes that some but not all of the students failed the
exam, but there is no scalar implicature at the assertion level, as there is no implication that he
is sorry that not all of the students failed the exam.
(73) a. John is sorry that some of the students failed the exam.
b.  John believes that some but not all of the students failed the exam.
c. 6 John is sorry that some but not all of the students failed the exam.
Let’s first assume the following lexical entry for sorry, modeled on Gajewski and Sharvit (2012),
where x is sorry that p simply means that x believes that p and that p is the case and that x does
not want it. Also, along the lines of the other soft triggers above, I assume the alternatives in
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(74b).24
(74) a. [[sorry]](p)(x) = λw[wantx,w¬p∧ believex,wp∧ pw]
b. Alt =

λw[wantx,w¬p∧ believex,wp∧ pw]
λw[believex,wp]
λw[pw]

Going back to (73a), which we can schematize as in (75a), we get the alternatives in (75b) and
the result of exhaustification leads precisely to the correct result that John believes that some of
the students failed the exam and he doesn’t believe that all of them did, but crucially not that
he is sorry that not all of the students failed the exam. This is because once we exclude the
alternative all of the students failed the exam ( φ∀) and John believes that all of the students
failed the exam (believejφ∀), the exclusion of the alternative that John is sorry that all of the
students failed the exam (believejφ∀∧φ∀∧wantj¬φ∀) is already entailed, hence there are no
further inferences predicted.25
(75) a. believejφSOME ∧ φSOME ∧ wantj¬φSOME
b. Alt =

φSOME
φALL
believejφSOME
believejφALL
believejφSOME ∧ φSOME ∧ wantj¬φSOME
believejφALL ∧ φALL ∧ wantj¬φALL

24Again, as one can verify these are the ones predicted by applying Abrusa´n (2011b) algorithm.
25Notice that the inference predicted is that it is not the case that John believes that all of the students failed
the exam, with negation taking wide scope over the attitude predicate. In some cases we might want to obtain the
stronger inference in which negation takes narrow scope, i.e. John believes that not all. There has been various
proposal on how to strengthen the weak inference to the stronger one, see Russell (2006) and Simons (2006) among
others. I will remain neutral at this point on how to do this. Thanks to Michael Franke (p.c.) for discussion on this
point.
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c. Excl =

φALL
believejφALL
believejφALL ∧ φALL ∧ wantj¬φALL

d. EXH(believejφSOME ∧ φSOME ∧ wantj¬φSOME) =
(believejφSOME ∧ φSOME ∧ wantj¬φSOME)∧ ¬φALL ∧ ¬believeφALL
4.3.1.2 Discover
The second case is a scalar item in the scope of a factive like discover. Again there is a straight-
forward and a more complicated case. Starting from the former, consider a case like (76a): the
reading here is one in which John believes that some but not all of the students failed the exam
and also that it is the case that some but not all of the students did it.
(76) a. John discovered that some of the students failed the exam.
b.  John believes that some but not all of the students failed the exam.
c.  some but not all of the students failed the exam.
In this case, we can obtain these inferences by simply exhaustifying locally as in (77) within the
complement of discover. This is because the two inferences in (76b) and (76c) above fall out as
entailments of (77).
(77) John discovered that EXH[some of the students failed the exam] =
John discovered that some but not all of the students failed the exam
Let’s turn now to the more reading of (77a), which is one that does not entail (77b) but does
still entail (77c). In this case, the relevant reading is one in which John believes that some and
possibly all of the students failed the exam, but still it is inferred that it is the case that some
but not all of the students failed the exam. The strategy for treating this case is similar to the
one above: consider the entry in (78a) and the alternatives in (78b), where x discovered that p
simply means that x did not believe that p at some time before the utterance time and that x now
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believes it and that p is also the case.
(78) a. [[discover]](p)(x) = λt[¬believex,t ′p∧ believex,tp∧ pt]
for some time interval t ′ such that t ′ < t
b. Alt =

λt[¬believex,t ′p∧ believex,tp∧ pt]
λt[¬believex,t ′p]
λt[pt]

Let’s go back now to the case above in ?? represented schematically in (79a); once we apply
the lexical entry in (78a) with respect to the alternatives in (78b), we obtain the correct result:
in fact we only obtain the implicature that some but not all of the students failed the exam.
Again, once we exclude the alternative all of the students failed (φt∀) the exclusion of the other
excludable alternative is already entailed. So we only predict the inference that it’s not the case
that all of the students failed, thus predicting the reading above.
(79) a. ¬believej,t ′φSOME ∧ believex,tφSOME ∧ φtSOME
b.

φtSOME
φtALL
¬believej,t ′φSOME
¬believej,t ′φALL
¬believej,t ′φALL ∧ believex,tφALL ∧ φtALL
¬believej,t ′φSOME ∧ believex,tφSOME ∧ φtSOME

c. Excl =
 φ
t
ALL
¬believej,t ′φALL ∧ believex,tφALL ∧ φtALL

(80) EXH(¬believej,t ′φSOME ∧ believex,tφSOME ∧ φtSOME =
(¬believej,t ′φSOME ∧ believex,tφSOME ∧ φtSOME ∧ ¬φ
t
ALL
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Summing up, the present account can predict two puzzling cases of the interaction between
presuppositions and scalar implicatures as simple cases of multiple scalar items.26
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I discussed how the account of soft presuppositions outlined in CHAPTER 2 can
provide an account of the intervention effects by soft presuppositions in the licensing of NPIs.
This, in particular, is allowed by the syntactic-semantic nature of the account, which postulates
operators in the syntax and thus predicts that they should be subject to syntactic constraints
such as minimality effects. Furthermore, I have shown that this approach can also solve some
puzzling cases arising with scalar terms like every embedded in the scope of soft triggers. In
Appendix A, I briefly compare the proposal here to the one by Chemla (in preparation) and in
Appendix B, I compare it to the one by Fox (2012b).
4.5 Appendix A: comparison with Chemla in preparation
Chemla (in preparation) proposes a unified alternative-based approach to presuppositions, free
choice inferences and scalar implicatures. The architecture is similar to Abusch (2010) pro-
posal: a global pragmatic principle operates on a set of alternatives and gives rise to presupposi-
tional inferences. In the following I briefly summarize his proposal and highlight the differences
with respect to the theory proposed in this and the previous chapter.
4.5.1 A sketch of the theory
Chemla’s (in preparation) has two main components: first, a method of constructing alternatives
from a sentence (i.e. a set of replacements), which also provides a way of grouping them into
26Gajewski and Sharvit (2012) can also account for it but they propose that scalar implicatures should also be
computed at the presuppositional level. Here, instead, I avoid this complication of the system. Chemla (in prepa-
ration) can also account for cases of interactions between presuppositions and scalar implicatures in his system.
However he does not discuss the cases above. I leave for further research the extent to which his system can be
extended to account for the cases here.
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separate subsets of alternatives. Second, a pragmatic principle that requires that a speaker is in
the same epistemic status with respect to the alternative in each subset. Let us go through both
components in more detail.
The method of constructing alternatives is based on the standard assumption that scalar
items are associated to sets of lexical alternatives. In the case of scalar implicatures, Chemla
(in preparation) assumes that a scalar item like many has the standard lexical alternatives some
and every. A first novel aspect is that he also assumes that there are two additional scale mates,
which are a strong contradictory alternative ⊥ and a weak tautological one >.27 Furthermore,
Chemla (in preparation) assumes that there are three procedures for constructing alternatives,
what he calls “transformations”: (a) “stronger replacements“, which substitute each scalar term
with a stronger scale-mate, (b) “weaker replacements”, which do the same but with weaker
scale-mates and (c) “connective split”, which for any sentence p⊗q, where⊗ is any connective,
it substitutes p⊗ q with p and p⊗ q with q. In the case of a sentence like (81a), schematized
in (81b), we, hence, obtain the alternatives in (82) through stronger and weaker replacements.
(81) a. Many students came.
b. MANY
(82)

>
SOME
EVERY
⊥

The second novel aspect of the proposal is that sets of alternatives like the one in (82) are then
divided into subsets of alternatives, according to how they are constructed (stronger replace-
ments, weaker replacements or connective split). The alternatives in each subset are called
“similar” alternatives. In the case of (82) the subsets of similar alternatives are in (83a) and
(83b).
27More precisely he assumes that there are scale-mates that creates a tautological or contradictory meaning at the
first scope site.
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(83) a. {SOME,>} weaker replacements
b. {EVERY,⊥} stronger replacements
In the case of a connective like disjunction in (84), the set of similar alternatives are in (85a)-
(85c).28
(84) p∨ q
(85) a. {p,q} connective split
b. {(p∧ q),⊥} stronger replacements
c. {>} weaker replacements
Given the alternatives, constructed and divided in the way above, there is a second component
of the theory, which is a pragmatic felicity condition operating on these alternatives. The felicity
condition that Chemla (in preparation) proposes is in (86) and the notion of epistemic similarity
is defined in (87).
(86) Similarity Principle: An utterance is felicitous only if its similar alternatives are epis-
temically similar.
(87) Epistemic Similarity (weak) Two propositions φ and ψ are epistemically similar if
Bs[φ]↔ Bs[ψ] (where Bs[φ] indicates that the speaker believes that φ)
The similarity principle requires that similar alternative, that is those alternatives that are grouped
together by the same transformation, have to be either believed to be true together or believed to
be false together by the speaker. For instance in the case of (81a), the inferences that we obtain
given (86) are (88) and (89).
(88) Bs[SOME]↔ Bs[>]
(89) Bs[EVERY]↔ Bs[⊥]
28Singleton sets like {>} can be ignored.
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What (88) requires is that the speaker believes that some of the students came if and only if she
believes the tautological proposition, in other words it requires that the speaker believes that
some of the students came. This is already entailed by the assertion. (89), instead, requires
that the speaker believes that every student came if and only if she believes the contradictory
proposition. This, in turn, means that it’s false that the speaker believes that every student came.
We hence obtain the inference in (90) for a sentence like (81a).
(90) ¬Bs[every student came]
The type of inferences in (90) are what Chemla (in preparation) calls “weak epistemic similarity
inferences”. These inferences can then be strengthened given the assumption that the speaker
is opinionated with respect to the alternatives: for any alternative φ, (Bs[φ]∨ Bs[¬φ]) as long
as the resulting inference is consistent with all the weak inferences.29 So now when possible a
weak similarity inference (Bs[φ]↔ Bs[ψ])will be strengthened to a strong similarity inference
Bs[φ↔ ψ]. In the case of (81a) we can strengthen (89) to (91).
(91) Bs[EVERY ↔ ⊥] =
Bs[¬[every student came]]
Turning now to the case of presuppositions, Chemla (in preparation) assumes that any φ gener-
ally assumed to be a presuppositional trigger with presupposition p is instead a non-presuppositional
scalar item associated to the alternatives p and ¬p. In addition, the weak tautological alternative
> and the strong contradictory one ⊥ are again assumed to be scale-mates. In the same way
as above, the alternatives of a sentence like (92) are constructed and divided into two groups of
similar alternatives, as in (93a) and (93b).
(92) a. John knows that it’s raining.
b. KNOWj(RAIN)
29See Sauerland (2004) for an analogous strengthening process that he calls “the epistemic step”.
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(93) a. {RAIN,>} weaker replacements
b. {¬RAIN,⊥} stronger replacements
As in the case of scalar implicatures, the similarity principle requires that similar alternatives
are either believed to be true together or believed to be false together by the speaker. in the case
of (92a), we obtain the weak epistemic similarity inferences in (94a) and (94b), which can be
strengthened to (95a) and (95b).
(94) a. Bs[RAIN]↔ Bs[>]
b. Bs[¬RAIN]↔ Bs[⊥]
(95) a. Bs[RAIN ↔ >]
b. Bs[¬RAIN ↔ ⊥]
Both (95a) and (95b) say that the speaker believes that it’s raining. So we obtain the presuppo-
sition of a sentence like (92a)
In essence, the proposal in Chemla in preparation provides a set of procedures for construct-
ing alternatives and dividing them into subsets of similar alternatives. Furthermore, it comes
with a pragmatic principle that requires that the speaker be in the same epistemic status with
respect to the alternatives obtained through the same procedure. This principle gives rise to
presuppositional inferences, which can in certain cases be strengthened. Let us turn now to a
comparison between this system and the present proposal.
4.5.2 Comparison
Given that Chemla in preparation is a unified account of presuppositions, scalar implicatures,
and free choice inferences, a complete comparison should eventually be done in each of these
areas. More specifically, one should compare the present account of soft presuppositions to-
gether with the exhaustivity-based account of scalar implicatures and free choice inferences
that I adopt on one hand and the proposal by Chemla (in preparation) on the other. While I re-
strict the comparison here to the presupposition part, there is one immediate point of divergence
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between these two systems with respect to scalar implicatures that I want to mention. The di-
vergence regards the account of scalar implicatures that appear to be embedded (see Chierchia
et al. To appear for discussion). The grammatical theory adopted here can simply merge the
exhaustivity operator locally, and indeed one of the main argument for this approach is precisely
the fact that it can easily account for embedded scalar implicatures. Chemla (in preparation),
on the other hand, has to assume a local application of the pragmatic principle that he proposes
(see Chemla (in preparation:pp.53-57) for discussion). While this is technically possible, one
might find this conceptually undesirable, as discussed in Recanati 2003 among others.
Turning now to presuppositions, I want to emphasize four main differences between Chemla
(in preparation)’s and the present proposal.
The first aspect regards how he responds to his own challenge discussed in CHAPTER 3,
section 3.3.2. Recall that Chemla (2009a) claims that the scalar approach to presuppositions
does not make the right predictions for presupposition projection from the scope of negative
quantifiers. This is because it would predict the existential inference in (96b), while the par-
ticipants of Chemla’s (2009b) experiment reported the strong universal inference in (96c) for
sentences like the one in (96a).
(96) a. No student won.
b. Some student participated.
c. Every student participated.
More precisely, the inference in (96c) from (96a) was accepted more often than the analogous
inference with a scalar implicature in (97c) from (97a).
(97) a. No student did all of the readings.
b. Some student did all of the readings.
c. Every student did some of the readings.
I showed in CHAPTER 3 that by assuming independently motivated alternatives for negative
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quantifiers we can in fact account for the universal inference in (97b) and furthermore, assum-
ing a difference in terms of whether they are subject to relevance or not, we can also account for
the difference between scalar implicatures and soft presuppositions. Chemla (in preparation),
instead, responds to the challenge above by effectively abandoning the idea that presupposi-
tional triggers are identical to strong scalar items, and assuming different alternatives for scalar
implicatures and presuppositions. As I discussed in the last section, he assumes that presupposi-
tional triggers have both a weaker alternative and it’s negation. In other words, a presupposition
trigger φ has both the weaker p and its negation ¬p as scale mates. On the other hand, strong
scalar terms like every do not: every does not have ¬some in addition to some as a scale-mate.
This difference is crucial in order to account for the difference between the projection from the
scope of negative quantifiers, because he only predicts existential inferences in the case of scalar
implicatures, while universal inferences for the case of presuppositions. To see this considers
a sketch of the derivation for the case of (98a), with the set of similar alternatives in (98b) and
(98c).
(98) a. No one won.
b. {NO x, participated(x), NO x, > }
c. {NO x, ¬ participated(x), NO x, ⊥}
The result of applying the epistemic similarity principle to the set in (98b) is the existential in-
ference in (99): the speaker doesn’t believe that no one participated, which can then be strength-
ened to the speaker believes that someone participated.
(99) Bs[NO x, PARTICIPATED(x)↔ NO x,>] =
Bs[NO x, PARTICIPATED(x)↔ ⊥] =
¬Bs[NO x, PARTICIPATED(x)] =
Bs¬[NO x, PARTICIPATED(x)] =
Bs[∃x, PARTICIPATED(x)]
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The result of applying it to (99c) is, instead, is the universal inference in (100): the speaker
believes that everyone participated.
(100) Bs[NO x,¬PARTICIPATED(x)↔ NO x,⊥] =
Bs[NO x,¬PARTICIPATED(x)↔ >] =
Bs[NO x,¬PARTICIPATED(x)] =
Bs[∀x, PARTICIPATED(x)]
Notice that the universal inference crucially comes from the set of similar alternatives that con-
tains the negated alternative, which Chemla (in preparation) only assumes for presuppositions.
In the case of every we do not have such alternative (i.e., we do not have ¬some), hence we can
only obtain the existential inference. To see this consider (101a) with the only possible set of
similar alternatives in (101b).
(101) No student did all of the readings.
(101) {NO x, SOME, NO x, > }
From (101b) we can only obtain the existential inference that the speaker doesn’t believes that
no student did some of the readings as shown in (102).
(102) Bs[NO x, SOME ↔ NO x,>] =
Bs[NO x, SOME ↔ ⊥] =
¬Bs[NO x, SOME] =
Bs¬[NO x, SOME] =
Bs[∃x, SOME]
In sum, by assuming different alternatives for presuppositions and strong scalar items Chemla
(in preparation) can account for the difference between scalar implicatures and presuppositions
in the acceptance of the universal projection inference in the case of the scope of negative quan-
tifiers. I can see two problems in connection with this: first, contrary to the present proposal,
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Chemla’s (in preparation) system can never predict a universal inference for the case of scalar
implicatures. I argued above, however, that a sentence like (103a) has (103b) as an inference.
(103) a. None of these teachers killed all of their students.
b. All of these teachers killed some of their students.
Furthermore, it is unclear why, given the motivations in chapter 3, section 3.5 we should not
also have not every as a scale mate of no. Recall, in particular, that a sentence with not every
in (104a) must have the alternative with no in (104b) in order to account for the inference from
(104a) to (104c).
(104) a. Not every student came.
b. No student came.
c. Some student came.
Furthermore, if we accept the arguments for the decomposition of no into negation plus indef-
inite (cf. CHAPTER 3, section 3.5), not some, it is unclear how to block the transformation of
sentences containing no (=not some) so that it does not create sentential alternatives with not ev-
ery (substituting every for some in the scope of negation). We could of course add to Chemla’s
(in preparation) system the assumption that not every is in fact a scale mate of no and we would
obtain the universal inference in (103b). To see this consider the set of alternatives in (105b)
that we would obtain by further replacing NO in the set in (105a) with NOT EVERY.
(105) a. {NO x, SOME, NO x, > }
b. {NOT EVERY x, SOME, NOT EVERY x, > }
Applying the epistemic similarity principle to (105b) we obtain (106): the speaker believes that
everyone did some of the readings.
(106) Bs[NOT EVERYx, SOME]↔ Bs[NOT EVERYx,>] =
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Bs[NOT EVERYx, SOME]↔ Bs[⊥] = ¬Bs[NOT EVERYx, SOME] =
Bs¬[NOT EVERYx, SOME] = Bs[EVERYx, SOME]
We can, therefore, amend Chemla’s (in preparation) system so as to obtain the inference in
(103b), however the account that the offers for the difference between between presuppositions
and scalar implicatures in the robustness of acceptance of the universal inference would be lost.
The fact that the present proposal can account both for the possibility of the inference in (103b)
and the difference between scalar implicatures and presuppositions is an argument in its favor.
A second difference regards the fact that the present proposal predicts an asymmetry be-
tween nuclear scope and restrictor of negative quantifiers in that soft presuppositions project
universally from the former but not from the latter. In other words, the inference in (107c) is
predicted from (107a) but not from (107b).
(107) a. No student won.
b. No student who won celebrated.
c. Every student won.
This prediction appears intuitively correct. Furthermore, Chemla (2009b) also tested cases like
(107b) in his experiments and while the results are less clear than in cases like (107a), they
suggest that (107c) is accepted much less from (107b) than from (107a). This asymmetry is,
however, not accounted for by Chemla (in preparation) and other recent accounts I am aware
of.
The third aspect that distinguishes the present proposal from Chemla (in preparation) ac-
count is that the former is explicitly restricted to soft presuppositions and this can account for
the context dependence of the former versus the latter and their difference in the case of quan-
tificational sentences.30
Finally, the fourth difference regards the fact that the present proposal is based on the gram-
30Notice that one could restrict also Chemla (in preparation) account to soft presuppositions. If one doesn’t,
however, one has to provide a different way to account for the differences between soft and hard presuppositions
with respect to context dependence and projection (see Chemla in preparation:p.41 for discussion).
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matical theory of scalar implicature. As I have shown in this chapter, in particular the assump-
tion of exhaustivity operators projected in the syntax predicts the intervention effects of soft
presuppositions. In so far that this account of intervention can be shown to be successful, it
constitutes an argument for the present syntactic-semantic approach against a purely pragmatic
alternative like Chemla in preparation.
Summing up, I followed the idea in Chemla 2009a, but proposed to develop it differently
from the alternative route explored in Chemla in preparation. As discussed above, the contri-
butions of the present proposal are: first, the alternatives for negative quantifiers proposed here
make better predictions both for the case of scalar implicatures and for that of soft presupposi-
tions from scopes and restrictors of negative quantifiers. Second, restricting the theory to soft
presuppositions, we can account for the differences between them and hard presuppositions.
Third, assuming a difference between scalar implicatures and soft presuppositions in terms of
the notion of obligatory implicatures, we can, in turn, account for their different behavior. Fi-
nally, the fact that the proposal here is based on an exhaustivity operator in the syntax allows an
account of the intervention effects of soft presuppositions.
4.6 Appendix B: comparison with Fox 2012
4.6.1 A sketch of the theory
Fox (2008, 2012b) proposes a trivalent theory of presupposition projection, focusing in partic-
ular on how it can account for the complex pattern of projection of presuppositions embedded
in the nuclear scope of quantificational sentences. In CHAPTER 5, I summarize the trivalent
approach to presupposition projection in detail, here I want to focus just on one aspect of the
proposal by Fox (2012b), namely the way he accounts for the differences between soft and hard
presuppositions.31 Recall that there are two main differences a theory of presuppositions should
account for: first, soft presuppositions appear to be easily suspendable in explicit ignorance con-
31Fox (2008, 2012b) also proposes a version of his account based on a bivalent, rather than trivalent, semantics,
which reproduces and extends the predictions of the trivalent semantics account at the pragmatic level. For our
purposes the differences between the two versions are not important, so I will disregard them here.
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texts, while hard presuppositions do not (cf. CHAPTER 3). This is exemplified by (108a) and
(108b).
(108) a. I don’t know whether John ended up participating in the race. But if he won, he
will celebrate tonight.
b. I don’t know whether anybody read that book. #But if it was John, we should
ask him what he thinks about it.
Second, as discussed in CHAPTER 3, soft and hard presuppositions appear to project differently
in quantificational sentences: while the latter uniformly project universally, the projection of the
former depends on the quantifier involved (Chemla 2009b and Charlow (2009)). In particular,
when embedded under a quantifier like no or some the presupposition of strong triggers like also
appears to always project universally: both (109a) and (109b) tend to give rise to the inference
in (109c).
(109) a. None of these ten boys also smokes Marlboro.
b. Some of these ten boys also smokes Marlboro.
c. Each of these ten boys smoke something other than Marlboro.
On the other hand, soft triggers like stop appear to project differently from the scope of no and
the one of some: while (110a) tends to give rise to the inference in (110c), (110b) does not.32
(110) a. None of these ten boys stopped smoking.
b. Some of these ten boys stopped smoking.
c. Each of these ten boys used to smoke.
The proposal on how to account for such differences is based on two ideas. The first idea is that
32Fox (2012b) also argues that there is another dimension of variation, which comes from individual differences
among different speakers (see also Sudo et al. to appear). He furthermore proposes that we can account for the
speaker’s variability by assuming a preference with respect to whether a speaker is willing to locally accommodate
or not. I will disregard this part of the proposal here and leave for further research how to account for speakers’
variability in the account proposed here.
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presuppositions are suspended by the use of a local accommodation operator, the (A)ssertion-
operator (Beaver and Krahmer (2001)).33 I refer the reader to CHAPTER 5 for the details on
the semantics of the A-operator, for our purposes here, it is enough to know that applying A
to a sentence φ with presupposition p is equivalent to asserting the conjunction of φ and p.
The idea is that a sentence like (111a) does not have the presupposition that Paul participated
because it has an A-operator in the antecedent, which makes it equivalent to (111b).
(111) I don’t know whether Paul participated or not.
a. But If A[he won], he will celebrate tonight.
b. But if he participated and won, he will celebrate tonight.
Furthermore, Fox (2012b) shows that the A-operator can also account for the difference be-
tween quantifiers. His accounts, in fact, predicts uniform universal projection of presuppositions
(given a principle of presupposition strengthening), however through the use of the A-operator
one can also account for the differences between quantifiers, in particular for the non universal
projection in cases like (110b) above.
The second idea is that the difference between soft and hard presuppositions has to do with
the fact that the former can be locally accommodated and the latter cannot. In the system he
proposes, this means assuming a constraint along the lines of (116).34
33Fox (2012b) calls it the “B” operator, as the original idea was proposed by the logician Dmitri Bochvar.
34As Fox (2012b) acknowledges in fn.19, the condition that the A-operator cannot be applied to strong triggers
cannot be as simple as (116). The problem is that we want to allow cases of suspension of soft presuppositions, even
when a soft trigger is embedded into a strong one. For instance in (112a), where stop appears in the scope of also,
we nonetheless need to insert the A operator in order to suspend the presupposition of stop.
(112) I know John stopped drinking. I don’t know whether he used to smoke too.
a. But if he also stopped smoking, he must be very proud of himself.
b. But if A[he [also [stopped smoking]]], he must be very proud of himself.
Fox (2012b) suggests that we co-index the A-operator with the soft trigger, the presupposition of which we want to
locally accommodate. The constraint in (116) could be then modified as (113).
(113) The A-operator cannot be co-indexed with a strong trigger and applied to a constituent that contains it.
As I discuss in Romoli 2012, the indexing between the A-operator and its trigger is independently motivated, if we
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(116) The A-operator cannot be applied to constituents that contain a strong trigger.
As he shows, given (116) the system can account for the differences in suspension and projec-
tion between strong and hard presuppositions. In brief, (117) would be infelicitous because we
cannot insert the A-operator and (118a) would only have the universal inference in (118b) for
the same reason.
(117) I don’t know whether anybody read that book.
#But if it was John, we should ask him what he thinks about it.
(118) a. Some of these ten boys also smokes Marlboro.
b. Each of these ten boys smoke something other than Marlboro.
Let us now turn to a brief comparison between this system and the proposal outlined in CHAP-
TER 2 and 3.
4.6.2 Comparison
The main point in favor of the account proposed in CHAPTER 3 and CHAPTER 4 regards the
fact that the use of alternatives for soft triggers provides an account of puzzling cases of in-
teractions between soft presuppositions and regular scalar implicatures (CHAPTER 4 section
4.3). Furthermore, the use of the exhaustivity operator also allows an account of intervention
effects by soft presuppositions in the licensing of negative polarity items (CHAPTER 4 SECTION
want to maintain an account of conflicting presuppositions in disjunctions via local accommodation, that is, if we
want to analyze (114a) as (114b) (see Soames 1979, Heim 1983 and Beaver and Krahmer (2001) for discussion).
(114) a. John stopped smoking or he started smoking.
b. [A[John stopped smoking] or A[John started smoking]]
The argument for co-indexing the A-operator and its trigger comes from cases like (115), where the only presuppo-
sition that we want to suspend is the one of stop and not the one of being upset (that John left the country) or too
(that somebody else salient left the country).
(115) If either John stopped being upset that he left the country too or he started being upset that he left the
country too, he will let us know soon.
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4.2) and it is not obvious to me how to reproduce these two accounts without alternatives and
exhaustification.
Another point regards the fact that the present account predicts that soft presuppositions
project differently from the nuclear scope and from the restrictor of universal and negative
quantifiers (CHAPTER 3, SECTION 3.5). In particular, it predicts that (119a) can give rise to
(119c), while (119b) cannot, in line with intuitions and the results in Chemla 2009b.
(119) a. No student in my class stopped smoking.
b. No student in my class who stopped smoking regrets it.
c. Every student in my class used to smoke.
Fox (2012b) does not talk about the predictions of his system with respect to restrictors, but as
far as I can see no difference is predicted between (119a) and (119b).
Finally, as Fox (2012b) observes, under downward entailing operators like negation the
reading in which the presupposition is locally accommodated is marked and it is felicitous only
with a continuation that forces that reading.
(120) John didn’t win the race. He didn’t participated.
Under the proposal here, the markedness of (120) follows with no extra assumptions from the
independently motivated minimize weakness condition, repeated in (121). The reason is that in
order to suspend (120) we need to exhaustify below negation, which is vacuous, thus against
the condition in (121).
(121) Minimize Weakness: Do not insert EXH in a sentence S if it leads to an equivalent or
weaker meaning than S without it.
Fox (2012b:p.22-23) proposes two possible conditions on the insertion of the A-operator, but
they are not independently motivated like (121).35
35Both conditions he proposes can, however, account for another difference between the markedness of (120)
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4.7 Appendix C
In this section, I first show that (124) analyzed as (125) gives rise to a contradictory meaning
and then I show the same for the case of because in (126), with the LF in (127).
(124) Theo didn’t play the guitar and drink any coffee.
(125) EXHiEXHj[¬[Theo play the guitar andj drink anyi coffee]]
(126) You are not mad at Peter because he broke anything
(127) EXHiEXHj[¬[You are mad at Peter becausej he broke anythingi]]
Let me simplify the notation and write (124) as the negated conjunction of (128a) and (128b),
where {a,b} stands for the domain of quantification of the NPI.
(128) a. Theo played the guitar = p
b. Theo drank any coffee = ∃x{a,b}
We start with the exhaustification associated to and with respect to its scalar alternatives in (129)
and we obtain (130).
(129) Alt =
 ¬[p∧ ∃{a,b}]¬[p∨ ∃{a,b}]

(130) ¬[p∧ ∃{a,b}]∧ (p∨ ∃{a,b})
and (122), which also needs the insertion of A in his account, but that doesn’t need a continuation in order to be
felicitous.
(122) Some of our students won.
(122) is not a problem in the present account because it does not require exhaustification and it only gives rise to the
existential inference that some of our students participated. Notice that, contrary to the system in Fox (2012b), the
proposal here does not predict that (122) can ever have a universal inference in (123). It is unclear to me, however,
that (122) can ever give rise to the inference in (123).
(123) Each of our students participated.
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We then exhaustify any with respect to its domain alternatives in (131), we negate them all and
we obtain (132).
(131) Alt =

¬[p∧ ∃{a,b}]∧ [p∨ ∃{a,b}]
¬[p∧ ∃{a}]∧ [p∨ ∃{a}]
¬[p∧ ∃{b}]∧ [p∨ ∃{b}]

(132) ¬[p∧ ∃{a,b}]∧ [p∨ ∃{a,b}]∧
¬[¬[p∧ ∃{a}]∧ [p∨ ∃{a}]]∧
¬[¬[p∧ ∃{b}]∧ [p∨ ∃{b}]]
(132) is equivalent to (133) and, as it is easy to see, it is contradictory. (133) is saying that Theo
either played the guitar or is such that there is some coffee in a domain D = {a,b} that he drank,
but that he didn’t play guitar and that there is no coffee in some subdomain D’ = {a} that he
drank and there is no coffee in some subdomain D” = {b} that he drank.
(133) ¬[p∧ ∃{a,b}]∧ [p∨ ∃{a,b}]∧
[p∧ ∃{a}]∨ (¬p∧ ¬∃{a}])∧
[p∧ ∃{b}]∨ (¬p∧ ¬∃{b})
Turning to the case of because, I simplify the notation also here by writing as in (134a) and
(134b), where {a,b} represents the domain of quantification of the NPI.
(134) a. Peter broke anything = ∃x{a,b}
b. You are mad at Peter = q
The first exhaustification with respect to the alternatives in (135) gives rise to the soft presup-
positions in (136).
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(135) Alt =

¬[(∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧(¬∃x{a,b} → ¬q)]
¬∃x{a,b}
¬q

(136) ¬[(∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧(¬∃x{a,b} → ¬q)]∧ (∃x{a,b} ∧ q)
We can then simplify (136) as (137).
(137) ¬(¬∃x{a,b} → ¬q)∧ (∃x{a,b} ∧ q) =
♦(¬∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧ (∃x{a,b} ∧ q)
We can then turn to the exhaustification of the NPI with respect to the domain alternatives in
(138) and the result is in (139).
(138) Alt =

♦(¬∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧ (∃x{a,b} ∧ q))
♦(¬∃x{a} ∧ q)∧ (∃x{a} ∧ q)
♦(¬∃x{b} ∧ q)∧ (∃x{b} ∧ q)

(139) [[EXH]](♦(¬∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧ (∃x{a,b} ∧ q)) =
♦(¬∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧ (∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧
¬[♦(¬∃x{a} ∧ q)∧ (∃x{a} ∧ q)]∧
¬[♦(¬∃x{b} ∧ q)∧ (∃x{b} ∧ q)]
From (139) we can conclude (140) and then (141).
(140) ♦(¬∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧ (∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧
[¬♦(¬∃x{a} ∧ q)∨ ¬(∃x{a} ∧ q)]∧
[¬♦(¬∃x{b} ∧ q)∨ ¬(∃x{b} ∧ q)]
(141) ♦(¬∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧ (∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧
[¬♦(¬∃x{a} ∧ q)∨ (¬∃x{a} ∨ ¬q)]∧
[¬♦(¬∃x{b} ∧ q)∨ (¬∃x{b} ∨ ¬q)]
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Finally, we can simplify (141) as (142), which makes it easy to see that it is a contradiction.
What (142) is saying is that there is something in some domain D = {a,b} that Peter broke and
that there is nothing in some subdomain d ′ = {a} that Peter broke and there is nothing in some
subdomain d ′′ = {b} that he broke.
(142) ♦(¬∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧ (∃x{a,b} ∧ q)∧
[¬♦(¬∃x{a} ∧ q)∨ ¬∃x{a}]∧
[¬♦(¬∃x{b} ∧ q)∨ ¬∃x{b}]
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Chapter 5
Exhaustification as a solution to
Soames’ problem
5.1 Introduction
Cases like (1), (2), and (3) are problematic for all major theories of presupposition projection.1
(1) Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too. (Soames 1982)
(2) I’ll go to the party, if you go too.
(3) Mary is in the office, if John is there too.
The recipe for these problematic examples is simple: create a sentence-final conditional with
“too” in the antecedent and its presupposition as the consequent. There are, in particular, three
problems with these cases: the first one, which I call “the presupposition problem,” concerns
the fact that (1)-(3) are felicitous and appear presuppositionless. Nonetheless, the prediction for
all theories above is that they should presuppose that Nixon is guilty, that I’ll go to the party,
1(see Heim 1983, Beaver 2001, Beaver and Krahmer 2001, Schlenker 2008a, 2009, George 2008, Rothschild
2011)
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and that Mary is in the office, respectively.2,3
The second problem, “the truth-conditions problem,” concerns the fact that a typical way of
solving the presupposition problem would be local accommodation of the presupposition in the
antecedent of the conditional. However, this predicts tautological truth-conditions for cases like
(1)-(3); the meanings obtained are equivalent to (6)-(8).
(6) Nixon is guilty, if both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
(7) I will go to the party, if you and I go to the party.
(8) Mary is in the office, if Mary and John are in the office.
The third problem, “the order problem,” has to do with the fact that there appears to be a contrast
between (1)-(3) on one hand and (9)-(11) on the other.
(9) ?If Haldeman is guilty too, Nixon is guilty. (Soames 1982)
(10) ?If you’ll go to the party too, I will go.
(11) ?If John is in the office too, Mary is there.
As a solution to the presupposition problem, I propose that the presupposition of too is nonethe-
less locally accommodated in the antecedent. As we just saw, the immediate challenge is that
this move gives rise to the tautological meanings in (6)-(8). In response to this second issue,
2Notice that one might think that the interpretation of (1) could be one in which we are presupposing that some-
body else in the context is guilty (not Nixon). As Kripke (2009) has observed, we are not generally able to do this
(cf. fn.27). Furthermore, we can exclude this reading explicitly as in (4).
(4) I don’t know whether anybody is guilty, but Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
3Karttunen and Peters (1979:fn.17) suggest an account of cases like (1) in terms of too taking scope over the
entire conditional. While this might be reasonable when too is located at the right edge of the sentence, it is unclear
how one could generalize this idea to cases of also like (5), which appears in the same way felicitous (thanks to
Yasutada Sudo (p.c.) for discussion on this data).
(5) I’ll go to the party, if you also go.
See also (Kripke 2009, Soames 2009) for discussion of these cases.
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I argue that cases like (1)-(3) are exhaustified and this gives rise to a meaning analogous to
(12)-(14).4
(12) Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
(13) I’ll go to the party, only if you go too.
(14) Mary is in the office, only if John is there too.
As I show below, this proposal provides, among other things, a unified account of (1)-(3) and
(12)-(14), the presuppositionless status of which is also problematic for many of the theories
mentioned above. Furthermore, given that if-conditionals in general are not interpreted as only-
if conditionals, I have to address below what mechanisms are responsible for the reinterpretation
in the cases I’m focusing on. Finally, as a solution to the contrast problem, I submit that the
slightly degraded status of (9)-(11) is an independent fact rooted in the relation between topic-
focus structure and the position of the if-clause.
I implement the solution using a trivalent theory of presupposition projection, but nothing
hinges on this choice.5 I use it because the trivalent theory is generally known and has been
revived as one of the serious contenders in the recent literature. Furthermore, like other recent
theories of presupposition projection, it separates clearly a basic system, which predicts sym-
metric projection of presuppositions and an independent mechanism for predicting asymmetric
patterns of projection.6 This is convenient for our purposes because it provides a way to present
the predictions of different mechanisms for creating the asymmetry. In particular, there are two
types of approaches for making the system asymmetric: a linear order based approach and a
hierarchical order based approach.7
4Thanks to Irene Heim (pc) for suggesting this strategy.
5(see Peters 1979, Beaver and Krahmer 2001, George 2008, Fox 2008, 2012b)
6The reason for this separation is the fact that the recent presupposition debate started from an attempt to explain
the asymmetric part of the projection behavior of presuppositions in a more principled way than previous approaches
(see Schlenker 2008a).
7For the former (see Schlenker 2008a, 2009, Fox 2008, George 2008, Rothschild 2011), for the latter (see Chier-
chia 2010), see also (George 2008) for discussion)
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Sentence-final conditionals are relevant for this debate, since they are some of the few cases
in which the two approaches make divergent predictions (see Schlenker 2008a, Chierchia 2010).
One might think that Soames’ cases can be solved by one or the other approach. In particular
the contrast between the sentence-final and a sentence-initial cases, repeated below in (15a) and
(15b), might suggest that a linear order based approach can fare better here.
(15) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. ?If Haldeman is guilty too, Nixon is guilty.
The trivalent theory provides a convenient way to illustrate that this is not the case: whether
we combine it with a linear or hierarchical order we make no headway on solving the problem.
Furthermore, the solution I propose in the end is neutral with respect to this debate.
The chapter is organized as follows: in section 5.2, I summarize the main ingredients of
the trivalent framework and discuss in detail why the presupposition is a problem for all major
theories of presuppositions, in section 5.3, I outline the proposal and in section 5.4 I discuss
some open issues and how to respond them. Finally, in section 5.5, sketch an alternative route
to the problem and the challenges it faces.
5.2 The trivalent framework
The basic logic is trivalent, hence the domain of truth-values is expanded to include a third value,
indicated as #. This third value is interpreted as uncertainty about some actual underlying truth-
value of the sentence. In other words, if a sentence φp (i.e., a sentence φ with presupposition
p) is evaluated in a world in which its presupposition p is not met we cannot tell whether it is
true or false in that world.
(16) If for some w, p(w) = 0 then φp(w) = #
Given the way we interpret the third value, we need a principle that guides us in deciding what
to do when a complex sentence has arguments that are non-classically valued. In other words,
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a principle that tells us how # projects. The principle that is generally adopted is the so called
“Strong Kleene principle”, the definition of which is in (17).
(17) Strong Kleene: If the classically-valued arguments of a connective would suffice to
determine a truth value in standard logic, then the sentence as a whole has that value;
otherwise it doesn’t have a classical value. (Beaver and Geurts To appear)
The principle requires us to do whatever we can with the classically valued arguments. To give
a concrete example, consider the case of disjunction with a presupposition trigger embedded
in one of the disjuncts, as schematically represented in (125b). The question to ask is how the
non-classical value of φp projects to the whole disjunction.
(18) q or φp
The Strong Kleene principle tells us that undefinedness projects to the whole disjunction, only
when we cannot determine a classical value just by looking at the value of q. In other words,
the predicted projection for (18) is the standard one in (19): if q is false, then the presupposition
of φp must be true or the whole sentence is undefined.
(19) ¬q→ p
That this result is a good prediction is shown by the intuitively presuppositionless status of
(20a), which is indeed predicted to presuppose just the tautological (20b).
(20) a. Haldeman isn’t guilty or Nixon is guilty too. no presupposition
b. If Haldeman is guilty, Haldeman is guilty.
The theory sketched up to now predicts symmetric filtering of presuppositions. It makes the
same predictions for (21a) and (21b). It is not clear that this is a wrong prediction in the
case of disjunction, but there are arguments for asymmetry in the literature coming from other
connectives (see Rothschild 2011 for a critical discussion).
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(21) a. Haldeman isn’t guilty or Nixon is guilty too.
b. Nixon is guilty too or Haldeman isn’t guilty.
Assuming that we want asymmetry, there are two main types of approaches for making a sys-
tem like the trivalent theory above asymmetric: a linear order based approach and a hierarchical
order based approach. As I show below, regardless of which approach one chooses, the predic-
tion is that cases like (22a) (=1) should presuppose (22b). In other words, the presupposition
problem really is a problem.
(22) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. Nixon is guilty.
In the following I sketch two ways of making the trivalent theory above asymmetric. Both
of them essentially restrict the material that one may consider in applying the Strong Kleene
Principle. The difference is whether we should base our restriction on material that comes first
in terms of linear order or on material that is “lower” in a structural sense.
5.2.1 A linear order based asymmetry
I adopt (and slightly adapt) an informal principle by Beaver and Geurts’s, (To appear) that
describes what the linear-order based approach does. Before turning to the principle, notice that
another way of formulating the Strong Kleene principle is as shown in (23).
(23) Strong Kleene (reformulation)
a. For each argument X that takes a non-classical value, check whether on the basis
of everything else in the sentence, you can determine that assigning an arbitrary
classical value to X would not have an effect on the overall value.
b. If so, just assign X an arbitrary value, and carry on. Otherwise, the sentence as a
whole lacks a classical truth value.
c. If this procedure allows all non-classical values to be filled in classically, then the
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sentence can be assigned a classical value.
Consider now what it means to restrict the principle above to just the material on the left in the
linear order.8
(24) Linear Order:
a. Go from left to right through the sentence. For each argument X that takes a
non-classical value, check whether on the basis of material on its left, you can
determine that an arbitrary classical value to X would not have an effect on the
overall value.
b. If so, just assign X an arbitrary value, and carry on. Otherwise, the sentence as a
whole lacks a classical truth value.
c. If this procedure allows all non-classical values to be filled in classically, then the
sentence can be assigned a classical value.
To give a concrete example, consider (25), analyzed as material implication for the sake of
simplicity. Imagine also that in the evaluation world w, φp(w) = #.
(25) if p, φp
It is clear that when we hit φp we know, looking only at material on its left, that it’s not going
to matter whether we assign 1 or 0 to φp(w). In fact, if φp(w) = #, then p(w) = 0, hence the
conditional is going to be true in w no matter what the value of the consequent is.
5.2.2 Structure-based approach
To facilitate a comparison between the two approaches, we can formulate a similar informal
description of the structure-based approach.
(26) Hierarchical Order:
8Sometimes this principle is called Middle Kleene, see Beaver and Geurts To appear.
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a. Proceed bottom up, following the semantic composition. For each function f and
argument X, if X takes a non-classical value, check:
(i) whether there is a co-argument Y of f c-commanded by X
(ii) if there is such Y, whether on the basis of it you can determine that an arbitrary
classical value to X would not have an effect on the value of f(Y)(X).
b. If so, just assign X an arbitrary value, and carry on to the next f, otherwise f(Y)(X)
(or f(X)(Y)) lacks a classical truth value.
c. If this procedure allows all non-classical values to be filled in classically, then the
sentence can be assigned a classical value.
As an example consider again (27a), and assume the structure in (27b), where f is a function
associated with the conditional.9
(27) a. if p, φp
b.
f p φp
If we consider the function f and the argumentφp, there is a co-argument of f c-commanded by
φp, on the basis of which we can determine that assigning an arbitrary value to φp is irrelevant.
This is because if φp(w) = #, then p(w) = 0 and the conditional is going to be true in w no
matter what the value of the consequent is.
Let’s go back now to the case is (28) (= 1), schematized as (29), and let us turn to see that
both approaches actually make the same problematic prediction.10
9I am using material implication here, but the same result would be obtained with the semantics of conditionals
that I discuss in section 4.2.
10As mentioned above, these two approaches make different predictions in certain instances of sentence final
conditionals (see Schlenker 2008a, Chierchia 2010). Consider (28a) and (28b), schematized as (29a) and (29b).
Notice that these cases are very similar to Soames’, but crucially the position of the sentence with “too” and its
presupposition are swapped: the latter is now in the antecedent and the former is in the consequent.
(28) a. If Haldeman is guilty, Nixon is guilty too.
b. Nixon is guilty too, if Haldeman is guilty.
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(31) Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
(32) p, if φp
5.2.3 Soames’ cases are problematic no matter what
Soames’ cases are problematic for the hierarchical order based approach because there is no co-
argument of φp c-commanded by φp on the basis of which we could determine whether any
arbitrary assignment to φp would be irrelevant. The presupposition of φp is hence wrongly
predicted to project to the whole conditional.11
(35)
p
f φp
The linear order based approach does not fare better here: the projection predicted for a sentence-
final conditional like (36a) is (36b).
(29) a. if p, φp
b. φp, if p
The linear-order based approach correctly predicts that (29a) should be presuppositionless. In fact, on the basis of
the material on the left we can determine that giving an arbitrary value to the consequent has no overall effect on
the truth-value of the whole conditional. On the other hand, in the sentence final case in (29b) there is no material
on the left; the linear order approach, thus, predicts that the presupposition of φp projects to the whole disjunction.
The hierarchical order predicts no difference between the two cases. In fact the antecedent is a co-argument of f and
it is c-commanded by the consequent, regardless of the linear order, so we can always take it into consideration.
(30) a.
φp f p
b.
f p φp
11Notice that the case of only if is also problematic for this approach because, wherever only is merged, there is
no apparent reason why it should change the relevant structural relation between antecedent and consequent.
(33)
only
p
f φp
Furthermore only seems to let presupposition go through in general as (34) shows.
(34) a. Only John likes his car.
b.  John has a car.
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(36) a. q, if φp
b. ¬q→ p
This is because if q is true in some w, we can determine that the whole conditional is true
in that world, regardless of the value of the antecedent. This means that the undefinedness of
the antecedent projects to the whole conditional only if the consequent is false. Applying this
to Soames’ case, which has the form in (37a), the predicted presupposition is (37b), which is
equivalent to (37c).
(37) a. p, if φp
b. ¬p→ p
c. p
Crucially the linear order based theory does not predict the tautological p → p, which is what
we would need here to account for the presuppositionless status of (37a).
In sum, Soames’ cases do not distinguish between a linear and a hierarchical order-based
approach.12
5.3 The Proposal
5.3.1 Solving the Presupposition Problem: Local Accommodation
As mentioned, I propose that the solution to the presupposition problem is simply that the
presupposition is accommodated in the antecedent. Let us first go through what this means in
the trivalent framework adopted here.
The Strong Kleene principle repeated in (38) (and its modified versions based on linear or
hierarchical order) tells us about how semantic undefinedness projects.
12Notice that while I presented it using the trivalent framework, the problem is very general and apply also to
more dynamic approaches like Heim, Beaver’s (1983, 2001) or pragmatic ones like Schlenker, Schlenker’s (2008a,
2009) and more in general to any theory of presupposition projection, which predicts that presuppositions should
project out of the antecedents of conditionals.
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(38) Strong Kleene: If the classically-valued arguments of a connective would suffice to
determine a truth value in standard logic, then the sentence as a whole has that value;
otherwise it doesn’t have a classical value. (Beaver and Geurts To appear)
The question is how to connect this notion to a more pragmatic notion of presupposition, in the
sense of Stalnaker (1978). Stalnaker (1978) himself suggests a way to do this, by proposing
that utterances should express propositions that have a (classical) truth-value in each world of
the context set. von Fintel (2008) formulates this as a felicity condition on the utterance of
sentences as in (39).
(39) Stalnaker’s bridge: A sentence φ uttered in a context c is felicitous if for every world
w ∈ c, φ(w) 6= #.
(39) connects semantic undefinedness and pragmatic presupposition in the sense above, as it
effectively requires that the presupposition of a sentence should be entailed by the context set
in which the presupposing sentence is uttered.
One question for any account of presuppositions based on contextual satisfaction is what
happens when a condition like (39) is not met. A response to this question from the trivalent
theory is allowing a reinterpretation of the sentence in a way that renders the presupposition
part of the assertion. In order to do this, we can define an assertion operator (A operator), that
works as a presupposition wipe-out tool in the system (Beaver and Krahmer 2001). I turn to
this task now.
The semantics of the A operator is in (40).
(40) [[A]](φ)(w)
= 1 if φ(w) = 1
= 0 if φ(w) 6= 1
(40), together with Stalnaker’s bridge, makes adding theA operator equivalent to asserting the
presupposition; for any sentenceφp,A(φp) = p∧φp. In a context in which Stalnaker’s bridge
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is not met, we have the option of reinterpreting the sentence with an A operator. Furthermore,
the A operator is an operator that can be merged at any scope site in the sentence, which also
raises the question about the scope position where A is merged relative to other operators in the
sentence. Suppose a sentence like (41) is uttered in a context in which Stalnaker’s bridge is not
met.
(41) John doesn’t drive his Ferrari to school. He doesn’t want to show off.
One way to reinterpret (41) is by merging the A operator globally and obtaining the intuitively
correct meaning in (42).
(42) A[¬[John drives his Ferrari to school]] = John has a Ferrari and doesn’t drive it to
school.
Suppose instead that the same sentence is uttered in the same context but with a different con-
tinuation as in (43).
(43) John doesn’t drive his Ferrari to school. He doesn’t have one.
Here globally merging the operator would create a meaning that is in contradiction with the
continuation. However, we also have the option of locally mergingA and obtaining the meaning
in (44), which is instead compatible with John not having a Ferrari: what (44) says is that either
he doesn’t have a Ferrari or he doesn’t drive it to school.
(44) ¬[A[John drives his Ferrari to school]] = It’s not true that [John has a Ferrari and drives
it to school]
One immediate question for accounts based on repairs like the A operator in (40) is what the
conditions that govern its use are and what the conditions that govern the choice between global
and local merging are. This is a general problem and it is completely parallel to the question
about global and local accommodation in the sense of Heim (1983). I come back to this issue in
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section 5.2. Now that I have introduced the A-operator, let us go to back to the presupposition
problem.
As mentioned above, I argue that the presupposition is locally accommodated in the an-
tecedent. In the trivalent framework adopted here, this means merging the A operator locally,
so that we interpret (45a) and (45b).
(45) a. p, if φp
b. p, if A(φp) = p, if (p∧ φp)
An immediate concern for this approach is what to do about the tautological meaning that we
obtain. This is what I called “the truth-conditions problem” above, which is the topic of the next
section.
5.3.2 Solving the truth conditions problem: exhaustification
I propose that cases like (46a) are cases of exhaustified conditionals, with a meaning analogous
to (46b). The meaning we obtain is thus equivalent to (47), which is obviously not tautological.
(46) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
(47) If Nixon is guilty, both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty
I adopt the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures presented in CHAPTER 1, based in partic-
ular on the EXH operator in (48).
(48) [[EXH]](Alt(p))(p) = λw.p(w)∧ ∀q ∈ Alt(p)[p * q→ ¬q(w)]
Given that, as we discussed, EXH has a meaning analogous to overt only (i.e., (49)), in the
following I adopt von Fintel (1997)’s semantics for “only if”, in order to give a compositional
account of the interaction between EXH and conditionals.
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(49) [[Only]](C)(p) = λw : p(w).∀q ∈ C[p * q→ ¬q(w)]
This, in turn, will provide a unified account of Soames’ cases with and without only like (50a)
and (50b).
(50) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
5.3.2.1 A semantics for “only if”
I adopt von Fintel (1997)’s theory of only if conditionals. Again this not essential, but it gives
me a concrete way to present and compute the predictions of the proposal here. The ingredients
of von Fintel’s (1997) account are the following: first, the LF for a case like (51a) is (51b),
where GEN is an implicit universal quantifier, with the semantics in (52).
(51) a. The flag flies only if the Queen is home.
b. Onlyc [ GEN [if the Queen is home] [the flag flies]]
(52) [[GEN]](f)(p)(q)(w) = ∀w ′ ∈ f(w)[p(w ′)→ q(w ′)]
where f is a context dependent function that selects a modal base
Importantly, this semantics validates contraposition, which says that a conditional if p,q is
equivalent to if ¬q,¬p.13
(53) Contraposition: [[GEN]](f)(p)(q)(w)⇔ [[GEN]](f)(¬q)(¬p)(w)
Furthermore, the semantics comes with two presuppositions: a compatibility presupposition,
which requires there to be antecedent worlds in the modal base and an homogeneity presuppo-
sition, which requires that either all antecedent worlds are consequent worlds or all antecedent
worlds are not consequent worlds.
13See von Fintel 1997 for a discussion of the cases in which contraposition intuitively should not be validated.
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(54) Compatibility presupposition: [[GEN]](f)(p)(q)(w) is defined if:
∃w ′ ∈ f(w)[p(w ′)]
(55) Homogeneity Presupposition: [[GEN]](f)(p)(q)(w) is defined if:
∀w ′ ∈ f(w)[p(w ′)→ q(w ′)]∨ ∀w ′ ∈ f(w)[p(w ′)→ ¬q(w ′)]
The homogeneity presupposition is one way of validating conditional excluded middle, which
requires that if p, q is false then if p, ¬q is true (see Lewis 1973b and Stalnaker 1980 for
discussion).
(56) Conditional Excluded Middle: for any f,p,q and w,
¬[[GEN]](f)(p)(q)(w)⇔ [[GEN]](f)(p)(¬q)(w)
From here on, I simplify the notation and just write as in (57).
(57) [[GEN]](f)(p)(q)(w) = [p→ q]
The meaning of only is the one in (58) repeated from above: only takes a set of alternativesC and
a proposition p as arguments and it presupposes the truth of p, while negating all alternatives in
C that are not entailed by it.
(58) [[Only]](C)(p) = λw : p(w).∀q ∈ C[p * q→ ¬q(w)]
For simplicity’s sake, let us work on the case in which the alternatives inC are just the following
in (59).
(59) C =
 (p→ q)(¬p→ q)

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von Fintel (1997) provides some cases where focus on the auxiliary or on if might plausibly be
interpreted as focus on the truth polarity of the sentence.14
(63) It probably won’t rain and
a. the game will only be cancelled if it DOES rain.
b. the game will only be cancelled IF it rains.
Given the ingredients above, we can now go through the following derivation: first we compute
the meaning of “only,” which presupposes the prejacent and negates the alternative[¬p→ q].
Next, we apply conditional excluded middle and finally we apply contraposition. The prediction
is that (65a) now entails (65b).
(64) a. Onlyc[GENf(p)(q)] =
b. (p→ q) . ¬(¬p→ q) meaning of only
c. (p→ q) . [¬p→ ¬q] cond excl middle
d. (p→ q) . [q→ p] contraposition
14von Fintel (1997) proposes a more general way to handle these cases which works both with wide and narrow
focus in the antecedent. We can straightforwardly adopt it. The extra assumption needed is that in the relevant cases
one of the alternatives to the antecedent is true.
(60) Onlyc[(p[...]f)(q)]
To give an example, consider the alternatives in (61).
(61) C =

(p→ q)
(p ′ → q)
(p ′′ → q)

Assuming that in all relevant alternatives one if q one of p,p ′ and p ′′ is true, ignoring the presupposition of the
prejacent we have the following derivation.
(62) a. Onlyc [ GEN(p)(q)] =
b. ¬(p ′ → q)∧ ¬(p ′′ → q) mean of only
c. [p ′ → ¬q]∧(p ′′ → ¬q) cond excl middle
d. [q→ ¬p ′]∧[q→ ¬p ′′] contrap
e. [q→ p] if q one of p...pn is true
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(65) a. The flag flies only if the Queen is home.
b. If the flag flies the Queen is home.
The ingredients for solving the presupposition and truth conditions problems are now in place;
let us go back to Soames’ cases and see how we can apply them there.
5.3.3 Soames’ cases again
5.3.3.1 First the Only-if case
Consider again the sentence in (66) (=1) and recall that the assumptions are von Fintel (1997)’s
semantics and the A operator.
(66) Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
We can now see that the derivation of the meaning of (67a), with LF in (67b), is (68). The
derivation is analogous as above, with the only addition of the A operator.
(67) a. Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. Onlyc[GEN[Nixon is guilty] [if A[Haldeman is guilty too]]
(68) Onlyc[GEN(q, if A(pq)] =
a. (Apq → q) . ¬(¬(Apq)→ q) meaning of only
b. (Apq → q) . [¬(Apq)→ ¬q] cond excl middle
c. ((p∧ q)→ q) . [¬(p∧ q)→ ¬q] meaning of A15
d. > . [¬(p∧ q)→ ¬q] log equiv
e. [q→ (p∧ q)] contraposition
The meaning predicted for (69a) is paraphrasable as (69b) with no presupposition. I argue that
this is the right meaning for the Soames’ case with overt “only.”
15Remember that A(φp) = φ∧ p.
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(69) a. Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. If Nixon is guilty, both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
5.3.3.2 Now back to simple conditionals
Now, let us go back to simple conditionals like (70) (=1). It is probably clear by now that the
proposal is that the sentence in (70a) is interpreted as in (70b), with a meaning analogous to
(71).
(70) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. EXH[Nixon is guilty [if [Haldeman is guilty too]]]
(71) Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty too.
The idea is that it is the tautological meaning that we obtain after local accommodation that
licenses a reinterpretation of the sentence with EXH. More precisely, when a sentence like (71)
is uttered in a context in which the presupposition of too is not satisfied, we first reinterpret it
with the A operator in the antecedent. The tautological meaning, thereby created, forces us to a
second reinterpretation with the exhaustivity operator.16 The meaning of EXH that I assume is
in (73).
(73) [[EXH]](Alt(p))(p) = λw.p(w)∧ ∀q ∈ Alt(p)[p * q→ ¬q(w)]
The LF for (70a) becomes (74) and the derivation in (75) is completely analogous as the deriva-
tion of the case with overt only above. The only difference concerns the fact that the prejacent
is now asserted instead of presupposed. Given that it is tautological anyway, there is no overall
16Mandy Simons (p.c.) pointed out to me that exhaustification is not a strategy that we seem to employ in response
to other tautological meaning like (72).
(72) War is war.
It’s not clear to me that this is problematic. In fact, we can assume that exhaustification can be used only if there are
triggered alternatives in the first place and it is not clear that with normal intonation there are alternatives to (72).
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difference in meaning with respect to the sentence with overt “only”.
(74) EXHAlt[GEN[Nixon is guilty, if A[Haldeman is guilty too]]]
(75) EXH[(Apq → q)] =
a. (Apq → q)∧ ¬(¬Apq → q) = mean of EXH
b. ((q∧ p)→ q)∧ ¬(¬(q∧ p)→ q) = meaning of A
c. ((q∧ p)→ q)∧(¬(q∧ p)→ ¬q) = cond excl middle
d. >∧(¬(q∧ p)→ ¬q) = logical equiv
e. (q→ (q∧ p)) contraposition
The meaning of (76a) is predicted to be (76b), again with no presupposition. In other words,
you would judge (75a) false if Nixon is guilty but Haldeman isn’t.
(76) a. Nixon is guilty if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. If Nixon is guilty, both Nixon and Haldeman are guilty.
Notice that this exhaustification reinterpretation appears to be independently motivated by non-
presuppositional cases like (77) and (78).17
(77) I will go to the cinema, if you go with me/if we go together.
(78) A: What about John and Mary, do you think that they will confess the murder?
B: John will confess, if both of them will.
These cases are also predicted to be tautological, unless interpreted as exhaustified conditionals,
so that the meanings are analogous to (79) and (80).
(79) I will go to the cinema, only if you go with me/only if we go together.
(80) John will confess, only if both of them will.
17Thanks to Philippe Schlenker (pc), Fabio del Prete (pc) and Brian Leahy for discussion on these cases.
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Summing up, it seems that exhaustification is needed independently for treating non presuppo-
sitional cases like (77) and (78). This same strategy can be used to solve the truth-conditions
problem in Soames’ cases.
5.3.4 A solution to the order problem
Recall that Soames (1982) argues that there is a contrast between (81a) and (81b).
(81) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. ?If Haldeman is guilty too, Nixon is guilty.
It has been claimed in the literature that whether a conditional clause is in initial or in final
position depends on its discourse status as being in the background or in the foreground (Givon
1982 and von Fintel 1994). What is relevant for us is the observation that the sentence-initial
position is dispreferred when the if-clause contains new information. An example that shows
this preference is the contrast in (82a) and (82b).
(82) Under what conditions will you buy this house? (von Fintel 1994)
a. I’ll buy this house if you give me the money.
b. #If you give me the money I’ll buy this house.
EXH needs focus on the antecedent to have the alternatives that gives rise to the exhaustification
with the meaning of an “only if” conditional. Assume, further, a question-answer congruence
principle for focus along the lines of (83) (Rooth 1996) and the notion of Question Under
Discussion (QUD) which stands for the explicit or implicit main question in the discourse (see
Roberts 2004, Beaver and Clark 2009).
(83) The focus of the answer corresponds to the questioned position in the wh-question.
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It follows that the focus in a sentence like (84), in turn, requires a question under discussion
along the lines of (85).18
(85) ?If [Haldeman is guilty too]F, Nixon is guilty
(86) Under what conditions is Nixon guilty?
This, however, is precisely the situation that the generalization above says it is degraded, thus
we account for the dispreference for sentence initial conditionals like (85).19 Notice that we
are not predicting that the sentence-initial case with “too” should be completely impossible, but
only that it should be dispreferred in comparison to the sentence-final one. I argue that this
prediction is correct, as most of my informants find the sentence-initial case possible, although
they prefer the sentence-final one.
5.3.5 Summing up
I argued that a conditional like (88a) has the LF in (88b) and the meaning in (89).
(88) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. EXHAlt[GEN[Nixon is guilty, if A[Haldeman is guilty too]]]
(89) If Nixon is guilty, both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
18Notice that as a reviewer points out focus is also needed on Haldeman, as that associates with too. The structure
is as in (84): the first focus on Haldeman associates with too, while the second focus on the entire antecedent
including the A-operator, associates with EXH.
(84) EXH[if [A[[Haldeman]F is guilty too]]F Nixon is guilty]
19It is easy to show that without the alternatives of the antecedent we do not get the meaning of “only if”. Consider
a focus structure in which the focus is on “Nixon” in the consequent. Assuming that we first locally merge the A,
we can only obtain the negation of alternatives of the form “x is guilty, if Haldeman and Nixon are guilty”. The
meaning obtained is thus that if both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty, nobody else relevant is guilty. Though this
might be a possible reading of the sentence, this is certainly not the primary reading.
(87) [Nixon]F is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too
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I have also argued that the contrast between (90a) and (90b) is attributable to the focus structure
of sentence-final/initial conditionals.
(90) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. ?If Haldeman is guilty too, Nixon is guilty.
The approach here predicts no presupposition problem given the assumption of local accom-
modation in the antecedent and no truth-conditions problem, as the meaning predicted is not
tautological. Furthermore, it provides a unified account of sentence-final conditionals and only
if conditionals with a trigger in the antecedent like (91).
(91) Nixon is guilty, only if Haldeman is guilty.
Finally, it can also account for related non-presuppositional cases like (92).
(92) I’ll go to the cinema, if we go together.
5.4 Open Issues & Estensions
In the following, I discuss four open issues and how to respond to them. First, I’ve claimed
that certain cases of if-conditionals are really interpreted as only if-conditionals, and one may
take issue with that. Second, it has been claimed in the literature that triggers like too cannot
be locally accommodated (Chemla and Schlenker To appear), so why would it be possible
here? Third, I have only talked about too, what about other triggers? Finally, what about other
quantificational structures, in particular ones for which conditional excluded middle cannot be
assumed? I turn to each of these issues in the next sections.
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5.4.1 Differences with “only-if” and the pragmatics of EXH
5.4.1.1 Differences
I have argued that (93a) means (93b); in other words, it is false if Nixon is guilty but Haldeman
isn’t.
(93) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. If Nixon is guilty, both Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
To give another example, imagine a context in which we were about to enter the door of our
house and I say (94). Then I open the door and Mark is there but Bill isn’t. The question is
whether, in that context, I said something false, as the present proposal predicts.
(94) Mark is here, if Bill is here too.
Instead of relying just on our intuitions about (94), we can ask whether there are differences
between (95a) and (95b), as a contrast would be an argument against the meaning proposed
here.20
(95) a. John will go to the movies, only if Mary goes too.
b. John will go to the movies, if Mary goes too.
There appear, in fact, to be cases in which (95a) and (95b) differ, in particular when we add a
continuation that is incompatible with the only-if meaning.
(96) a. John will go to the movies, only if Mary goes too. #But if there is a movie with
George Clooney, he will go whether Mary goes or not.
b. John will go to the movies, if Mary goes too. But if there is a movie with George
Clooney, he will go whether Mary goes or not.
20Thanks to Brian Leahy, Bernhard Nickel and David Beaver for extremely helpful discussions of the data dis-
cussed here.
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The difference between Soames’ cases with and without “only” is not prima facie predicted by
the present proposal. Notice that cases like the above are also possible with non presuppositional
cases like (97) and (98), so a response is needed independently from Soames’ cases.
(97) I will go to the cinema, only if we go together. #But if there is a movie with George
Clooney, I’ll go whether you go or not.
(98) I will go to the cinema, if we go together. But if there is a movie with George Clooney,
I’ll go whether you go or not.
Notice, also, that I am not committed to the claim that a case like (93a) is always interpreted
as (93b). The proposal is that one way to avoid attributing a tautological meaning to what
the speaker said is re-interpreting it exhaustively. It is compatible with the proposal that the
tautological meaning can be also avoided in other ways in certain cases (cf. fn 24). In the next
section, I explore one such strategy and show that we can, in fact, account for such differences
on pragmatic grounds.21
21Bernhard Nickel (p.c.) also make the following two objections to the meaning predicted here: first, he points
out that there is a contrast between (99) and (100)
(99) John goes, only if Mary goes too. But even if Mary goes, John might not go.
(100) John goes, if Mary goes too. #But even if Mary goes, John might not go.
To my ears, there is a felicitous reading of (100). However, the contrast needs to be accounted for and I leave this
open for now. Furthermore, the fact that (100) may sound ok to some speakers, could be because this is a case
of suspension of entailed material like (101), which Beaver and Clark (2009) describe as the pragmatic strategy of
“letting the hearer down gently”.
(101) This ones for hardcore fans ... and maybe not even them.
The second objection regards the following reasoning in (102), which seems intuitively a good argument.
(102) a. John goes, if Mary goes too.
b. Mary goes.
c. Therefore, John goes.
(102c), however, is not predicted to follow from (102a) and (102b) in the present proposal. This is I am proposing
that (102a) means (103).
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5.4.1.2 The pragmatics of EXH
As discussed in CHAPTER 1, the grammatical theory of scalar implicature embodies a proposal
to draw the line between semantics and pragmatics differently than in Gricean and Neo-Gricean
accounts. In particular, Fox (2007) divides the labor between semantics and pragmatics as
follows: scalar implicatures are derived as entailments of exhaustified sentences, they are com-
pletely on the semantic side, while ignorance inferences about the speaker are derived pragmat-
ically. More specifically, the latter are derived by reasoning about the speaker’s mental state, as
in the (neo)-Gricean accounts, in accordance with a maxim of quantity along the lines of (105)
(adapted from Fox 2007).
(105) Maxim of Quantity: If S1 and S2 are both relevant to the topic of conversation and
S2 is not more informative or equivalent to S1, if the speaker believes that both are
true, the speaker should utter: (i) S1 rather than S2, if S1 entails S2 or (ii) both S1 and
S2, if they are logically independent.
Notice that (105) is not restricted to alternatives allowing us to (only) conclude that the speaker
is ignorant about every relevant proposition that isn’t entailed by the assertion.22 By way of
illustration consider the sentence in (107a): (107a) can be read with the scalar implicature
in (107b) or with the ignorance inference in (107c). The idea is that the former is derived
(103) If John goes, Mary goes.
The question here is whether intuitively one wouldn’t normally also assent to the argument in (104) with overt only,
given its being a sufficiently reasonable argument, despite its not being logically valid. I leave this question for
further exploration.
(104) a. John goes, only if Mary goes too.
b. Mary goes.
c. Therefore, John goes.
22A maxim of quantity non-restricted to alternatives allows us to derive only ignorance inferences because of
the so-called “symmetry problem”. In brief, the problem is that every time you consider a more informative and
relevant proposition p for any asserted proposition q, also the more informative q ∧ ¬p, must also be relevant,
given reasonable assumptions about relevance. However, if we assume that the speaker both doesn’t believe p and
he doesn’t believe q ∧ ¬p we obtain that she is ignorant about p. (see Fox 2007 and Chierchia et al. To appear for
discussion).
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by exhaustification, while the latter is derived by reasoning in accordance with the maxim of
quantity in (105).23
(107) a. Some student came.
b. Not every student came.
c. The speaker is ignorant as to whether all student came.
In case of a continuation that is incompatible with (107b) like the one in (108), an obvious
strategy for this approach would be to say that (107a) is simply interpreted without exhaustifi-
cation. In other words, it is read with the weak inference in (107c), which is compatible with
the continuation.
(108) Some student came. In fact, maybe even all of them did.
Can we apply the same strategy to the case of (109), repeated from above?
(109) John will go to the movies, if Mary goes too. But if there is a movie with George
Clooney, he will go whether Mary goes or not.
I propose that we can and that this is precisely what happens in the case of (109): when we
reach the continuation that is incompatible with the exhaustification of the first part, we simply
re-interpret the first sentence without EXH. Notice, though, that in the case of (109), this cannot
be the whole story, because if we just interpret the first part without exhaustification, we wind
up with the tautological meaning in (110).
(110) John will go to the movies, if Mary and John go.
23(107b) is obtained via assuming the LF in (106a) and the alternatives in (106b).
(106) a. EXH[some student came]
b. {some student came, every student came}
200
Indeed, I argued above that the tautological meaning is what triggers exhaustification. Now,
however, I am proposing that in the case of a continuation that is incompatible with this ex-
haustification we do not exhaustify. The question, hence, is how in these cases we deal with the
tautological meaning. I argue that we should look at the pragmatic inferences of (110) obtained
by reasoning in accordance to the maxim of quantity in (105), and that these are enough to ac-
count for the meaning of (109). In particular, the meaning that we obtain could be paraphrased
as (111), which is a coherent and plausible meaning for (109).
(111) It’s possible that if John goes to the movies, both Mary and John go. But if there is a
movie with George Clooney, he is going whether Mary is going or not.
Let us now go through how we obtain (111): (105) tells us that the speaker is ignorant about
all relevant propositions that are not entailed by the assertion. We obtain, in particular, that the
speaker is ignorant about (112).
(112) John will go to the movies, if not both Mary and John go.
What does it mean that the speaker is ignorant about (112)? It means that we can conclude
(113a) and (113b).
(113) a. It’s possible for the speaker that it’s true that if not both Mary and John go, then
John goes.
b. It’s possible for the speaker that it’s false that if not both Mary and John go, then
John goes.
This, in turn, means that, from (113b), we can go through the derivation in (114), using condi-
tional excluded middle and contraposition as before, and conclude (121d), thus we obtain the
meaning in (111), which is not contradictory.24
24To illustrate that (111) is coherent, we have to first look at the interpretation of (121d). If the conditional is
an epistemic conditional, that is it quantifies over the belief state of the speaker, I argue that the way we should
formalize it is (114): the speaker considers possible that if John goes, Mary and John go.
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(121) a. It’s possible for the speaker that it’s false that if not both Mary and John go, then
John goes.
b. It’s possible for the speaker if not both John and Mary go, John doesn’t go con-
ditional excluded middle
c. It’s possible for the speaker that if John goes, Mary and John go. contraposition
d. It’s possible for the speaker that if John goes, Mary goes. log equiv
I argue that a sentence like (122) can have the strong reading in (123a), obtained via the insertion
of EXH, or the weak reading in (123b), in turn obtained via pragmatic reasoning in accordance
(114) ♦[p→ q]
This is parallel to the cases in which an overt epistemic possibility modal is present in the assertion, like in (115),
which is also to be formalized as (114).
(115) Maybe if John goes, Mary will go.
In the case of a generic conditional like (116), we would, instead, formalize it as (117), where ♦ and  range over
different modal bases.
(116) Maybe the kids play soccer, if the sun is shining.
(117) ♦[p→ q]
We also have to look at the contribution of the unconditional whether or not in the continuation. For our purposes,
I simply assume that whether or not-p, q should be formalized as (118a). (118a) is equivalent to (118b), but given
the compatibility presupposition it also requires that in the domain of quantification there is a world in which p
and a world in which ¬p (see Rawlins 2008 for a more sophisticated analysis of unconditional, which is, however,
compatible with the present proposal).
(118) a. [p→ q]∧[¬p→ q]
b. q
Putting these two things together, I propose that the way to formalize (119) is (120a), which is coherent and equiva-
lent to (119b), with the presupposition that there is a world in the modal base in which there is a movie with George
Clooney and Mary goes and one in which there is a movie with George Clooney and Mary doesn’t go.
(119) It’s possible that if John goes, Mary goes. But if there is a movie with George Clooney, John goes whether
or not Mary goes.
(120) a. ♦[p→ q]∧[(r∧ ¬q)→ p]∧[(r∧ q)→ p]
b. ♦[p→ q]∧[r→ p]
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with (105). The latter reading is used, in particular, when the first one is incompatible with
either a continuation of the sentence or information in the context.
(122) John goes, if Mary goes too.
(123) a. If John goes, Mary goes.
b. It’s possible that if John goes, Mary goes.
In the case of overt “only” repeated in (124), on the other hand, of course there is no option of
interpreting the sentence without “only”, thus contradiction is bound to arise.25,26
25To illustrate, we formalize the meaning of (131) as (124a). This is equivalent to (124b) but it introduces the
compatibility presuppositions that there is a world in which r and ¬q (cf. fn. 23). Given the second conjunct,
however, that world must also be a p-world, which means that this world falsify the first conjunct, as it is a world in
which p and ¬q.
(124) a. [p→ q]∧[(r∧ ¬q)→ p]∧[(r∧ q)→ p]
b. [p→ q]∧[r→ p]
26An anonymous reviewer points out that a sentence like (125) is felicitous and asks whether this is not a problem
for the present approach.
(125) I’ll go, whether you go too or not.
Let me show that (125) is not a problem: I analyze (125) to as (126a), which is equivalent to (126b), but that also
introduces the compatibility presuppositions that in the modal base there is at least a world p∧q and a world p∧¬q
(cf. fn. 23)
(126) [(p∧ q)→ p]∧[¬(p∧ q)→ p]
(126) p
(125) is, hence, not tautological and just means that I will go, while presupposing that it’s possible that you come
and that you don’t come. In other words, in this case we do not need to exhaustify to obtain a tautological meaning
after local accommodation.
This strategy helps also with another question of the same reviewer about cases like (127).
(127) Nixon is guilty, even if Haldeman is guilty too.
An indicative even-if conditional like (127) appears to have a whether or not interpretation. In other words, it
appears to entail the consequent (Barker (1994)). I submit that the meaning we want to obtain for (127) is that
Nixon is guilty and that it’s possible that both Haldeman is guilty and that it’s possible that Haldeman isn’t guilty.
Assuming a simplified version of even-if conditionals, which says roughly that p, even if q means that p, if q and p,
if not-q, we would predict that (127) is not tautological and means (128a), which is equivalent to (128b), and that
presupposes (128c) and (128d) (see Barker (1994) for discussion and a more sophisticated version of this analysis).
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(131) John will go, only if Mary goes too. #But if there is a movie with George Clooney, he
will go, whether or not Mary goes.
In sum, we can account for certain differences between Soames’ cases with and without overt
“only”, if we look at their pragmatic inferences.
5.4.2 too and accommodation
5.4.2.1 Is local accommodation possible or not?
It is claimed in the literature that triggers like too are very hard, if not impossible, to locally
accommodate.27 Chemla and Schlenker (To appear) discuss the case in (133).
(133) #I talked to Ann. It’s impossible that John too will come. Ann is abroad.
The question is why (133b) cannot mean that it is impossible that both John and Ann will come
because Ann is abroad. This would be exactly the meaning that we would obtain if we could
(128) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman and Nixon are guilty and Nixon is guilty if not both Haldeman and
Nixon are guilty
b. Nixon is guilty
c. it’s possible that Nixon and Haldeman are guilty
d. it’s possible that not both Nixon and Haldeman are guilty
Putting it all together, the meaning we obtain is that Nixon is guilty and that it’s possible that Haldeman is guilty and
that it’s possible that he isn’t, which is precisely the meaning that we wanted to obtain above. Notice that, as in the
case of whether or not, we do not need to exhaustify. This fact also accounts for the observation that overt “only”
cannot occur with “even” in cases like (129) and with whether or not as in (130).
(129) Nixon is guilty, (*only) even (*only) if Haldeman is guilty too.
(130) Nixon is guilty, (*only) whether (*only) Haldeman is guilty too or not.
27Triggers like too are also assumed to be impossible to accommodate globally. Kripke (2009) shows that an
example like (132) is infelicitous in a context in which there is no salient individual that satisfies the predicate.
(132) ??Sam is having dinner in New York tonight, too.
In response to this data, it has been claimed that too has an anaphoric component that needs a salient entity in the
context (Heim (1992) and Kripke (2009)). The lack of global accommodation can be traced back to the absence of
a salient anaphoric reference. Notice that in Chemla and Schlenker (To appear)’s case the first sentence provides a
salient entity in the context.
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locally merge the A operator.
(134) It’s impossible [A[that John too will come]]. = It’s impossible that [Ann will come
and John will come]. Ann is abroad.
More to the point, why can’t we insert an A locally in (133b) and we can in Soames’ cases?
Chemla and Schlenker (To appear) propose a semantics for too based on contrastive focus. As
I discuss in the next section, their analysis can account for why it is not possible to locally
accommodate in their case above and it is possible instead in cases like Soames’.28
5.4.2.2 A semantics for too
Chemla and Schlenker (To appear)’s analysis of too has the following characteristics: (i) too
is a focus sensitive particle that requires a clausal antecedent (ii) the clausal antecedent has to
be presupposed to be true (iii) the clausal antecedent has to entail a member of the focus value
of the clause containing too. For illustration consider a case like (135), adapted from Rooth
(1992): the requirement is that a member of the focus value of [HE insulted HER] is entailed
by the antecedent clause [Mary insulted John] (the antecedent of too will be indicated with
co-indexation).29
(136) [Mary insulted John]i, and then HE insulted HER tooi.
28Notice that, as they discuss, this runs against their own assumption that too is impossible to locally accommo-
date. Thanks to Philippe Schlenker (p.c.) for pointing this to me and for extensive and extremely helpful discussion
on this part of the chapter.
29More formally, the analysis of too is the following in (135) (where [[]]f and [[]]o are the focus and ordinary value,
respectively, see Rooth 1992)
(135) [[tooi IP]]g,wo = # unless
a. g(i) denotes a proposition that is true at w
b. for some proposition p in [[IP]]g,wf
(i) p is an alternative distinct from [[IP]]g,wo
(ii) relative to the context set, g(i) entails p
if [[tooi IP]]g,w is defined than it is equal to [[IP]]g,w
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The case in (136) is straightforward; consider now a slightly more sophisticated case like (137).
(137) is felicitous as long as we globally accommodate that if Mary called John a republican,
she insulted her.
(137) [Mary called John a republican]i, and then HE insulted HER tooi.
This is derived by Chemla and Schlenker (To appear)’s analysis. In fact, the requirement is
that the antecedent entails a member of the focus alternatives of the clause [HE insulted HER].
The alternatives are of the form x insulted y, where for (137) x and y are resolved to Mary and
John, respectively. Then, [Mary called John a republican] entails that [Mary insulted John] if
we accommodate that if Mary called John a republican, then she insulted him.
Notice that allowing global accommodation of conditionals like the above, would massively
overgenerate. In fact, it is in principle possible with any antecedent, unless some economy
condition is postulated. Chemla and Schlenker (To appear) propose the constraint in (138).
(138) Role of the antecedent. The antecedent clause of too plays a role in satisfying the
presupposition it triggers. More precisely, the presupposition which is accommodated
when i denotes this antecedent should not be equivalent to the presupposition that
would have to be accommodated in its absence, i.e. if i denoted the context set.
Chemla and Schlenker (To appear:p.14)
To illustrate the role of (138), they discuss the contrast between (139) and (140).
(139) [Mary is eating popovers]i, and John tooi is overeating.
(140) [Mary is drinking Bordeaux]i, and John tooi is overeating.
In both (140) and (139) the clausal antecedent entails the clause containing too if we accom-
modate the conditionals if Mary is eating popovers, she is overeating and if Mary is drinking
Bordeaux, she is overeating. The former case, however, appears unproblematic, while the latter
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is quite hard in absence of further information in the context. Their intuition is that if one is
willing to accommodate (140), then this is probably because one already believes the conse-
quent, i.e. that Mary is overeating. But if this is the case, then the antecedent plays no role in
the satisfaction of the presupposition and this is precisely what (138) disallows.
5.4.2.3 Back to local accommodation
Contrary to Chemla and Schlenker (To appear) I am assuming that local accommodation is
possible with too.30 The idea is that once we adopt their analysis of too and the economy
condition in (138), we can account for the infelicity of (133) as a violation of (138), without
assuming that it is due to an impossibility of local accommodation. In fact, too needs a clausal
antecedent and this forces global accommodation of the conditional if I talked to Ann, she is
coming to the party and one would do this presumably only if one already believes that Ann is
coming to the party. However, this leads to a violation of (138).
Soames’ cases, on the other hand, are such that the consequent can be the anaphoric an-
tecedent for too, so no such problem arise and we can locally accommodate.31
30As Chemla and Schlenker (To appear) discuss a resulting prediction is that sentences like (141) and (142) should
be felicitous. In my intuitions, (141) is felicitous, while (142) is more degraded. I leave this as an open problem
here.
(141) John wonders whether Mary will come to the party. But its clear that if Peter comes too, the evening will
be highly entertaining.
(142) ?John doubts that Mary will come to the party. But its clear that if Peter comes too, the evening will be
highly entertaining.
Notice that (142) also raises a question about the status of “too” with respect to the soft-hard distinction discussed in
CHAPTER 3 and 4, at least in the case we use the explicit ignorance test as diagnostic. In particular, (142) suggests
that too would be more similar to soft triggers than generally thought. On the other hand, as we discussed the
presupposition of “too” appears to project differently from the ones of soft triggers in quantificational sentences. I
leave a further exploration of this issue for future research.
31One might ask why we cannot globally accommodate in Soames’ cases. I believe this relates to the generaliza-
tion in (143) proposed by Katzir and Singh (To appear) (see also Gazdar 1979).
(143) Ignorance Inferences Block Accommodation: Accommodation of a proposition p is disallowed if doing
so would contradict an earlier ignorance inference that the speaker is ignorant about p. (Katzir and Singh
To appear)
Katzir and Singh To appear provide examples like (144) in support of (143).
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(147) [Haldeman is guilty]i, if Nixon is guilty tooi
5.4.3 Other Triggers
We saw that triggers like too can give rise to Soames’ cases. also can be used to create analogous
cases.
(148) Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is also guilty.
We might be able to create these cases with again, as in (149a).
(149) Suppose we are at the beginning of the season, Shaq has just came to Boston and we
are at the second game
a. I don’t know if Shaq played yesterday, but
(?)He played yesterday, if he plays again today.
However other triggers appear to be non felicitous in this configuration.
(150) ?Mary used to smoke, if she stopped.
(151) ?Mary is in New York, if John discovered that she is there.
(152) ?Somebody killed Mary, if it was the butler.
(144) If Lyle flies to Toronto, he has a sister. #His sister is from Montre´al.
The proposition that Lyle has a sister is the consequent of the conditional thus the speaker implies that she is ignorant
about it (Gazdar 1979). The idea is that the speaker cannot go on and require the hearer to accommodate the same
information that she implied to be ignorant about. Soames’ cases provide a similar situation: we have a proposition
that is both the presupposition to be accommodated and the consequent of the conditional.
(145) p, if φp
What we would get if we were to globally accommodate would simply equivalent to p.
(146) A(p, if φp) = p ∧ (p, if φp)
However, the speaker has just implied that she is ignorant about p, so there is a clash and p cannot be globally
accommodated.
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This might suggest that we are dealing with a specific phenomenon linked to additives. Notice,
though, that in those cases the correspondent overt only if conditionals are also infelicitous.
(153) ?Mary used to smoke, only if she stopped.
(154) ?Mary is in New York, only if John discovered that she is there.
(155) ?Somebody killed Mary, only if it was the butler.
There appears to be some yet to be explained factor that makes also overt only if weird in these
configurations. In these cases we have a tautological meaning that triggers exhaustification,
however, the sentences remain weird as the overt only examples show. The present proposal
predicts that to the extent that one can create a context in which the sentence with only if is
felicitous, so will be the sentence final conditional without only. If the weirdness is both with
conditionals and only-if conditionals, those cases might not tell us much about the Soames’
problem.
5.4.4 Quantificational cases
Given the treatment above, we expect to find analogous cases with generic and quantified sen-
tences.
5.4.4.1 Generics
In the case of generics, we can straightforwardly adopt von Fintel (1997) proposal, which extend
to only in generics. The only modification is generalizing the meaning of GEN so that it can
quantify over predicates.
(156) a. Only professors are confident.
b. Onlyc[GEN[professors] [are confident ]]
c. All confident people are professors.
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The question is whether we can create cases analogous to Soames’ ones with generics or habit-
uals. I argue that we can: although in English these cases sound a bit funny, in Italian, where
subjects can appear easily post-verbally, these examples sound natural.
(157) a. (?) Only professors that are also confident are tall.
b. (?) Professors that are also tall are confident.
(158) Sono
are
bravi
good
i
the
professori
professors
che
that
sono
are
anche
also
ben
well
vestiti.
dressed
The problem is the same, the meaning predicted for (158) is tautological, something we can
paraphrase as (159). If we apply von Fintel (1997)’s semantics we obtain the non-tautological
meaning in (160).
(159) Professors that are well-dressed and good are good.
(160) Professors that are good are good and well-dressed.
Summing up, the proposal here can be extended straightforwardly to cases of generics that are
analogous to Soames’ cases.
5.4.4.2 Overt quantifiers
The case of overt quantifiers is more complicated. Consider (161), with focus on the entire
restriction.
(161) Yesterday, I met every [student that you also met]f
The problem is that here we do not have conditional excluded middle. In fact, if (162a) is true
it certainly does not follow that (162b) also is.
(162) a. Not every student came
b. Every student didn’t come
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Notice, however, that this is a problem also for cases with overt “only”, as shown by (163), so
we need an independent solution for that as well. For cases in which the focus is on the entire
restrictor, von Fintel (1997:p.43) proposes a solution expanding the domain of alternatives; a
solution that we can adopt here.
(163) Yesterday, I only met every [student that you also met]f
5.5 An sketch of an alternative approach
I have proposed an account of Soames’ cases in terms of local accommodation and exhausti-
fication. I have talked about some open issues and some possible responses. If you are still
dissatisfied, I sketch a different approach you might try and some problems you should solve.
5.5.1 Back to the relation between presupposition and truth-conditions problem
I talked about the truth-conditions problem as caused by local accommodation. There is, how-
ever, a further complication: suppose we have a mechanism to cancel the presupposition re-
quirement altogether. Even so, the problem would remain because most theories make the
assumption in (164). Hence, given that the presupposition is locally entailed, if we forget about
the presupposition, the meaning for (165a) is still (165b).
(164) Presuppositions are locally entailed: Every presupposition is also an entailment of
the minimal sentence that carries it.
(165) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
Let’s consider dropping the assumption in (164). In fact, there are proposals in the literature that
do not make that assumption at all, DRT being an example of it (van der Sandt 1992, Geurts
1999). Another proposal in the literature, Klinedinst 2010, drops (164) selectively for “hard
triggers”, which include too (cf. CHAPTER 3 and 4). Let us go through what it would mean to
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adopt this strategy in very general terms for Soames’ cases.32
Assume that at least in the case of too (164) does not hold and assume that in certain cases
we can cancel the presupposition of too altogether. This would provide a solution for the truth-
conditions problem in Soames’ cases, as (166a) now simply means (166b), which is obviously
non-tautological.
(166) a. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. Nixon is guilty, if Haldeman is guilty.
Furthermore, we would have no problem with other triggers if we assume with Klinedinst 2010
that only strong triggers do not entail their presuppositions. We expect a tautological meaning
for soft triggers like stop and this can explain the infelicity of (167).
(167) ?Jane used to smoke, if she stopped.
We would also have no problem with other quantifiers like every in cases like (168a), which
would end up meaning just (168b).
(168) a. I read every book that Mary also reads.
b. Every book that Mary reads I read.
Finally, the fact that the continuation in (169a) is felicitous and the one in (169b) is not would
be accounted for. Similarly the argument in (170) would also be accounted for.
(169) a. John goes, if Mary goes too. But if there is a movie with George Clooney, John
goes, whether or not Mary goes.
32Notice that in a standard trivalent framework it is impossible to have a presupposition that is not entailed by the
minimal sentence containing it. This is because if φp is any value different from the third value, then p must be
true; hence, if φp is true, then p must be true. However Klinedinst (2010) shows that we can reinterpret # in a way
that is compatible with the assumption above (see also Fox 2008). The idea is to interpret # as “unassertable”, which
is not incompatible with the value of the sentence being true or false. This goes back to the idea of assuming that
presuppositions live on a different dimension than truth-conditional meaning (Gazdar 1979, Karttunen and Peters
1979). As Klinedinst (2010) shows there is no obvious explanatory loss by doing this move. I cannot go in detail
here, see Klinedinst 2010 for discussion.
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b. John goes, if Mary goes too. #And even if Mary goes, John might not go.
(170) a. John goes, if Mary goes too.
b. Mary goes.
c. Therefore, John goes.
Summing up, this strategy would make good predictions with respect to the presupposition and
truth-conditions problem and can also solve some of the open issues for the other approach
above. However, it also has its own problems, to which I now turn.
5.5.2 Open Issues
An immediate question for this account is why (171a) cannot be felicitous if it just means (171b)
and the presupposition is cancelled in the antecedent? The same question arises for a quantifier
case like (172a), which should just mean (172b).
(171) a. ??Nixon isn’t guilty, if Haldeman is guilty too.
b. Nixon isn’t guilty, if Haldeman is guilty.
(172) a. ??I didn’t read every book that Mary also read.
b. Every book that Mary read, I didn’t read.
Notice that these are not problematic for the previous approach above. For instance in the case
of (171a), the meaning we would get after local accommodation is (173), which is equivalent to
the negation of the antecedent, thus its infelicity is predicted.33
(175) Nixon isn’t guilty, if Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
33If we exhaustify we obtain the meaning in (173). (173) is equivalent to (174), which is the negation of the
consequent of the original sentence, thus again it is predicted to be infelicitous (cf. fn.31)
(173) If Nixon isn’t guilty, Haldeman and Nixon are guilty.
(174) Nixon is guilty.
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Another problem is a case raised by Rooth (1992). The question is why do (176a) and
(176b) feel intuitively different? In fact, if the presupposition of “too” can just be cancelled
with Ak and it is not locally entailed, they should just mean the same thing. However B is a
perfect response to A, while B’ sounds vague and non-related to A.
(176) A: John is in the elevator.
a. B: If Mary were in the elevator too, the weight limit would be violated.
b. B’: ?If Mary were in the elevator, the weight limit would be violated.
Finally a problem arises when we turn to non presuppositional cases like (177). The question is
what is the meaning here? If we want to obtain the meaning in (178), how do we obtain it?
(177) I go, if we go together.
(178) I go, if you go
In sum, I have outlined an alternative approach to Soames’ cases. While it can resolve straight-
forwardly certain open issues of the previous approach, it has its own problems to solve. I leave
for future research a more in depth exploration of this alternative strategy.
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Chapter 6
Which Alternatives? Under- and
Over-generation in Scalar Reasoning
In this thesis, I have adopted the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures presented in CHAP-
TER 1, based on the exhaustivity operator in (2).
(1) [[EXH]](Alt(φ))(φ) = λw.φw ∧ ∀ψ ∈ Excl(φ)[¬ψw]
In presenting the notion of excludable alternatives, I have proposed to move from the standard
(2), which excludes all alternatives stronger than the assertion, to (3), which also excludes
alternatives logically independent from it.
(2) Exclst(φ) = {ψ ∈ Alt(φ) : ψ ⊂ φ}
(3) Exclnw(φ) = {ψ ∈ Alt(φ) : λw[¬ψw] ∩ φ 6= ∅}
Following Fox (2007), I have then motivated the modification of (2) in (4). However, I have not
yet motivated the first step from (2) to (3).
(4) Exclinn(p,Alt(p)) =⋂
{X : X ⊆ Alt(p) : {¬q : q ∈ X} ∪ {p} is MAXIMAL and CONSISTENT}
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In this chapter, I first discuss the motivation for moving from excluding only stronger alterna-
tives to excluding also logically independent ones. I, then, discuss how the inclusion of logically
independent alternatives also over- and under-generates. Finally, I propose a solution to each
problem and compare it to others given in the literatures (Fox 2007 and Chemla in preparation).
The main argument against both of these alternative proposals is going to be that they do not
predict the inference from (5a) to (5b). I argue, instead, that (5b) is an inference of (5a) and the
theory in this chapter predicts it.
(5) a. None of these professors killed all of their students.
b. Each of these professors killed some of his students.
Notice that the notion of exclusion that I adopt is (4), however most of the points in the first part
could be made by using the simpler (3). Notice also that although in presenting the problem
I make use the grammatical theory of scalar implicatures, these are general problems for all
theories of scalar implicatures that allow the exclusion of logically independent alternatives.
6.1 Motivating the exclusion of logically independent alternatives
6.1.1 First argument: non-monotonic contexts
As Spector (2007a) observes, an approach based on (2) predicts that when scalar items are
embedded in non-monotonic contexts like (6a), no scalar implicatures should arise.
(6) a. Exactly one of the students did some of the readings.
b. Exactly one of the students did all of the readings.
While (6b) is an alternative of (6a), given the standard procedure adopted in CHAPTER 1, it is
also logically independent of (6a), therefore it is not among the excludable alternatives accord-
ing to (2). Spector (2007a), however, provides the intuition that (6a) can be read as in (7). If he
is right, then we need a way to obtain the reading in (7).
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(7) Exactly one did some but not all of the readings and all of the others did none of them.
As he observes, (7) is precisely what we would obtain if we could exclude the logically inde-
pendent alternative in (6b). To illustrate, consider (8): the first conjunct requires that one and
only one student did some or all of the readings. This entails that all of the others did no reading.
The second conjunct requires that either none or more than one student did all of the readings.
Together with the first conjunct, we can conclude that the only one that did some of the readings
didn’t do them all and that all of the others did none of them.
(8) Exactly one of the students did some of the readings ∧ ¬[Exactly one of the students
did all of the readings]
In sum, a theory based on (2) does not predict scalar implicatures in non-monotonic contexts.
If, instead, we could exclude logically independent alternatives, we would be able to obtain
the right inferences. In the next section, I summarize two additional problems for the standard
definition of excludable alternatives.
6.1.2 Second argument: existential modals and free choice
6.1.2.1 Existentials
Consider the dialogue in (9): from B’s response in (9b), we intuitively draw the inference in
(10).1
(9) context: looking at a cake and an ice-cream on the table
a. A: What can we eat?
b. B: We can eat the cake.
(10) We can’t eat the ice-cream.
1Thanks to Danny Fox (p.c.) for suggesting this argument to me.
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However, it can be shown that we only obtain the inference in (10) from (9b) if we can exclude
the logically independent alternative (11a) and not only the stronger one in (11b).
(11) a. We can eat the ice-cream.
b. We can eat the cake and the ice-cream.
The reason for this is the fact that the conjunction of (9b) and the negation of (11b) does not
entail (10). More schematically, (12a) does not entail (12b): if there exists a world in which we
eat the cake and no world in which we eat both the cake and the ice-cream, still there could be
a world in which we eat the ice-cream alone, contrary to what (10) (= (12b)) says.
(12) a. ♦[cake]∧ ¬♦[cake∧ ice-cream]
b. ¬♦[ice-cream]
In sum, another argument for logically independent alternatives comes from cases with existen-
tial modals like (9b) above. In the next section, I present a related argument, coming from the
phenomenon of so-called ‘free choice permission’.2
6.1.2.2 Free choice
The phenomenon of free-choice is exemplified by (13a), which has the interpretation in (13b).3
(13) a. You may have the cake or the ice-cream.
b. You may have the cake and you may have the ice-cream (and you aren’t allowed
to take both)
2Notice that this argument does not apply to Klinedinst’s (2007) treatment of free choice. The argument has
force insofar as we have reasons to prefer Fox’s (2007) account of free-choice over Klinedinst’s (2007). I leave this
open here.
3The exclusivity inference that you are not allowed to take both the cake and the ice-cream can be absent. Nothing
changes for the point here, but for completeness I illustrate the case without the exclusivity inference in detail in
Appendix C.
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What is remarkable is that in this interpretation a disjunction winds up having a conjunctive
meaning. Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) and Alonso Ovalle (2005) show that these inferences
have the characteristics of scalar implicatures and Fox (2007) shows that the grammatical theory
of scalar implicatures can derive them as scalar implicatures of sort. The gist of the idea is to
apply the EXH operator recursively. I will not go too much in detail here, for our purposes it is
enough to show that Fox’s theory works only if it is based on a notion of excludable alternatives
that is not restricted to stronger alternatives but that includes also logically independent ones.
Consider the schematic version of (12a) in (14a) and its alternatives in (14b).
(14) a. ♦(p∨ q)
b. Alt1(♦(p∨ q)) =

♦[p∨ q]
♦p
♦q
♦[p∧ q]

The result of exhaustifying (14a) is (15).
(15) EXH[♦(p∨ q)] = ♦(p∨ q)∧ ¬♦(p∧ q)
Consider now what happens if we exhaustify again: the alternatives that we have to consider
are the exhaustifications of the alternatives in Alt1, represented in (16). Notice in particular the
exhaustification of ♦p and ♦q, which is done with respect to the alternatives inAlt1. Crucially,
as we are allowing ourselves to exclude logically independent alternatives, in the case of ♦p we
negate ♦q and viceversa.
(16) Alt2(EXH[♦(p∨ q)]) =

EXHAlt1 [♦[p∨ q]] = ♦(p∨ q)∧ ¬♦(p∧ q)
EXHAlt1 [♦p] = ♦p∧ ¬♦q
EXHAlt1 [♦q] = ♦q∧ ¬♦p
EXHAlt1 [♦[p∧ q]] = ♦[p∧ q]

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At this point, we now exhaustify again with respect to this second set of alternatives and in this
way we obtain the free choice inferences. This is because when we negate the exhaustification
of ♦p and ♦q, we obtain a biconditional that, together with the assertion, entails the conjunction
of ♦p and ♦q.
(17) EXHAlt2 [EXHAlt1♦[p∨ q]] =
[♦(p∨ q)∧ ¬♦(p∧ q)]∧ ¬(♦p∧ ¬♦q)∧ ¬(♦q∧ ¬♦p) =
[♦(p∨ q)∧ ¬♦(p∧ q)]∧ (♦p→ ♦q)∧ (♦q→ ♦p) =
[♦(p∨ q)∧ ¬♦(p∧ q)]∧ (♦p↔ ♦q) =
[♦(p∨ q)∧ ¬♦(p∧ q)]∧ ♦p∧ ♦q
What is crucial for us here is that the alternatives in (18a) and (18b), which are the ones that
allow us to obtain the free choice inferences in the derivation above, are only obtained if we
exclude logically independent alternatives (that is, if we negate ♦q when exhaustifying ♦p and
vice-versa).
(18) a. EXHAlt1 [♦p] = ♦p∧ ¬♦q
b. EXHAlt1 [♦q] = ♦q∧ ¬♦p
In sum, we saw that we can derive free choice inferences, in the way Fox (2007) proposed, if
we use a notion of excludability of alternatives like Exclinn. I show now that we cannot derive
them if we exclude only stronger alternatives - that is if we use Exclst. Consider again the
exhaustification of ♦p and ♦q in the first set of alternatives: if only stronger alternatives are
excludable, the only alternative that we can exclude is ♦(p∧ q), therefore obtaining (19a) and
(19b) (which now replace (18a) and (18b) above).
(19) a. EXHAlt1 [♦p] = ♦p∧ ¬♦(p∧ q)
b. EXHAlt1 [♦q] = ♦q∧ ¬♦(p∧ q)
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At this point, at the second round of exhaustificaton the negations of (19a) and (19b) are incom-
patible with the exclusivity inference, that is ¬♦(p ∧ q), obtained at the first exhaustification.
Therefore, we cannot exclude (19a) and (19b) and, as a consequence, the second exhaustifica-
tion this time is just vacuous. This, in turn, means that we do not derive free choice inferences.4
(21) EXHAlt2 [EXHAlt1♦[p∨ q]] =
(♦p∨ q)∨ ¬♦(p∧ q)
6.1.3 Summary
Summing up, logically independent alternatives are needed for obtaining scalar implicatures
in non-monotonic contexts, in certain sentences containing existential modals and in order to
derive free choice inferences. Each of these cases is an argument for moving from the stan-
dard notion of excludable alternatives Exclst to one like Exclinn. In other words, they are
arguments for modifying the scalar reasoning so as to include also logically independent alter-
natives. We have now motivated the inclusion of logically independent alternatives, so let us
now turn to two problems that they give rise to.
6.2 The Over-generation Problem
6.2.1 The problem
As Fox (2007), Magri (2010a) and Chemla (in preparation) discuss, logically independent al-
ternatives cause an overgeneration problem in sentences with multiple scalar items. Consider
(22a): beyond giving rise to the unproblematic scalar implicature that not all of the students did
all of the readings, it is also predicted to give rise to the inference in (22c). (22c) is the negation
of the logically independent alternative in (22b), obtained by replacing some with all and all
4As it is easy to show, (20) is a contradiction: either one or the other but not both but if either of them then both.
(20) ♦(p∨ q)∧ ¬♦(p∧ q)∧ (♦p→ ♦(p∧ q))∧ (♦q→ ♦(q∧ p)) = ⊥
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with some.
(22) a. Some of the students did all of the readings.
b. Alternative: All of the students did some of the readings.
c. Scalar implicature: ¬[All of the students did some of the readings] =
Some of the students did none of the readings.
However, this is intuitively a wrong result, there appears to be no case in which (22a) would
suggest anything about students doing none of the readings. A similar case is (23a). In this case
the negation of the logically independent alternative in (23b), obtained by replacing allowed
with required and all with some, gives rise to the inference in (23c). (23c) is again intuitively
not attested: if I am saying that we are allowed to take all of the phonology classes in the first
year, I am not suggesting at all that we are also allowed to take none of them.
(23) a. We are allowed to take all of the phonology classes in the first year.
b. Alternative: We are required to take some of the phonology classes in the first
year.
c. Scalar implicature: ¬[We are required to take some of the phonology classes in
the first year] = We are allowed to take none of the phonology classes in the first
year.
Notice that similar cases like (24a), instead, do not create problems. (24a) is just like (22) but
this time it is all that embeds some. In this particular case, the inference that we obtain by
negating the alternative in (24b) is also equivalent to what one would obtain with a local scalar
implicature, namely all of the students did some but not all of the readings (see Chemla and
Spector 2011 and Chierchia et al. To appear for discussion).
(24) a. All of the students did some of the readings.
b. Alternative: Some of the students did all of the readings.
c. Scalar implicature: ¬[Some of the students did all of the readings] =
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None of the students did all of the readings.
In other cases like (25a), there is no corresponding equivalent local implicature. The inference
in (25c) is obtained by negating the alternative in (25b), which is in turn obtained by substituting
no (=not some) with not all and all with some.5
(26) a. None of the students did all of the readings.
b. Alternative: Not all of the students did some of the readings.
c. Scalar implicature: ¬[(26b)] = All of the students did some of the readings.
I argue that the inference in (26c) is an inference of (26a). An argument for the existence of this
inference comes from Hurford’s constraint, discussed in CHAPTER 1 (Hurford 1974; see also
Singh 2008b). Recall that the constraint regards the fact that a disjunction isn’t felicitous if one
of the disjuncts entails the other and can help us explaining the infelicity of (27).
(27) #John is in Italy or in Milan.
In cases in which this constraint appears violated, like in (28a), Chierchia et al. (To appear)
argue that there is an embedded exhaustivity operator as in (28b), which makes (28a) equivalent
to (28c) and, therefore, disrupts the entailment relation between the disjuncts.
(28) a. John solved some or all of the problems.
b. [EXH[John solved some] or all of the problems]
c. John solved some but not all of the problems or he solved them all.
5The alternative not all for no is motivated by a decompositional analysis of no as not some and by the scalar
implicature in (25c) of a sentence like (25a), which can be obtained if we have and negate the alternative in (25b).
In other words, if not all has no has an alternative (see CHAPTER 3, section 3.6).
(25) a. Not all of the students came.
b. None of the students came.
c. Some of the students came.
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On the basis of Hurford’s constraint and the idea that sometimes its apparent violations reveals
the presence of local scalar implicatures, Chierchia et al. (To appear) construct a case for the
existence of the inference in (29b) from (29a).
(29) a. All of the students did some of the readings.
b. None of the students did all of the readings.
(29b) can be obtained by a local exhaustification as in (30a), which gives rise to the meaning in
(30b), which in turn entails (29b).
(30) a. All of x [x is a student] [EXH[ x did some of the readings]]
b. All of the students did some but not all of the readings
The logic of the argument is as follows: one creates a disjunction, where one of the disjunct
entails the other in all readings of (29a) but the one with the scalar implicature in (29b). The
case Chierchia et al. (To appear) construct is (31), which is felicitous and is compatible with
Hurford’s constraint, only if we interpret (31) as (32).
(31) Every student solved some of the problems, or Jack solved all of them and all the other
students solved only some of them.
(32) Every student solved some but not all of the problems, or Jack solved all of them and
all the other students solved only some of them.
Chierchia et al. (To appear) were constructing this argument as an argument for local exhaus-
tification, that is for the existence of embedded scalar implicatures. Notice, however, that as
said above, we actually have two ways to derive the inference in (29b): the local derivation just
presented and a global derivation, which excludes the logically independent alternative in (33)
(see Chemla and Spector 2011).
(33) Some of the students did all of the readings.
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In this case, then, proving the existence of the inference in (29b) cannot distinguish between the
two derivations. In other words, it is an argument for either the need of local scalar implicatures
or logically independent alternatives, but it does not distinguish between the two.
In other cases, however, we can distinguish between embedded scalar implicatures and
global scalar implicatures obtained via the exclusion of logically independent alternatives. Con-
sider in particular what happens if we apply the same logic of Chierchia et al.’s (To appear)
argument to the case in (34a), repeated from above: we construct a disjunction that is felicitous
under Hurford’s constraint only if we assume that the first disjunct has the scalar implicature
that I am proposing in (34b).
(34) a. None of the students did all of the readings.
b. All of the students did some of the reading.
Given that there is no local derivation of the inference in (34b), the argument, if successful,
is going to be an argument for logically independent alternatives. In sum, to check whether a
sentence like (34a) can have the inference in (34b), we construct the disjunction in (35), which
is such that the second disjunct entails the first one unless the latter has the implicature in (34b).
(35) None of my professors failed all of their students or Gennaro failed none and all of the
others failed just some
To my ears, while a little involved as a sentence, (35) is felicitous, thereby supporting the
existence of the inference in (34b), which can only be derived via the alternative in (36).
(36) Not all of the students did some of the readings.
Summing up, some sentences with a scalar item embedded into another creates an over-generation
problem. The question to answer at this point is what distinguishes the problematic and the non-
problematic cases above. I turn to this task now.
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6.2.2 The generalization
Following Magri (2010a), I argue that the generalization should be formulated in terms of the
strength of the scalar items involved; in other words, whether a scalar item is strong or weak
in the environment in which it is in and with respect to its alternatives. For instance, according
to this notion of strength, every is strong as it appears in (37a), because (37a) is stronger than
its alternatives with some in (38a). However, every is weak when it appears in a downward
entailing environment like in (37b), because (37b) is weaker than its alternative (38b).
(37) a. Every student came
b. I doubt that every student came
(38) a. Some student came
b. I doubt that some student came
In a configuration of two scalar items, one embedded into the other, there are, therefore, four
logical possibilities (where α[β] indicates that α embeds β).
(39) a. STRONG[STRONG]
b. WEAK[WEAK]
c. STRONG[WEAK]
d. WEAK[STRONG]
Let us go through each of them in turn. Consider the first configuration, STRONG[STRONG],
which is exemplified by (40), with its alternatives in (41).
(40) All of the students did all of the readings
(41) Alt =

all[all]
all[some]
some[all]
some[some]

226
It is easy to see that the alternatives in (41) are all entailed by the assertion, therefore none of
them is excludable and no scalar implicature is predicted to arise.
The second configuration, WEAK[WEAK], is exemplified by (42). This time all alternatives
in (43) entail the assertion, hence they are all excludable and we end up with the inferences that
not all of the students did all of the readings, none of the students did all of the readings and
that some of the students didn’t do any of the readings. This also appears intuitively correct.
(42) Some of the students did some of the readings
(43) Alt =

some[some]
all[some]
some[all]
all[all]

The results for these first two configurations are not problematic and are in fact identical for
a theory based on stronger alternatives and one based on non-weaker ones. As I show now,
the predictions of the two theories diverge in the other two cases. Furthermore, only one of
the two cases leads to problematic predictions for the theory based on non-weaker alternatives.
Consider the STRONG[WEAK] configuration, which is exemplified by the two non-problematic
cases we discussed above in (24a) and (26a). (24a) is represented schematically in (44) with its
alternatives in (44b).
(44) all[some]
(45) Alt(44) =

all[some]
all[all]
some[some]
some[all]

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The set of excludable alternatives is (46) and the exhaustification of (44) with respect to such
set is given in (47). As discussed above, there are cases in which such inference appears to be
attested.
(46) Exclinn(44) =
 some[all]all[all]

(47) [[EXH]]](all(some)) = all[some] ∧ ¬all[all] ∧ ¬some[all] =
All of the students did some of the readings and none of them did all
Analogously, as argued above, the case in (26a), represented in (48), has the reading in (50),
obtained by excluding the alternatives in (51).
(48) none[all]
(49) Alt =

none[all]
none[some]
not all[all]
not all[some]

(50) [[EXH]](none[all]) = none[all] ∧ ¬none[some] ∧ ¬not all[some] =
None of the students did all of the readings and all of them did some
(51) Exclinn =
 none[some]not all[some]

The configuration STRONG[WEAK] is, therefore, not problematic: it gives rise to inferences that
appear attested (and sometimes equivalent to local scalar implicatures).
It is the fourth option, the one in which a weak-scalar item embeds a strong one, that gives
rise to the over-generation problem. Consider the case in (52), repeated from above, with its
alternatives in (53).
(52) Some of the students did all of the readings
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(53) Alt =

some[all]
all[all]
some[some]
all[some]

The inference that we obtain by excluding the alternatives in (54) is in (55). As said above, this
is problematic because, intuitively, there appears to be no case in which (52) has the reading in
(55).
(54) Exclinn =
 all[some]all[all]

(55) [[EXH]](some[all]) = some[all] ∧ ¬all[all] ∧ ¬all[some] =
Some of the students did all of the readings and some of them didn’t do any
In the next section, I propose a solution to the overgeneration problem. Before that, let me
observe that it is not clear how a solution in terms of a notion of relevance like that presented
in CHAPTER 1 could be given. In particular, it is not clear how relevance could block the
logically-independent alternative in a WEAK[STRONG] configuration but not the alternative of
a STRONG[WEAK] one.
6.3 The Solution
I propose a new algorithm for computing which alternatives are excludable in a given sentence.
The proposal is based on two ingredients: the notion of excludable alternatives, Exclinn, and
a recursive procedure for considering which alternatives are excludable. The gist of the idea is
that the excludability of alternatives should not be evaluated by looking at all of the alternatives
together, but one should rather proceed in steps starting from the most embedded scalar item.6
6Notice that instead of talking about “the most embedded scalar item”, we could define the procedure as applying
at each scope site as it proceeds bottom up. This is possible as long as we ensure that we only have one scalar item
for scope site. This move would make the proposal here compatible with a theory of alternatives like Fox and Katzir
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6.3.1 The procedure
Let us start by defining two auxiliary notions, a standard notion of c-command as in (56) and
the notion of most embedded scalar item (to be refined below).
(56) C-command: A C-commands B iff A doesn’t dominate B and the first relevant branch-
ing node that dominates A dominates B.
(57) Most-embedded scalar item (first version) A scalar item embeds another if it c-
commands it. A scalar item X is the most embedded scalar item in a sentence φ iff
for all scalar item Y in φ, Y c-commands X.
The steps of the procedures are summarized in (58), for some sentence S (or more precisely its
LF) with n scalar items.
(58) Step 1: Construct all possible alternatives of S that you can obtain by only replacing
its most embedded scalar item, call this set Alt1
Step 2: Compute the excludable subset of Alt1. Call it Excl1.
Step 3: Now consider the set of alternatives Alt1 ′ , which is { [[S]] } ∪ Excl1
Step 4: Starting from Alt1 ′ collect all possible alternatives by only replacing the next
most embedded scalar item and obtain Alt2.7
Step 5: Compute the excludable subset of Alt2. Call it Excl2.
... Repeat until you exhaust all scalar items in S.
Final Step: the set of excludable alternatives is the last excludable set obtained with
the steps above, Excln.
In the next section, I illustrate how this procedure provides a solution to the over-generation
problem.
(2011), where there is no notion of “scalar item”.
7The next most embedded scalar of Y in some sentence φ is simply the most embedded scalar item in φ if we
ignore Y.
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6.3.2 Application
6.3.2.1 Blocking Weak Strong
Let us go back the case in (59a) with the LF in (59b) and apply the procedure.
(59) a. Some of the students did all of the readings
b. [Some1 [all2 [t1 did t2 ] ] ]
Step 1: we compute all the possible alternatives by replacing the most embedded scalar item
with all its scale mates, thereby obtaining the set of alternatives in (60).
(60) Alt1(59a) =
 some(all)some(some)

Second Step: we then consider the set of excludable alternatives of (60) with respect to (59a).
In this case the set is just empty.
(61) Excl1(59a) =
{
∅
}
Third Step: we now go back to the set of alternatives corresponding to the assertion and the
excludable alternatives in Excl1. Given that the latter is empty, the set that we obtain is simply
(62).
(62) Alt1 ′(59a) =
{
some(all)
}
Step 4: at this point are ready to compute the alternatives by replacing the next most embedded
scalar item and we obtain Alt2.
(63) Alt2(59a) =
 some(all)all(all)

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Step 5: finally, we compute the set of excludable alternatives of (63) with respect to the sentence
in (59a) above.
(64) Excl2(59a) =
{
all[all]
}
Final Step: the set of excludable alternatives is the last one obtained, that is Excl2.
(65) Excl(59a) = Excl2 =
{
all[all]
}
Given the set of excludable alternatives in (65), when we exhaustify we only get the attested
inference that not all of the students did all of the readings and crucially we do not get the
problematic one that some of the students didn’t do any of the readings.
(66) [[EXH]](some[all]) = Some of the students did all of the readings and not all of the
students did all of them
In sum, we saw that the proposed procedure for computing excludable alternatives does not run
into the over-generation problem. Let us now go through how it allows, instead, the exclusion
of the logically independent alternative of a STRONG[WEAK] configuration.
6.3.2.2 Not blocking Strong Weak
Consider again the case in (67a) with the LF in (67b).
(67) a. None of the students did all of the readings
b. [None1 [all2 [t1 did t2 ] ] ]
Step 1: we compute all the possible alternatives by replacing the most embedded scalar item
with all its scale mates, thereby obtaining the set of alternatives in (68).
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(68) Alt1(67a) =
 none(all)none(some)

Second Step: we then consider the set of excludable alternatives of (68) with respect to (67a),
which is (69) in this case.
(69) Excl1(67a) =
{
none(some)
}
Step 3: at this point, we consider Alt1 ′ , that is the assertion plus the excludable alternatives in
(69).
(70) Alt1 ′(67a) =
 none(all)none(some)

Step 4: we are ready to compute the alternatives by replacing the next most embedded scalar
item and we obtain Alt2
(71) Alt2(67a) =

none(all)
none(some)
not all(all)
not all(some)

Step 5: finally, we compute the set of excludeble alternatives of (71) with respect to the sentence
in (67a) above.
(72) Excl2(67a) =
 none(some)not all(some)

Final Step: the set of excludable alternatives is the last one obtained, that is Excl2.
(73) Excl(67a) =
 none(some)not all(some)

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Notice that crucially we have not all(some) among the alternatives, therefore we obtain the
reading discussed above: none of the students did all of the readings but all of students did
some of them.
(74) [[EXH]](none[all]) = None of the students did all of the readings but all of them did
some of the readings
6.3.3 Summing up
Scalar items in non-monotonic contexts and existential modals require including logically in-
dependent alternatives in scalar reasoning. However, these alternatives create cases of over-
generation. The recursive algorithm for computing excludable alternatives proposed here takes
care of the problem, while also accounting for the inference in (26c). I turn now to a further
problem caused by logically independent alternatives.
6.4 The Under-generation Problem
A disjunction embedded under a universal quantifier like (75a) gives rise to the inferences in
(75b) and (75c). These inferences are called ‘free-choice’ or ‘distributive’ inferences (see Sauer-
land (2004), Fox (2007), and Chemla (in preparation) among others).
(75) a. Everyone took syntax or semantics
b. Someone took syntax
c. Someone took semantics
These inferences arise in all configurations where a universal quantifier over individuals or
worlds embeds a disjunction or symmetrically a negated existential quantifier embeds a con-
junction as in (76).
(76) No student took both semantics and syntax
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a. Some student took semantics
b. Some student took syntax
To see how the inferences are derived consider a schematic version of (75a) in (77a) and its
alternatives in (77b).
(77) a. every(syntax or semantics)
b. Alt(77a) =

every(syntax or semantics)
every(syntax)
every(semantics)
every(syntax and semantics)

The excludable alternatives are those in (78), therefore negating them all we get the inferences
in (79).
(78) Exclie(77a) =

every(syntax)
every(semantics)
every(syntax and semantics)

(79) [[EXH]](every(syntax or semantics)) =
every(syntax or semantics) ∧¬ every(syntax and semantics) ∧
¬ every(syntax) ∧¬ every(semantics)=
Every student took syntax or semantics and not every student took both and some of
them took syntax and some of them took semantics
The problem is that the alternatives of the single disjuncts, every(syntax) and every(semantics),
are not innocently excludable once we also consider further alternatives, that is some(syntax)
and some(semantics). These two alternatives are obtained from replacing both the high quanti-
fier every and the disjunction for one of the disjuncts and, in fact, there is no reason for why we
should not also consider them in the set of alternatives. The set that we should actually consider
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is, therefore, not the one in (77b) but that in (80).
(80) Alt(77a) =

every(syntax or semantics)
every(syntax)
every(semantics)
every(syntax and semantics)
some(syntax or semantics)
some(syntax)
some(semantics)
some(syntax and semantics)

It is easy to see that the two alternatives become non-innocently excludable because their exclu-
sion entails the inclusion of the other two. As we saw above, the exclusion of every(syntax) and
every(semantics), together with the assertion, entails that some(syntax) and some(semantics).
This means that the excludable alternatives are now only those in (81) and from (81) we cannot
conclude that some of the students took syntax and some of the students took semantics.
(81) Exclie(77a) =
 every(syntax and semantics)some(syntax and semantics)

(82) [[EXH]](every(syntax or semantics)) = every(syntax or semantics)∧ ¬ every(syntax
and semantics) ∧ ¬ some(syntax and semantics) =
Every student did syntax or semantics and nobody did both
Notice that by excluding the alternative some(syntax and semantics) we conclude that nobody
did both syntax and semantics instead of just that not everyone did both. This appears to be
a reading of the sentence in (75a) (see also Klinedinst (2007) for discussion). The problem of
under-generation is orthogonal to this; the problem is that we do not predict anymore the two
distributive inferences that we used to derive with the smaller set of alternatives above in (77b).
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6.5 A first strategy and its problem
A first strategy to solve the under-generation problem is modifying the algorithm proposed
above, in order to block also the cases of under-generation. There is, in fact, a simple way to
do this, just modifying the final step of the procedure above so that instead of taking the last
obtained excludable set it takes the union all the excludable sets obtained at each step of the
procedure.
(83) Final Step: the set of excludable alternatives Excl is the last excludable set obtained
from the algorithm, that is Excln.
(84) Final Step (revised): the set of excludable alternatives Excl is the union of all exclud-
able sets Excl1..Excln.
This move does not change anything for the over-generation problem, because, as one can
easily check, in the two relevant cases, it is always the case that the union of all excludable sets
is equivalent to the last excludable set obtained in the procedure. Therefore, if successful in
accounting for the under-generation problem, the revised algorithm would constitute a unified
solution for both the over- and the under-generation problem. In the next section, I illustrate
how this procedure provides a solution to the under-generation problem and I discuss an open
problem that it has.
6.5.1 Back to the under-generation problem
Consider again the case in (85a), with the LF in (85b) and let me describe the steps of the
procedure as applied to the case here.
(85) a. Every student took syntax or semantics
b. [ Every student1 [ t1 [ took [ syntax or semantics ] ] ] ]
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Step 1 is constructing all alternatives by replacing only the most embedded scalar item, which
is disjunction in this case, thus obtaining the alternatives in (86).
(86) Alt1(85a) =

every(syntax or semantics)
every(syntax)
every(semantics)
every(syntax and semantics)

Step 2 is looking at this set of alternatives and compute the excludable subset thereof. The
results is in (87). As we will see below, the effect of the modified procedure is going to be that
these alternatives now stay for good in the set of excludable ones.
(87) Excl1(85a) =

every(syntax)
every(semantics)
every(syntax and semantics)

In Step 3, we consider the set of alternatives Alt1 ′ , which is the alternatives corresponding to
the asserted sentence plus all members of Excl. In the case at hand, Alt1 ′ happens to be just
the same as Alt1.
(88) Alt1 ′(85a) =

every(syntax or semantics)
every(syntax)
every(semantics)
every(syntax and semantics)

We are now at Step 4 of the procedure; this is analogous to Step 1: we compute the alternatives
by replacing only the next most embedded scalar item, thereby obtaining Alt2.
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(89) Alt2(85a) =

every(syntax or semantics)
every(syntax)
every(semantics)
every(syntax and semantics)
some(syntax or semantics)
some(syntax)
some(semantics)
some(syntax and semantics)

In Step 5, we collect the set of all excludables alternatives, that is Excl2.
(90) Excl2(85a) =
 every(syntax and semantics)some(syntax and semantics)

Finally, in the Step six, we compute the union of Excl1 and Excl2 and obtain the final set of
excludable alternatives in (91).
(91) Excl(85a) =

every(syntax)
every(semantics)
every(syntax and semantics)
some(syntax and semantics)

As one can see, we only obtain the alternatives that allow us to derive the right distributive
inferences that we wanted.
(92) [[EXH]](every student(syntax or semantics)) =
Every student took syntax or semantics and some student took syntax and some student
took semantics and nobody took both
In the final step, we take the union of Excl1 and Excl2 and crucially we have all the alternatives
that we need in order to get the distributive inferences. In the next section, I outline a problem
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for this modified algorithm.
6.5.2 The problem
The new procedure runs into a problem in a case of multiple disjunctions like (93), as it predicts
the unattested inference in (93b).
(93) a. Jon, Paul or Sue will come.
b. Sue won’t come.
To illustrate, consider a possible parsing for (93a) in (94).
(94) (p∨ q)∨ r
In the first excludable set we have the alternative (p ∧ q) ∨ r and this winds up being an
excludable alternative also in the final stage, given that the new algorithm takes the union of
all excludable subsets. The problem is that the negation of this alternative is problematic, as it
gives rise to the negation of r. I show this in (95a)-(95f).
(95) a. (p∨ q)∨ r
b. Alt1 =

(p∨ q)∨ r
p∨ r
q∨ r
(p∧ q)∨ r

c. Excl1 =
{
(p∧ q)∨ r
}
d. Alt1 ′ =
 (p∨ q)∨ r(p∧ q)∨ r

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e. Alt2 =

(p∨ q)∨ r
(p∨ q)
r
(p∧ q)
(p∧ q)∨ r
(p∨ q)∧ r
(p∧ q)∧ r

f. Excl2 =

(p∧ q)
(p∨ q)∧ r
(p∧ q)∧ r

g. Excl =

(p∧ q)
(p∨ q)∧ r
(p∧ q)∨ r
(p∧ q)∧ r

In sum, the modified procedure above would be a unified solution for both the over- and the
under-generation problem but makes the wrong predictions in the case of multiple disjunctions.
In the next section, I turn to a second strategy for solving the under-generation problem.
6.6 A second strategy
As discussed in CHAPTER 1, focus can affect the possible implicatures that an utterance gives
rise to (Rooth 1992 and Fox and Katzir 2011 among others). One of the example discussed
above is the contrast between (96b) and (97b): the former, but not the latter, has the inference
that John didn’t talk to both Mary and Sue.
(96) a. What did John do yesterday?
b. He [talked to Mary or Sue]F
(97) a. Who talked to Mary or Sue yesterday?
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b. [John]F talked to Mary or Sue yesterday.
The generalization appears to be that in (98) from Zondervan 2009.
(98) The QUD Focus Condition for Scalar Implicatures: A scalar implicature will arise
in a sentence iff the scalar term (with which the scalar implicature is associated) is
in a constituent that answers the QUD of the context that the sentence is part of, and
therefore has focus.
In CHAPTER 1, I showed that (98) can be derived by a notion of relevance based on the partition
of the question under discussion. For the purposes of this chapter, it is not important how (98)
is derived. We can simply assume that scalar terms can only be replaced if they are within a
focused constituent. The question is whether (98) is enough to account for the under-generation
problem.
6.6.1 The focus constraint as a solution to the under-generation problem
Notice that given the focus constraint, in order to obtain the problematic alternatives we need to
replace both scalar items. Therefore, if the focused constituent does not include both of them,
there are no problematic alternatives to begin with.8 In a case like (99a), only the disjunction is
in focus, therefore we cannot construct alternatives by replacing each. This, in turn, means that
we will not run into an under-generation problem.
(99) a. What did each of your students take?
b. Each of them took [syntax or semantics]F
In particular, we can only construct alternatives by replacing the scalar item in the focus con-
stituent, that is disjunction, therefore the alternatives that we obtain are only those in (100).
8Thanks to Danny Fox (p.c.) for suggesting this strategy as a solution to a problem set in MIT’s Pragmatics class,
Fall 2009.
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(100) Alt(100b) =

every(syntax or semantics)
every(syntax)
every(semantics)
every(syntax and semantics)

As we saw above, the exhaustification of (99b) with respect to the alternatives in (100) does
give rise to the distributive inferences.
Another possible case is the one in which the disjunction is not in focus like in (101b). In
this case the only alternatives that we can construct are the ones in (102), which are all entailed
by the assertion, thus no inference is predicted to arise.
(101) a. Who took syntax or semantics?
b. [Each of my students]F took syntax or semantics.
(102) Alt(102b) =
 each(syntax or semantics)some(syntax or semantics)

The question at this point is whether it is possible to have a case with wide focus (including both
scalar items) but which gives rise nonetheless to distributive inferences. The question-answer
in (103a)-(103b) appears to be a good candidate.
(103) a. You look happy!, what’s up?
b. [Each of my students took syntax or semantics]F
Given that the focus includes both scalar items, the alternatives will include both (104a) and
(104b). This, in turn, means that we should not have the distributive inferences that some of
my students took syntax and some of my students took semantics. Intuitively, however, we still
want these inferences.
(104) a. Some of my students took syntax
b. Some of my students took semantics
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A possible response from the strategy pursued here is arguing that in those cases in which we
have focus including both scalar terms and we still perceive distributive inferences, we are actu-
ally accommodating a more specific question under discussion than that in (103a). This would
be allowed by the fact that the intonational pattern corresponding to wide focus is identical to
the ones of other narrower focus, like for instance that in (105).
(105) Every student [took syntax or semantics]F
In sum, relying on the QUD/focus constraint can account for the under-generation problem, but
it forces us to assume that in the case of very general questions under discussion that corre-
sponds to wide focus of the answer and we do perceive the distributive inferences, an accom-
modation of a more specific question under discussion corresponding to a narrower focus not
including both scalar terms must be going on.9
9Notice that the focus constraint provides a way to modulate other possible inferences coming from multiple
scalar terms, which appear not to be always present. Recall that from a sentence like (106a) we can derive the
inference in (106b) but also the stronger (106c).
(106) a. Everybody took syntax or semantics.
b. Not everybody took syntax and semantics.
c. Nobody took syntax and semantics.
(106b) is obtained as the negation of the alternative in (107).
(107) Somebody took syntax or semantics.
The focus constraint provides a way to modulate these two inferences: only if every is in focus we obtain the
alternative in (108a), which negated gives rise to the strong inference in (106c). If the focus, instead, does not
include every like in (109), we cannot replace it, thus we only expect the weaker inference in (106b) coming from
the alternative in (108b).
(108) a. Somebody took syntax and semantics
b. Everybody took syntax and semantics
(109) Every student [took syntax or semantics]F
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6.7 Comparison with other accounts
In the following, I summarize briefly Fox’s (2007) and Chemla’s (in preparation) solutions to the
under- and over-generation problems and compare them to the present proposal. As mentioned
above, the main argument against both of these alternative proposals is going to be that they do
not predict the inference from (110a) to (110b).
(110) a. None of these professors killed all of their students.
b. Each of these professors killed some of his students.
6.7.1 Fox 2007
Fox (2007:fn.35) suggests a new definition of alternatives by which the offending alternatives
are filtered and do not appear in the set of alternatives from the start. The intuition is the
following: each scalar alternative ψ of ϕ is obtained from ϕ by a sequence of steps; at each
step, only one scalar item can be replaced; and a replacement is licit unless it leads to something
weaker.
(111) The set Alt(ϕ) is recursively defined as follows:
a. ϕ ∈ Alt(ϕ);
b. ψ1 ∈ Alt(ϕ) iff there is ψ2 ∈ Alt(ϕ) such that ψ1 is not weaker than ψ2 and
furthermore ψ2 is obtained from ψ1 by replacing a single scalar item in ψ1 with
a Horn-mate.
6.7.1.1 Predictions
It is easy to see that this procedure cannot construct the problematic logically independent
alternative in (113) for a WEAK[STRONG] configuration like (112).
(112) Some of the students did all of the readings.
(113) All of the students did some of the readings.
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This is because there is no way to replace one scalar item at a time in (112) and construct (113),
without also going from stronger to weaker alternatives. To illustrate, consider the options that
we have in constructing alternatives from (112): first, we cannot replace all in (112), because
we would obtain the weaker alternative (114).
(114) Some of the students did some of the readings.
The only other option is replacing some in (112). In this way, we obtain the alternative in
(115), which is stronger than (112), therefore it is a licit alternative. (115), however, is also
stronger than (113), therefore, we know we cannot obtain (113) from (115) (by replacing the
most embedded all).
(115) All of the students did all of the readings.
Analogously, it is easy to see that in the same way the procedure does not allow us to construct
the unproblematic alternative in (117) for a STRONG[WEAK] configuration like (116).
(116) All of the students did some of the readings.
(117) Some of the students did all of the readings.
This is because, we cannot replace some in (116) or we would obtain the weaker alternative in
(118).
(118) Some of the students did some of the readings.
The only option is replacing some with all. This gives rise to the alternative in (119), which,
however, is stronger than (117), so we know that from (119) we cannot construct (117).
(119) All of the students did all of the readings.
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Finally, the procedure also blocks the alternatives that create the under-generation problem:
consider the case in (120) repeated from above.
(120) Every student took syntax or semantics
Remember that the problematic alternatives where the ones in (121a) and (121b). Consider
(121a): we need to make two replacements to obtain it, replacing disjunction with one of its
disjuncts and replacing every with some. It is easy to see that no matter where we start from,
we cannot get it with Fox’s procedure.
(121) a. Some student took syntax
b. Some student took semantics
This is because if we start by replacing every with some we obtain (122a), which is weaker than
(120). If we start by replacing disjunction with one of its disjunct we obtain (122b), which is
stronger than (120). However, if we now replace every in (122b) with some we obtain (122c),
which is weaker than (122b), thus we cannot include it in the set of alternatives. The same
applies to the other disjunct.
(122) a. Some student took syntax or semantics
b. Every student took syntax
c. Some student took syntax
Summing up, the procedure by Fox (2007) solves the over- and under-generation problem. It
blocks, however, also the non-problematic inference of the STRONG[WEAK] configuration. I
turn to this now and show that this is a problem for his proposal.
6.7.1.2 Problems
I can see two arguments against Fox’s procedure: the first argument is that Fox’s constraint does
not allow the inference in (123c) from (123a). This is because it cannot construct the alternative
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in (123b).
(123) a. None of my ten students solved all of the problems.
b. Not all of my ten students solved some.
c. All of my ten students solved some.
However, (123c) appears to be an inference of (123a). In particular, I constructed the disjunction
in (124) which is predicted to be felicitous only if we allow the inference in (123b) for the first
disjunct.
(124) None of my professors failed all of their students or Gennaro failed none and all of
the others failed just some
The fact that (124) is felicitous is therefore an argument against Fox’s (2007) procedure, which
predicts that (123c) should never be an inference of (123a) and, in turn, it does not predict (124)
to be felicitous.
The second argument comes from an observation by Chemla (in preparation). He argues
that (125c) is an inference of (125a).
(125) a. All of the students solved some of the problems.
b. Many of the students solved all of the problems.
c. Not many of the students solved all of the problems.
The judgment is a subtle one, but if he is right, then (125c) is only obtainable by excluding
the alternative in (125b). Crucially, the alternative (125b) is not allowed by Fox’s original
constraint. This is because to obtain (125b) we should replace first some with all, thereby
obtaining (126), which is not weaker than (125b). However, (126) is stronger than (125b), so
we know we cannot obtain construct the latter from the former.
(126) All of the students solved all of the problems
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Summing up, I have presented two problems for the procedure by Fox (2007). In both cases the
problem comes from the fact that the procedure blocks the logically independent alternative of
a STRONG[WEAK] configuration, whereas there appear to be inferences coming precisely from
that type of alternatives. In the next section, I turn to the proposal in Chemla in preparation.
6.7.2 Chemla 2010
Chemla (in preparation) proposes a unified alternative based approach to presuppositions, free
choice inferences and scalar implicatures. I discussed and summarized his proposal in CHAPTER
4, Appendix A, and pointed out to three arguments for the theory proposed in CHAPTERS 3 and
4. In this section, I want to concentrate on the predictions that his system makes with respect to
the over- and under-generation problem.
6.7.2.1 Predictions
Before going to the predictions in the case of over- and under-generation, let us go through
how multiple scalar items are handled in Chemla’s (in preparation) system. Recall that he
assumes a set of three procedures for constructing alternatives: (a) “stronger replacements“,
which substitute each scalar term with a stronger scale-mate, (b) “weaker replacements”, which
do the same but with weaker scale-mates and (c) “connective split”, which for any sentence
p⊗ q, where ⊗ is any connective, it substitutes p⊗ q with p and p⊗ q with q.
In the case of multiple scalar items, the question that arises is how do we go on in con-
structing alternatives after we do the first replacements on one of the scalar items. Chemla (in
preparation) proposes two constraints. The first constraint requires that when we apply a sec-
ond replacement on the alternatives that we obtained through a first replacement, we should
do it in such a way that the same exact transformation is applied to each alternative in each
subset of similar alternatives. The second constraint that he proposes is analogous to the one
proposed in this chapter and it is the idea is that the second replacement should not apply at a
more embedded level than the first one.
To see how these constraints work, let us work through the case of a strong scalar item
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embedding a weak one like (127a). Recall that this configuration is not problematic and the
procedure proposed in this chapter allows for the inference in (127b), obtained from the exclu-
sion of the logically independent alternative someone did all of the readings.
(127) a. Everyone did some of the readings.
b. No one did all of the readings.
Chemla (in preparation) also obtains the inference in (127b) from (127a). To illustrate, consider
the schematic version of (127a) in (128).
(128) EVERY x, x did SOME
In constructing the alternatives for (128) we can do three things, given the constraints above:
first, we can start from the most embedded scalar item some and substitute it with the stronger
scale-mates every and ⊥ and obtain the set of similar alternatives in (129).10
(129) {EVERY x, x did EVERY, EVERY x, ⊥}
Second, we can now apply a further transformation on the members of (129), but it has to be
the same exact transformation for each member. In particular, we can substitute every with the
weaker some and obtain (130).
(130) {SOME x, x did EVERY, SOME x, ⊥}
Finally, we can start, instead, from the least embedded scalar item in (128), substitute it with
some and > and obtain the set in (131). Notice that we cannot do anything else, given the
constraint that the second transformation should not apply at a most embedded level than the
first.
(131) {SOME x, x did SOME, >}
10We can also substitute it with the weaker >, but this creates a singleton set so we can ignore it.
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In sum, from (127a) we obtain the three set of alternatives in (132a)-(132c).
(132) a. {EVERY x, x did EVERY, EVERY x, ⊥}
b. {SOME x, x did EVERY, SOME x, ⊥}
c. {SOME x, x did SOME, >}
For each of these set, the epistemic similarity principle applies and requires the alternatives to
have the same status in the speaker’s mind. From (132a), we predict that the speaker believes
that not everyone did every readings, as show in (133), while from (132b) we obtain the stronger
inference that no student did every readings. Finally from (132c) we obtain that someone did
some of the readings, which is already entailed by the assertion.
(133) Bs[EVERY, x did EVERY↔ ⊥] =
Bs¬[EVERY, x did EVERY]
(134) Bs[SOME, x did EVERY↔ ⊥] =
Bs¬[SOME, x did EVERY] =
Bs[¬∃ x did EVERY]
The prediction for the case of a strong scalar item embedding a weak are, therefore, correct.
Notice, however that the stronger inference that no one did every readings is crucially obtained
given the further replacements of the alternatives of every. Given that Chemla (in preparation)
assumes that no does not have any scale-mate he cannot predict the corresponding inference
from (135a) to (135b).
(135) a. No one did every reading.
b. Everyone did some reading.
As I have shown in CHAPTER 4, Appendix A, for (135a) we can only obtain the existential
inference in (136) and not the universal one in (135b).
251
(136) Someone did some reading.
To see this consider (137a) with the only possible set of similar alternatives in (137b).
(137) No student did all of the readings.
(137) {NO x, SOME, NO x, > }
From (137b) we can only obtain the existential inference that the speaker believes that someone
did some of the readings, as shown in (138).
(138) Bs[NO x, SOME ↔ NO x,>] =
Bs[NO x, SOME ↔ ⊥] =
¬Bs[NO x, SOME] =
Bs¬[NO x, SOME] =
Bs[∃x, SOME]
As discussed in CHAPTER 4, Appendix A, the problem is that the system can never predict the
universal inference (135b) from (135a).
Turning to the case of weak embedding strong like (139a), Chemla’s (in preparation) system
correctly blocks the non attested inference in (139b).
(139) a. Someone did every readings.
b. Someone didn’t do any reading.
To see this consider the schematic version of (139a) in (140) and the derivation in (141).
(140) SOME x, EVERY
(141) a. Replacing the most embedded item every:
Bs[SOME[SOME] ↔ SOME[>]] already entailed by the sentence
b. Further replace the less embedded item some:
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Bs[EVERY[SOME] ↔ ALL[>]] i.e. everyone did some.
c. Replacing the less embedded item some alone:
Bs[EVERY[EVERY] ↔ ⊥] i.e. Not everyone did every reading.
In the case of a weak scalar term embedding a strong Chemla’s (in preparation), therefore, does
not over generate. Notice that it predicts a novel different inference for a case like (139a), which
is that everyone did some readings. I am not sure whether this is an inference of (139a), but it
is fair to say that it does not appear problematic as (139b) does.
Finally, Chemla’s (in preparation) does not run into the under-generation problem. In other
words, it predicts the distributive inferences in (142b) and (142c) from (142a).
(142) a. Every student took syntax or semantics.
b. Some student took syntax.
c. Some student took semantics.
To illustrate, consider the schematic version of (142a) in (143).
(143) EVERY(SYN OR SEM)
The alternatives that we obtain are in (144a) and (144b).
(144) a. {EVERY[SYN], EVERY[SYN]} connective split
b. {EVERY[SYN AND SEM], EVERY, ⊥} stronger replacements
c. {SOME[SYN], SOME[SYN]} second weaker replacements on (144a)
The inferences that we obtain from (144a)-(144c) are in (145a)-(145c).
(145) a. Bs[EVERY(SYN AND SEM)]↔ Bs[⊥] i.e. ¬Bs[EVERY(SYN AND SEM)]
b. Bs[EVERY(SYN)]↔ Bs[EVERY(SEM)]
c. Bs[SOME(SYN)]↔ Bs[SOME(SEM)]
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Given that we conclude that it’s false that the speaker believes that every student took both
syntax and semantics, we can conclude (146) from (145b): it’s false that the speaker believes
that every student took syntax and it’s false that the speaker believes that every student took
semantics.
(146) ¬Bs[EVERY(SYN)]; ¬Bs[EVERY(SEM)]
From (146) and the assertion we can conclude that the speaker believes that some student took
syntax and some student took semantics. In the same way from the assertion and (145c) we can
conclude the same thing. Finally, nothing blocks strengthening the inferences in this case so we
get the right prediction that the speaker believes that every student took syntax or semantics and
that some student took syntax and some student took semantics.
Summing up, Chemla (in preparation)’s system does not predict non-attested inferences in
the case of a weak scalar item embedding a strong one and it does not undergenerate in the case
of a universal quantifier embedding a disjunction. As discussed above, however, it does not
predict the inference from (147a) to (147b).
(147) a. No one did every reading.
b. Everyone did some reading.
More precisely, it would predict this inference, as I have shown in CHAPTER 4, appendix A, if
we amend it by adding the alternatives for negative quantifiers that I proposed in CHAPTER 3
(i.e., not every as an alternative of no). In fact, it is actually unclear why, given the motivations
in chapter 3, section 3.6 we should not have them. However, if we add this alternative to his
system, we would loose his account of the difference between the universal inference in (147b)
from (147a) and the corresponding inference in the case of presuppositions like in (148b) from
(148a).
(148) a. No one won.
b. Everyone participated.
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6.8 Conclusion
Scalar items in non-monotonic contexts and existential modals require including logically inde-
pendent alternatives in scalar reasoning. However, I showed above that these alternatives create
cases of under- and over-generation. I proposed a recursive procedure for computing which
alternatives are excludable, which takes care of the over-generation problem. I also outlined
to possible solutions to the under-generation problem and some open problems that they have.
Contrary to Fox’s (2007) and Chemla’s (in preparation), the present proposal predicts the pos-
sibility of the inference in (149b), from (149a). I argued above that this constitute an argument
in its favor.
(149) a. None of these professors killed all of their students.
b. Each of these professors killed some of their students.
6.9 Appendix A: free choice without exclusivity inference
Simons (2005) shows that there are cases of free choice in which we do not draw an exclusivity
inferences. In other words, (150a) would get the interpretation in (150b) and not the one in
(150c).
(150) a. You may have the cake or the ice-cream
b. You may have the cake and you can have the ice-cream and you are allowed to
take both
c. You may have the cake and you can have the ice-cream and you are not allowed
to take both
Fox (2007) provides a way to account also for this case. He proposes that each disjunct is first
exhaustified, before the disjunction is exhaustified twice. For what is relevant here, the same
problem for a theory based on Exclst arises. Let’s look at the derivation in brief. First, the
alternatives over which each disjunct is exhaustified are the following in (151) and the LF of the
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disjunction is in (152).
(151) Alt3,4 =
 pq

(152) EXHAlt2 [EXHAlt1♦[EXHAlt3 [p]∨ EXHAlt3 [q]]]
At the very first exhaustification of each disjuncts below the modal there is no problem. But the
problem is coming later at the level of the second exhaustification.
(153) a. EXHAlt3 [p] = p∧ ¬q
b. EXHAlt3 [p] = q∧ ¬p
(154) Alt1 =

♦[EXHAlt3 [p]∨ EXHAlt4 [q]] = ♦[(p∧ ¬q)∨ (q∧ ¬p)]
♦[EXHAlt3 [p]] = ♦[p∧ ¬q]
♦[EXHAlt4 [q]] = ♦[q∧ ¬p]
♦[EXHAlt3 [p]∧ EXHAlt4 [q]] = ♦[(p∧ ¬q)∧ (q∧ ¬p)] = ⊥

(155) Alt2 =

EXHAlt1 [♦[(p∧ ¬q)∨ (q∧ ¬p)]]
EXHAlt1 [♦[p∧ ¬q]]
EXHAlt1 [♦[q∧ ¬p]]
EXHAlt1 [♦[(p∧ ¬q)∧ (q∧ ¬p)]]

Again the crucial step is here in exhaustifying the two alternatives ♦[p∧¬q] and ♦[q∧¬p]. If
you do not consider logically independent alternatives, the only stronger one is the contradiction
(the negation of which is obviously vacuous). On the other hand if you consider non-weaker
alternatives you get the right alternatives that at the next round gives you free choice.
(156) a. EXHAlt1 [♦[p∧ ¬q]] = ♦[p∧ ¬q]∧ ¬♦[q∧ ¬p]
b. EXHAlt1 [♦[q∧ ¬p]] = ♦[q∧ ¬p]∧ ¬♦[p∧ ¬q]
(157) EXHAlt2 [EXHAlt1♦[EXHAlt3 [p]∨ EXHAlt3 [q]]] = ♦[(p∧¬q)∨ (q∧¬p)]]∧♦[p∧
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¬q]∧ ♦[q∧ ¬p]
6.10 Appendix B: scalar terms not in a c-command relation
The proposal in this chapter is based on a notion of c-command. The question is how should
we extend this account to sentences like (158) in which more than one scalar item is present but
some or all of them are not in a c-command relation.
(158) Some of the students who finished every question in the first part completed every
question in the second part.
First, we need to revise the notion of most embedded scalar item to accommodate sentences like
(158).
(159) Most-embedded scalar item (second version) A scalar item embeds another if it
c-commands it. A scalar item X is the most embedded scalar item in a sentence φ iff
for all scalar item Y in φ, either (a) or (b):
a. Y c-commands X
b. Y doesn’t c-command X and X doesn’t c-command Y
(159) can account for the cases in which some scalar items are in the relevant WEAK[STRONG]
or STRONG[WEAK] relation, while there is also another scalar item in the sentence that is not in
a c-command relation with them. This is for instance the case in (160), for which again we do
not want to conclude (161b) by excluding the alternative in (161a). In other words, we want to
still block a WEAK[STRONG] case, even if there are other scalar terms in the sentence.
(160) Some of the students who took syntax or semantics passed every first year exam.
(161) a. Each of the students who took syntax or semantics passed some first year exam.
b. Some of the students who took syntax or semantics didn’t pass any first year
exam.
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Furthermore, there is a question as to whether among the scalar terms that are not in a c-
command relation present a pattern so that we have to allow some configurations and exclude
others. The configurations here of course cannot be in terms of c-command, but could be for
instance in terms of linear order. While the judgments are very delicate, it appears that neither if
strong precedes weak nor if weak precedes strong we should have the inference corresponding
to the exclusion of the logically independent alternative obtained by replacing both scalar items.
I leave a more in depth exploration of these cases for further research.
(162) a. the boys with all of their ducks on one side have some of their frogs on the other
b. alternative: the boys with some of their ducks on one side have all of their frogs
on the other
c. Scalar Implicature?: the boys with some of their ducks on one side do not have
all of their frogs on the other
(163) a. the boys with some of their ducks on one side have all of their frogs on the other
b. alternative: the boys with all of their ducks on one side have some of their frogs
on the other
c. Scalar Implicature?: the boys with all of their ducks on one side have none of
their frogs on the other
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